# ESSAYS ON THE EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING PARTICIPATION ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN TROOP-CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES

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# ESSAYS ON THE EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING PARTICIPATION ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN TROOP-CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES

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# ABSTRACT

ESSAYS ON THE EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING
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Keywords: UN peace operations, troop contributions, coup-proofing strategies,
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How do peacekeeper deployments to United Nations (UN) peace operations affect
civil-military relations in troop-contributing countries? Since the late 1990s, the
UN's peacekeeping efforts have predominantly drawn personnel contributions from
democratically deficient and economically developing countries, often with a history
of military intervention. In light of this trend, this dissertation comprises three
studies investigating the relationship between the scale of troop dispatches to UN
peace operations and the strategies adopted by contributing governments to thwart
the threat of military political involvement via coups. Each study focuses on dis-
tinct coup-avoidant measures employed by leaders to secure their positions in office.
In doing so, this project advances existing research on the civil-military implica-
tions of involvement in UN peace operations. The first empirical chapter examines
whether peacekeeper deployments reduce the likelihood of military participation in
government. The findings indicate that military-specific benefits associated with
UN peacekeeping involvement can alleviate military pressure on leaders to allocate
cabinet seats to active-duty officers as an accommodative institutional arrangement.
The second empirical chapter analyzes how UN peacekeeping involvement can serve
as a substitute for counterbalancing by emphasizing the comparative benefits of
troop deployments over the drawbacks associated with establishing armed counter-
weights to the regular military. The findings suggest that leaders who contribute

significant portions of their military personnel to UN peace operations are less likely to engage in counterbalancing efforts. The third empirical chapter uses information on ethnic stacking in Africa and investigates whether African leaders exploit sizable contingent dispatches for peacekeeping rents to embolden their efforts to dominate their militaries with allied ethnic groups. The findings demonstrate a positive association between large troop contributions and leaders' propensity to engage in ethnic stacking.

# ÖZET

## BİRLEŞMİŞ MİLLETLER BARIŞ OPERASYONLARINA KATILIMIN ASKER GÖNDEREN ÜLKELERDEKİ SİVİL-ASKER İLİŞKİLERİNE ETKİLERİ ÜZERİNE MAKALELER

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Anahtar Kelimeler: BM barış operasyonları, asker katkıları, darbeye mukavemet stratejileri, askerî siyasî müdahale, sivil-asker ilişkileri

Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) barış operasyonlarına yapılan barış gücü katkıları, asker gönderen ülkedeki sivil-asker ilişkilerini nasıl etkilemektedir? 1990'ların sonlarından bu yana, BM'nin barış koruma çabaları ekseriyetle demokratik açıdan yetersiz, ekonomik olarak gelişmekte olan ve hatrısayılır kısmı askerî müdahale tecrübesi yaşamış ülkelerden personel katkısı almıştır. Bu tez, mevzubahis eğilimin ışığında BM barış operasyonlarına yapılan askerî personel katkılarının büyüklükleri ile gönderen hükümetlerin darbe yollu askerî siyasî müdahale tehdidini bertaraf etmek için benimsediği stratejiler arasındaki ilişkiyi araştıran üç çalışmadan oluşmaktadır. Her bir çalışma, liderlerin görevdeki pozisyonlarını güvence altına almak için kullandıkları farklı darbeden kaçınma tedbirlerine odaklanmaktadır. Böylelikle bu proje, BM barış operasyonlarına katılımın sivil-asker eksenindeki etkilerine dair mevcut araştırmaları ileri taşımaktadır. İlk ampirik bölüm, barış gücü görevlerinin ordu mensuplarının hükümette yer alma olasılığını azaltıp azaltmadığını incelemektedir. Bulgular, BM barış operasyonlarına katılımın orduya sağladığı faydaların, uzlaşmacı bir kurumsal tertip dahilinde kabine koltuklarının muvazzaf subaylara tahsis edilmesi yönünde liderler üzerindeki askerî baskıyı hafifletebileceğini göstermektedir. İkinci ampirik bölüm, düzenli orduya karşı silahlı denge unsurları oluşturmanın sakıncalarına kıyasla BM barış operasyonlarına yapılan asker tedarikinin nisbî faydalarını vurgulayarak barış gücü hizmetinin nasıl karşı dengelemenin ikâmesi olarak hizmet

edebileceğini analiz etmektedir. Bulgular, askerî personelinin önemli bir kısmını BM barış operasyonlarına gönderen liderlerin karşı dengeleme gayretine girme olasılıklarının daha düşük olduğuna işaret etmektedir. Üçüncü ampirik bölüm, Afrika'daki etnik istifleme verilerini kullanmakta ve Afrikalı liderlerin barış operasyonları rantları için yaptıkları hacimli askerî birlik sevkiyatlarını müttefik etnik gruplarla ordularına tahakküm kurma çabalarını pekiştirmek için kullanıp kullanmadıklarını araştırmaktadır. Bulgular, geniş çaplı askerî personel katkıları ile liderlerin etnik istifleme eğilimleri arasında pozitif bir ilişki olduğunu göstermektedir.

# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

*To my family*

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

# LIST OF TABLES

# LIST OF FIGURES

# 1.  INTRODUCTION

Over the past decade, the scholarship on peacekeeping has reiteratively stressed the importance of sizable troop deployments to reduce the severity of conflicts in which the United Nations (UN) acts as a third-party peacekeeper (Ruggeri, Gizelis, and Dorussen 2012; Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013; 2014). The UN joins scholars in recognition of the necessity of maintaining a large pool of peacekeeping personnel in order to build up a robust security presence on the ground, thereby improving the effectiveness of its peace operations in mission-host countries (United Nations 2015). Since the early 2000s, countries from the Global South have steadily ranked among the top troop contributors, gradually constituting the majority the UN's active peacekeeping force. Extant research posits that these high-volume deployments reflect member states' private incentives as a result of their domestic attributes (Bove and Elia 2011; Gaibulloev et al. 2015). While most member states exhibit shirking behavior by making token personnel commitments or none at all, large peacekeeper contingents are frequently dispatched from countries that are democratically deficient and economically challenged (Coleman 2013; Duursma and Gledhill 2019).

Member-state militaries' corporate interests can play a prevalent role in determining the decision to deploy security personnel to UN peace operations (Sotomayor 2010). Major contributors often have vested interests in extracting financial, professional, reputational, and security benefits through participation in UN peace operations. While the degree of member-states' involvement in peacekeeping is a significant determinant of mission success, it also has civil-military implications for the contributors themselves. The present literature provides piecemeal qualitative evidence for the impact of peacekeeping on contributing militaries' praetorian tendencies (Banini, Powell, and Yekple 2020; Cunliffe 2018; Kenkel 2021; Levin, MacKay, and Nasirzadeh 2016; Worboys 2007), and quantitative studies so far have primarily concentrated their efforts on investigating this relationship within the scope of military coups (Kathman and Melin 2017; Lundgren 2018; Levin et al. 2021).

However, civil-military relations extend well beyond instances of coups, which mark the breakdown of bargaining interactions between the governing leadership and the armed forces (Svolik 2012). UN peacekeeping involvement generates various benefits for troop-contributing countries from the Global South. These private benefits also influence the dynamics of civil-military interactions in high-volume troop suppliers. The dissertation comprises a series of studies aimed at filling this gap by examining the effects of peacekeeper deployments on the military's political involvement at the top administrative level, as well as contributing leaders' coup-proofing practices, with a particular focus on counterbalancing and ethnic stacking. Identifying peacekeeping's relevant functions for civilian control, the studies rest on the expectation that troop deployments have a significant impact on leaders' strategic choices to thwart coup threats.

First, I narrow my focus on the relationship between UN peacekeeping involvement and military participation in government. Military subordination to civilian control is not a well-established norm in transitional and nondemocratic regimes. Having distinct corporate interests, officers can pressure their governments to obtain institutional prerogatives that secure their corporate needs. Coup-avoidant leaders may seek to demonstrate their credible commitment to accommodating officers' demands by providing institutional guarantees, such as allocating government seats to give the armed forces direct access to policymaking processes. By generating economic rewards and fostering professionalization, peacekeeping involvement can reduce the likelihood of active-duty officers being observed in government roles.

Second, I investigate whether contributing greater proportions of peacekeeping troops from militaries is a favorable substitute to counterbalancing. While intensive peacekeeping engagements allow leaders to reorient their militaries' focus outward, it also enables them to send troublemakers away and impose coordination challenges among coup-prone officers. Counterbalancing typically takes a significant toll on military effectiveness. In contrast, participation in UN peace operations enables inexperienced militaries of developing countries to gain valuable operational experience. Further, given the financial burden of escalating defense costs through the establishment of armed counterweights to regular armed forces, dispatching peacekeepers can be a more strategic approach for some developing countries. In doing so, contributing leaders can leverage personnel reimbursements and other benefits, rather than bearing additional security costs.

Third, I scrutinize whether UN peacekeeping involvement emboldens African leaders to stack their militaries with ethnic loyalists. In countries where political competition is shaped along ethnic cleavages, the composition of militaires can be ma-

nipulated accordingly. High-volume UN troop deployments, which often signal active engagement also in regional operations, can provide additional resources for country leaders to allocate to their ethnic clients, thereby solidifying or expanding their support base within the military by stacking politically reliable ethnic groups. Therefore, I expect a positive relationship between committed peacekeepers and the probability of ethnic stacking.

This introductory chapter begins with a brief historical overview of the evolution of UN peacekeeping throughout the decades. It then proceeds by summarizing previous scholarly findings that shed light on the constitutive impact of troop deployments on UN peace operations' success in reducing hostilities in conflict zones. Third, it provides an account of member states' financial and personnel contributions to UN peace operations, which is followed by a presentation of current research on the private incentives driving states' troop commitments. The chapter concludes by identifying the research gap with respect to the relationship between peacekeeping involvement and civil-military relations in troop-contributing countries, highlighting the dissertation's contribution to the existing literature, and outlining the following chapters.

## 1.1 Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: A Brief Overview

During the early 1990s, the evaporation of the structural balance of the bipolar world order unleashed the outbreak of numerous harsh civil conflicts driven by ideological and ethnic cleavages across different continents. Many countries had become power voids marred by human tragedy and plagued by immense bloodshed. The emergent hostilities engendered vast waves of violence that took a desperate toll on the populaces within the former territories of the Republic of Yugoslavia, and the former colonies of great powers dispersed throughout Africa, Americas, and Asia.

