Essays on the effects of united nations peacekeeping particıpation on civil-military Relations in troop-contributing countries

Official URL: https://risc01.sabanciuniv.edu/record=b3422553

How do peacekeeper deployments to United Nations (UN) peace operations affect civil-military relations in troop-contributing countries? Since the late 1990s, the UN’s peacekeeping efforts have predominantly drawn personnel contributions from democratically deficient and economically developing countries, often with a history of military intervention. In light of this trend, this dissertation comprises three studies investigating the relationship between the scale of troop dispatches to UN peace operations and the strategies adopted by contributing governments to thwart the threat of military political involvement via coups. Each study focuses on distinct coup-avoidant measures employed by leaders to secure their positions in office. In doing so, this project advances existing research on the civil-military implications of involvement in UN peace operations. The first empirical chapter examines whether peacekeeper deployments reduce the likelihood of military participation in government. The findings indicate that military-specific benefits associated with UN peacekeeping involvement can alleviate military pressure on leaders to allocate cabinet seats to active-duty officers as an accommodative institutional arrangement. The second empirical chapter analyzes how UN peacekeeping involvement can serve as a substitute for counterbalancing by emphasizing the comparative benefits of troop deployments over the drawbacks associated with establishing armed counterweights to the regular military. The findings suggest that leaders who contribute significant portions of their military personnel to UN peace operations are less likely to engage in counterbalancing efforts. The third empirical chapter uses information on ethnic stacking in Africa and investigates whether African leaders exploit sizable contingent dispatches for peacekeeping rents to embolden their efforts to dominate their militaries with allied ethnic groups. The findings demonstrate a positive association between large troop contributions and leaders’ propensity to engage in ethnic stacking.