This grim climate posed a critical challenge to global peace and security, creating turbulent regions destabilized by the breakdown of government authority. What followed were permissive settings for refugee outflows caused by conflict-related displacement, the emergence of safe havens for crime and terror networks, and an increase in illicit trade activities (Iqbal and Zorn 2007; Weiner 1996), as well as emerging safe havens for crime and terror networks, and illicit trade activities (Conrad et al. 2019; Haass 2021; Piazza 2008). In general, sustained episodes of hostility often cultivate "negative security and economic externalities and can destabilize entire regions" (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, 3).

Belligerent substate fragments are typically engaged in disputes over issues with limited prospect to resolve on their own. Compared to conflicts involving state parties, intrastate wars are less likely to conclude without a 'decisive victory' in which the losing side completely exhausts its organizational capacity to continue using violent means against its adversaries (Walter 1997). By themselves, conflicting parties hardly achieve lasting settlements that can credibly guarantee mutual benefits that follow from laying down their weapons "at a time when no legitimate government and no legal institutions exist to enforce a contract" (Walter 1997, 335-6). In these circumstances, the involvement of third-party actors is a key enabler of the pursuit of conflict cessation and the preservation of postconflict stability (Walter 1997).

The UN has traditionally been a leading contributor to global peace and security through its peace operations across different geographical locations of conflict since the early stages of the post-World War II period. Conventionally, these operations pursued neutralism with respect to belligerent parties, and were established on the basis of host-state consent with commitment to minimal military engagement limited to self-defense purposes (Bellamy and Williams 2004, 3; Diehl 2008, 6-7; Goulding 1993, 454-455). During the Cold War period, blue berets were predominantly assigned the task of physically insulating disputants, mainly states, from each other after they reach an agreement to halt hostilities, and thereby facilitating the postconflict process (Diehl 2008, 4). Examples to such missions are the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), which is still active to date, marking the genesis of the UN's peacekeeping efforts in 1948 (Theobald 2015), as well as the First UN Emergency Force (UNEF I), which was the first substantially staffed operation that remained in effect from 1956 to 1967 (Diehl 2015a), among others.

The first instance of intervention in an intrastate conflict came with the UN Operation in Congo (ONUC), which had a large peacekeeping force that peaked at roughly 20,000-strong during its deployment from 1960 to 1964 (Boulden 2015, 161; Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu 1998, 179; United Nations Peacekeeping, n.d.). Although the operation had relatively lenient rules of engagement allowing for coercive measures apart from self-defense, troop contingents suffered heavy casualties, amounting up to 245 military personnel, of whom 135 killed in clashes with Katangese forces (Boulden 2015, 167; United Nations Peacekeeping, n.d.). Moreover, the operation's substantial toll also included the death of the then Secretary-General, Dag Hammarksjöld in a plane accident while on his way to sit down with the secessionist Katangese leader Moise Tshombe in Ndola (Boulden 2015, 165). In response to the mission's perceived failure by many, the UN's peacekeeping efforts were dampened over the following three decades, as manifested by the comparatively less assertive manpower capacity of its subsequent peacekeeping involvements in other conflicts,

including the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP) (Asmussen 2015; Dos Santos 2015; Gizelis, Dorussen, and Petrova 2016), alongside other missions, such as the UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM) on the India-Pakistan border zone close to Kashmir (Singh 2015), and the Second UN Emergency Force (UNEF II) in the Sinai peninsula (Diehl 2015b).

As the number of civil wars proliferated in the aftermath of the Cold War, the UN globally expanded the scope of its engagement in erupted conflicts by increasing its peacekeeping initiatives. In March 1992, the Secretary-General at that time, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, restructured peace operations' organizational framework at the Secretariat, by founding the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (later renamed the Department of Peace Operations). Once an ad hoc practice led by the Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs, the deployment of peacekeepers has become a more institutionalized bureaucratic process within the Department (Andersen 2018, 348). Almost simultaneously, the UN's increasing peace activism was also discursively emboldened through the conceptual framework developed by Boutros-Ghali at the outset of the 1990s (Boutros-Ghali 1992). Building upon this framework, Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 781) further outlined that the UN's operational efforts for conflict management are epitomized by four broad and mostly interrelated functions on the basis of ground-level conditions: (1) monitoring and observer missions; (2) traditional peacekeeping; (3) multidimensional peacekeeping; and (4) peace enforcement. Accordingly, monitoring or observer missions employ military and civilian personnel for overseeing postconflict ceasefire processes on the basis of host-state consent to facilitate reaching settlements (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 781). Referring to the UN Charter's Chapter VI and relying on host-state consent, traditional peacekeeping operations aim to prevent conflict recurrence by forming a logistical barrier that insulates belligerent parties from each other through an armed military presence, thereby ensuring postconflict phase advances toward a peaceful resolution (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 781).

Complementarily, multidimensional peacekeeping facilitates the implementation of reached settlements, while improving political and socioeconomic conditions in cooperation with local actors to alleviate hostilities, which serves as a comprehensive countermeasure against conflict recurrence (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 781). With peace enforcement, reflecting a departure from the earlier practice of peacekeeping, the UN fundamentally extended the horizon of peace operations beyond host-state consent with reference to Chapter VII. This necessitates a more muscular UN-commanded military presence in the field (Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 781). From the birth of the 21st century, the UN Security Council has generously au-

thorized multidimensional peace missions to instrumentalize robust measures for civilian protection in reference to a less restrictive interpretation of Chapter VII (Howard and Dayal 2018). Moreover, the UN gradually moved toward greater militarization by adopting the Capstone doctrine, which marked a partial departure from enforcement toward stabilization missions (Karlsrud 2015). Initially mandated in 2004 within the framework of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUS-TAH), these operations aim to pacify drastically volatile conflict environments by identifying hostile elements that harm civilians and neutralizing them, if necessary (Karlsrud 2015, 42). The existing distinction between traditional peacekeeping and militarized missions has turned to be increasingly vague (Andersen 2018, 351; Sloan 2014, 679). For this reason, the terms peacekeeping and peace operations are employed interchangeably in the remainder of this dissertation, including all or a subset of abovestated functions.

## 1.2 Effectiveness of UN Peace Operations

Although the UN's interventionist activism aimed to stop the killings and resolve the underlying reasons of conflicts, many of its initial peacekeeping attempts did not bring palpable changes to the violent status quo in countries such as Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, and elsewhere. Case evidence brought to light UN peacekeeping's poor track record in ensuring a successful transition to peace between hostile fragments within areas of limited statehood (Bratt 1996; Luttwak 1999). Luttwak (1999, 38) was one of the observers who voiced a pessimistic perspective on UN peace operations, noting that: "at best, U.N. peacekeeping forces have been passive spectators to outrages and massacres, as in Bosnia and Rwanda; at worst, they collaborate with it, as Dutch U.N. troops did in the fall of Srebrenica by helping the Bosnian Serbs separate the men of military age from the rest of the population." This heavy critique was predominantly in response to the UN's notorious involvements in severe civil conflicts in the early 1990s, which did not produce effective results in terms of diminishing the scale of the bloodshed. Earlier failures of UN peacekeepers in fulfilling their mandate objectives can be partly attributed to missions' staff deficiency. Despite numerous successful involvements, historical record shows that blue berets' coercive capacity to deter further aggression between former belligerents occasionally has been limited due to the shortage of manpower and the lack of proactive engagement, as exemplified by the UN Interim Force in Lebanon's (UNIFIL) failure to prevent the Israeli incursion through the buffer zone established by peacekeepers, which led to the occupation of Lebanese territories in the south

(Diehl 2008, 4).

Personnel shortage remained a serious challenge to the effectiveness of peace operations in the post-Cold War period. For example, Costalli's (2014) analysis of locally disaggregated data on peacekeeper deployments and total casualties at the municipal level from 1992 to 1995, with a narrow focus on the UN's involvement in the Bosnian civil war, revealed that the United Nations Protection Force (UNPRO-FOR) was impotent in reducing the severity of the conflict. In his view, this poor performance can be blamed on ambiguous mandate objectives, failing to extend beyond tactical countermeasures, and the relative understrength of blue berets, devoid of the capability to project ample power to deter combatants from committing violent acts, notwithstanding their close proximity to areas with high levels of civilian casualties. Kuperman (2001), similarly, pointed to the disproportionate personnel shortfall of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) during the genocide perpetrated by Hutu extremists against the Tutsi. Against the sizable Hutu militia force estimated to be in the range of 15,000 to 30,000, the combat-ready peacekeeping force was composed of only a 420-strong Belgian contingent stationed in Kigali, accompanied by 400 Ghanaian soldiers deployed to Byumba, alongside 600 technical personnel (Kuperman 2001, 39-40). Following the outbreak of violence, most troops were withdrawn having secured the removal of Western citizens from the theater of conflict through the French-led Operation Amaryllis and Belgian-led Operation Silverback (Kuperman 2001, 40, 42).

In response to these failures, the UN signaled a more outspoken commitment to the Protection of Civilians (PoC) as a guiding norm for its peacekeeping involvements toward the late 1990s. Shortly after appearing in the then Secretary-General Kofi Annan's 1998 Report on Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace in Africa, PoC became an integral part of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone's (UNAMSIL) mandate in 1999 (UN Security Council 1998; 1999). As later delineated in the Brahimi Report, the UN called for peacekeepers' proactive military engagement in situations where civilian lives were at risk, by suggesting that "rules of engagement should not limit contingents to stroke-for-stroke responses but should allow ripostes sufficient to silence a source of deadly fire" (UN Security Council 2000, 9). In this regard, these documents denoted a doctrinal departure from minimal use of military force only for self-defense (Bode and Karlsrud 2019; Hultman 2013, 62; Sheeran and Kent 2016, 43-44). As a result of this transformation, peacekeepers' conventional commitment to impartiality is hindered by their combat engagements with rebel forces, as well as other nonstate actors, in necessity of civilian protection (Howard and Dayal 2018; Karlsrud 2015; Sloan 2014). Humanitarian concerns were later reemphasized in the 2015 report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace

Operations (HIPPO) convened as per the request of then Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. Prompting a self-evaluative reflection, the report recognized that the UN "has not been able to deploy sufficient peacekeeping forces quickly and often relies on underresourced military and police capacities" (UN Security Council 2015, 9).

Concomitantly, a major focus of scholarly efforts has been to conceptualize and measure peacekeeping success. One query concerned identifying the optimal window of time. Some operationalized arbitrary temporal yardsticks following the exit of peacekeepers (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). In contrast, Diehl and Druckman (2015, 97) underscore the difficulty of making long-term assessments of the performance of continuing peace operations or those being finalized a short while ago, given that missions' impact could last for a decades-long timeframe. They suggest that "the longer the time period that passes between the end of the operation and the assessment, the more difficult it will be to draw causal conclusions about the operation per se," while pointing to the necessity of making short-term assessments for an extensive understanding of peacekeeping's impact in the long run (Diehl and Druckman 2015, 97). Partly because of this, and issues related to data availability, a wide majority of quantitative research operationalizes the concept of peacekeeping performance by looking at its immediate effects.

What constitutes peacekeeping success has generally been evaluated in the literature with respect to the distinct notions of positive and negative peace (Galtung 1969). In terms of positive peace, some prioritized its 'participatory' nature by looking at how peacekeeping affects postconflict democratization efforts (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; 2006). Others paid attention to its impact on fostering local receptiveness to cooperation with deployed mission mandates in the process of implementing multi-dimensional programs (Ruggeri, Gizelis, and Dorussen 2012). Further evidence suggest that peacekeeper presence tends to bolster democratization efforts in conflict-affected countries, particularly when engaged with electoral tasks, by safeguarding a more stable political environment through the reduction of election-related violence, which can be detrimental to the process of government formation (Smidt 2021; Fjelde and Smidt 2022). A larger body of the literature, on the other hand, analyzed the impact of peacekeeping focusing on the negative peace in reference to the 'absence of violence' (Galtung 1969, 168). Some examine the effectiveness of peacekeeping in immobilizing conflicts through logistic impairment, aimed at preventing violence from breaching through the borders of adjacent countries (Beardsley 2011), and disseminating to other districts at the substate level (Beardsley and Gleditsch 2015). Some evaluate peacekeeping effectiveness with reference to ongoing or inactive conflicts in advance of and subsequent to the deployment of blue berets, measured by civilian deaths and battlefield casualties including government and rebel forces

(Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013; 2014; Hegre, Hultman, and Nygård 2019).

Another concern has been related to measuring peacekeeping involvement. Earlier quantitative research on UN interventions at the time of and in the immediate decade after the Cold War found that the mere presence of peacekeepers is not likely to produce fruitful results in preventing conflict recurrence between belligerent states or substate adversaries by facilitating settlements (Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel 1996; Greig and Diehl 2005). Other studies, similarly based on binary measurements of UN interventions or categorical classifications of UN mission types have suggested that the effect of peacekeeper presence is either futile, or at best, limited in terms of halting ongoing hostilities in active conflicts (Gilligan and Sergenti 2008). In parallel, some noted that the UN "has proven to be very ineffective peace enforcer, or war-maker, in the many intrastate, civil conflicts that emerged in the post-Cold War world" (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, 2). However, in contrast to the previous evidence, later findings left some room for optimism in noting that the presence of peacekeepers tends to yield fruitful results in attaining durable peace by decreasing the likelihood of inter- and intrastate conflict reemergence (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008; Kreutz 2010). Overall, the dominant view has been that the UN's efforts to keep the peace can be effective as long as there is a peace to keep.

Fortunately, this dichotomized approach to UN involvements gave way to a more nuanced conception of how peace operations affect the nature of conflicts. In this respect, later scholarship improved the understanding of peacekeeping performance by emphasizing the decisive importance of the size and composition of UN missions in terms of determining the operational effectiveness in reducing violence and fostering reconciliation between adversaries. This was in reaction not to the question of whether peacekeepers are deployed to conflict zones, but rather how strongly they are stationed on the ground. Correspondingly, scholars have begun investigations into the impact of the magnitude of peacekeeping forces on the feasibility of accomplishing mandate objectives aimed at abating atrocities. Ruggeri, Gizelis, and Dorussen (2012) presented evidence suggesting that the UN can more successfully secure local cooperation from government and rebel actors through the deployment of sizable peacekeeping contingents, especially when the balance of military might is tilted in favor of government forces. Further, the seminal studies conducted by Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon (2013; 2014) confirmed the importance of large peacekeeping contingents, pointing to their positive impact on the UN's effectiveness in managing conflicts and protecting civilians. As well, diverse mandate objectives dictate a careful selection of security personnel suited to engage effectively in a

variety of peacekeeping tasks.

Extant research underscores the critical relevance of recruiting peacekeepers on the basis of task-oriented criteria for optimizing mission performance. Compared to other types of peacekeeping personnel, for example, missions staffed with more troops are better equipped to mitigate ongoing violence by signaling robust capacity to ensure the safety of combatants willing to put down their weapons, and by establishing a sizable on-the-ground presence between belligerents, thereby constructing logistical obstacles that impose greater combat costs (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2014). Therefore, the presence of militarily intensive peacekeeping forces likely translates into lower levels of conflict severity with fewer civilian and battlefield deaths (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013; 2014). Large troop contingents also pose challenges to the mobility of belligerents, particularly rebels, and thereby act as a preventive countermeasure against conflict diffusion to other subnational districts (Beardsley and Gleditsch 2015). Sizable police contingents, on the other hand, likely play a more prominent role in mitigating the level of organized violence ensuing concluded episodes of explicit hostility (Bara 2020), they also tend to deter violent attacks on communal areas relatively spared by the conflict (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013). Nevertheless, rather than pointing to the redundancy of peacekeeping soldiers in the post-conflict security vacuum, peacekeeping scholarship posits that good mission performance requires a finely-tuned balance between military and police forces in the process of recruitment, considering that former adversaries are not completely stripped of the capability to engage in violence (Bara 2020, 997; Kathman and Wood 2016, 152).

The literature demonstrates that the peace operations' ability to reduce violence is also influenced by the sources of personnel supply. Peacekeeping performance is likely to improve with well-trained troops who have mastered the sophisticated techniques of modern warfare, sourced from technologically advanced militaries of developed countries with larger defense spending (Haass and Ansorg 2018). This is so because these troops typically enjoy the upper hand with respect to meeting transportation and communication challenges, which facilitates operational coordination. As well, they tend to have modern and efficient combat capabilities accompanied by a greater material capacity that is noticeable to conflicting parties, thereby deterring them from engaging in civilian aggression (Haass and Ansorg 2018). Relatedly, Bove and Ruggeri (2016) argue that staff diversity within a mission can foster complementary synergy by expanding the pool of technical skills and enhancing interoperability for problem-solving, despite the risk of coordination challenges. Mission diversity may also help in establishing firmer monitoring mechanisms, ensuring accountability among contingents, while providing broader exposure to cross-national media

spotlight. This can consequently discourage peacekeeper misconduct which would otherwise lead to local distrust and impede the process of information collection necessary for effective mission implementation (Bove and Ruggeri 2016). However, this creates a catch-22 for large deployments, as countries tend to be less willing to commit personnel to peace operations that already have a high number of contributing nationalities (Passmore, Shannon, and Hart 2018).

## 1.3 Who Contributes to UN Peacekeeping?

The UN's peacekeeping personnel portfolio consists of military troops, lightly-armed police, and military observers. On the supply side, military troop deployments experienced a sevenfold jump from 9,570 in early 1988 toward 73,393 in late 1994 (Boutros-Ghali 1995, 256). However, the scale of the UN's interventionist engagement advanced gradually over decades. Bellamy and Williams (2015, 15) report that, in contrast to the previous level of peacekeeping engagement, which corresponded to 24 percent of all global conflict instances throughout the Cold War period, the UN intensified its third-party activism over the ensuing decades. As such, the scale of UN peace operations climbed to 41 percent during the 1990s, followed by steady increases to 64 percent in the 2000s, and an overwhelming 83 percent in the 2010s. With time, the UN also expanded its partnership with regional actors to share the peacekeeping burden, such as the African Union (AU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as well as country-led mandates. Nevertheless, Bellamy and Williams (2015) observe that the UN has largely maintained its leading role in global peacekeeping endeavors.

If adequately staffed, UN operations are found to be effective in delivering improved stability to conflict-affected countries and regions. The UN's efforts in conflict management delivers public goods through its contribution to global peace and stability and human rights protection, yielding non-excludable benefits for the entire international community. However, this public nature of peacekeeping output is also permissive for free-riding or meager commitments among the UN member states. As Olson (1971, 2) famously asserts: "If the members of a large group rationally seek to maximize their personal welfare, they will not act to advance their common or group objectives unless there is coercion to force them to do so, or unless some separate incentive, distinct from the achievement of the common or group interest, is offered to the members of the group individually on the condition that they help bear the costs or burdens involved in the achievement of the group objectives."

UN peacekeeping efforts rely on contributions from member-states in two tangible forms: financial support and personnel deployments. During the early decades following World War II, the UN mostly financed peace operations through its regular budget. After encountering challenges in funding operations with ample staff, particularly in the African continent, the UN began seeking ways to outsource peacekeeping costs as a means to surmount budgetary constraints (Mills 1990). In December 1973, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 3101, which established the institutional framework for generating extra-budgetary resources for its peacekeeping efforts (UN General Assembly 1974). This resolution allocated operational expenses among member states according to assessments scaled across four income groups: (1) the Security Council's five permanent members; (2) the remaining developed states; (3) developing countries; and (4) a subgroup of explicitly identified developing countries (Mills 1990, 101-102). In this system, member states' payments follow a funding mechanism similar to that of the UN's regular budget, though with some members' shares in the operational budget subject to revisions (Passmore, Shannon, and Nadeau 2023). Further, the UN also seeks to discourage member states from engaging in shirking when it comes to fulfilling their budgetary obligations, as outlined in Article 19, which denies member states the right to vote in the General Assembly if they have outstanding peacekeeping dues equal to or greater than the total amount they were required to pay over the previous two years (United Nations, n.d.).

Despite undergoing some modifications in 2000, the system remains in effect as of today (Passmore, Shannon, and Nadeau 2023). However, the UN can struggle with underfinancing for its peace operations because of occasional payment delays and arrears. While not each member state is equally incentivized to pay its assessed peacekeeping contributions in full and on time, the assessment system remains somewhat effective as most major financial contributors largely adhere to it (Shimizu 2005, 4). Throughout years, the financial burden of UN peacekeeping has primarily been encumbered by a small group of richer donors in a disproportionate manner (Bobrow and Boyer 1997, 737; Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu 1998, 188; Sandler 2017), while states with greater global trade participation, democratic institutions, and peacekeeper commitments are more likely to fulfill their financial obligations determined by payment assessments (Passmore, Shannon, and Nadeau 2023). Overall, the UN's budgetary allocations to peace operations rely predominantly on the monetary support from developed countries to cover operational costs, including the reimbursements for equipment and personnel deployments.

As members states' financial contributions are assessed within the legal framework of the UN Charter, peace operations often receive insufficient but a relatively sustain-

able inflow of funding (Gaibulloev et al. 2015, 828; Sandler 2017, 1887). Personnel contributions, on the other hand, depend entirely on states' willingness to make deployments on a voluntary basis. But why do states commit peacekeepers to UN operations? Focusing on the contrasting differences between idealist and realist explanations, early accounts concluded that states are primarily motivated by self-interest when they take up an active role in peacekeeping burden-sharing, rather than pursuing an altruistic agenda (Neack 1995). Building on Olson's (1971) earlier work, a wealth of research moved beyond this dichotomous understanding, adopting an approach that draws on joint public goods delivered by UN peacekeeping, which are pure in terms of benefiting the international community, and impure since a group of participant countries achieve private gains from their involvement (Bobrow and Boyer 1997; Bove and Elia 2011; Gaibulloev et al. 2015; Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu 1998; Passmore, Shannon, and Hart 2018).

In this view, the collective international interest in the provision of global peace and stability, the cessation of hostilities, as well as the protection of human rights through UN peace operations, does not entail a tradeoff with the accommodation of contributor-specific interests. On the contrary, the dispatch of blue berets enables states to take part in the generation of public goods that are transnationally consumable, while extracting private goods for themselves. This contrapuntal mechanism of joint benefits also reduces states' free-riding behavior in response to peacekeeping-generated public goods that non-exclusively benefit the entire international community. Similarly, extant research identifies states' private incentives as the key driving mechanism behind their peacekeeper deployments (Bove and Elia 2011; Passmore, Shannon, and Hart 2018; Rost and Greig 2011). To sum up, in the absence of mandatory regulations ensuring a sustainable peacekeeper supply from member-states, ones who make high-volume personnel deployments to UN peace operations typically extract private benefits from this transaction. But who allocates their valuable human resources to UN peacekeeping, and why do they do so?

Relying on data from the early post-Cold War period, previous studies supported the view of UN peacekeeping as a democratic venture pursued by developed states with liberal humanitarian concerns aimed at maintaining global peace and stability in which democratic norms and free market economy can disseminate, and fundamental human rights can prosper (Andersson 2000; Lebovic 2004). Through the doctrinal transformations outlined in the Brahimi and HIPPO reports, as well as mission mandates authorized under Chapter VII, peacekeeping has evolved into a militarily demanding endeavor, marked by rising fatality rates (Henke 2019b), and an undermet need for troop supplies (Passmore, Shannon, and Hart 2018). Indeed, UN peace operations have become riskier due to the prioritization of PoC, which

often necessitates proactive measures involving robust military engagements with aggressor forces. Peacekeepers themselves can also fall victim to local-level violence. Present research suggests that the perceived military disadvantage by rebel forces may propel them to attack peacekeeping forces in compensation for their power shortcomings vis-à-vis the government, and prevent the fixation of the resulting adverse status quo (Fjelde, Hultman, and Lindberg Bromley 2016). Further, larger troop deployments partly reflect missions' risk environment particularly concerning the safety of peacekeepers' lives. Evidence shows that peace operations staffed with higher numbers of troops tend to be troubled with greater numbers of peacekeeper casualties due to malicious acts including a wide range of local-level aggressions, as well as accidents and illnesses (Henke 2019b).

Despite earlier findings heavily influenced by Cold War patterns suggesting otherwise (Regan 1998), high-intensity civil conflicts, marked by greater casualties, are likely to attract third-party interventions (Kathman 2011; Rost and Greig 2011). With respect to conflict severity, the same holds for UN operations (Bove and Elia 2011; Costalli 2014; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Hegre, Hultman, and Nygård 2019), often with sizable contingents (Bove and Elia 2011). Similarly, analyses, informed by the location of peacekeepers' duty stations and conflict occurrence at the substate level, confirm that blue berets are likely sent to areas geographically proximate to where violence takes place (Ruggeri, Gizelis, and Dorussen 2016). Paradoxically, severe conflicts, while often inducing intervention, may also discourage ongoing participation in peacekeeping. This poses a considerable challenge to UN peace operations, which has been described by some as "understaffed, underfunded, and underequipped" (Fortna 2008, 76). This is so because the post-Cold War expansion of UN peacekeeping necessitated steadfast peacekeeper deployments from member states, yet the demand has largely outpaced the number of recruited blue berets (Fortna 2008). Similarly, Passmore, Shannon, and Hart (2018) point out that post-1990 UN peace operations have grappled with an understaffing problem, averaging about 22 percent lower than required on a monthly basis.

Coincidingly, the habitual democratic ardency for peacekeeping participation began to wane personnelwise. Since the early 2000s, developed democracies have largely held back from committing their valuable human resources with sophisticated training and equipment. Many of them sought to pass the buck in terms of supplying peacekeepers despite the preexisting public favoritism toward UN peacekeeping (Lyon and Malone 2009). Some past observers were swift to highlight that their "fears of sustaining casualties, entanglement in expanding conflicts and the escalating costs involved in ill-defined missions have resulted in slower, less ambitious and, sometimes, vetoed UN peacekeeping missions" (Brayton 2002, 308). Extant

studies confirm this reluctance to deployment by presenting evidence that developed states with greater school enrollment rates are more reluctant to send armed uniformed personnel to UN peace operations, while peacekeepers are more likely to be deployed from poorer countries with populations challenged by educational disenfranchisement (Bove and Elia 2011).

More recently, Duursma and Gledhill (2019) show that previous Western enthusiasm for taking part in UN peace operations during the 1990s has since dwindled. Their findings suggest that high-volume troop contributions currently pour from countries lacking strong democratic institutions compared to those governed by liberal electoral incumbents. According to them, comparatively scanty personnel influx from the developed world can be attributed to the fading inclination among democratic governments to export liberal norms via UN peace operations, particularly in response to the failing experiences in Angola and Cambodia, and to the growing wariness among elected leaders of the public disfavor toward the elevated lethality risk associated with robust humanitarian missions (Duursma and Gledhill 2019, 1161-1163).

In this context, as the new operational dynamics of UN peacekeeping have generated a mismatch in Western actors' cost-benefit calculations, the personnel burden has shifted increasingly onto the shoulders of developing countries (Gaibulloev, Sandler, and Shimizu 2009). As a result, many conventional peacekeepers from the Global North adopted various forms of tokenism in their scaled-down personnel contributions. Coleman (2013) argues that tokenism seeks extensive rather than intensive forms of peacekeeping involvement, by showing that developed states prefer to engage in a high number of missions through the assumption of key mandate positions rather than deploying large numbers of personnel. Scholars suggest that tokenism enables states to gain or preserve prestige as troop contributing countries, and to acquire information regarding mission specifics through broader avenues of diplomatic engagement at the level of the UN, thereby bolstering their international impact (Coleman 2013, 55; Duursma and Gledhill 2019, 1165). At the onset of the 2010s, with respect to GDP per capita, about 46 percent of the token personnel contributors were ranked in the upper half of the world's economies, while approximately 13 percent were situated in the uppermost decile (Coleman 2013, 49). Regarding military size, on the other hand, about 52 percent were globally ranked above the fiftieth percentile, whereas roughly 9 percent were in the top tenth (Coleman 2013, 49).

Further, the UN confronts the risk of its already short-handed peacekeeping force eroding due to concerns among contributors, leading to withdrawals. For example,

Melin and Kathman (2023) find that more severe conflicts, where there are higher numbers of battle-related government and rebel deaths in a mission host country, are likely to result in personnel withdrawals by contributing nations in response to the partial failure of peacekeeping efforts to bring stability. They also present evidence supporting that concerns over reputational damage from backing down among democratic contributors yield resilience to this withdrawal effect (Melin and Kathman 2023). This may emanate from democratic keenness in reaping success in peacekeeping efforts, making selective staffing decisions for missions that are wary of audience costs, and enjoying favorable public opinion for the UN's objectives, alongside the face-saving effect of operating under its banner (Melin and Kathman 2023, 404, 407-408).

Nevertheless, the question that begs to be asked is whether the personnel supply is affected when UN peace operations are deadlier for peacekeepers themselves. Existing research findings are somewhat inconsistent regarding the impact of peacekeeper fatalities on the size of deployed contingents (Levin 2021; Raes, Du Bois and Buts 2019). Focusing partially on UN operations involving peacekeepers from the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), some find that only illness-related peacekeeper deaths lead to a reduction in countries' personnel commitments (Raes, Du Bois, and Buts 2019). A broader examination of individual missions, on the other hand, reveals that states are susceptible to disengaging from operations that are deadlier for their own troops, with larger withdrawals likely from democracies compared to other regimes (Levin 2021). Given that democratic leaders potentially face greater audience penalties as a result of costly policy choices, this leads to a slightly larger peacekeeper pullout (Levin 2021).

In contrast, leaders not bound by strong democratic institutions are often less concerned about the large audience costs arising from public discontent over peacekeeper fatalities (Duursma and Gledhill 2019; Fearon 1994; Levin 2021). Interestingly, the level of economic development generates a striking difference in countries' personnel contribution patterns in the aftermath of peacekeeper casualties. Whereas developed states tend to reduce their commitments in response to peacekeeper fatalities, their poorer counterparts tend to lean toward an increase (Levin 2021). In this respect, countries from the Global South are more reliable troop suppliers with greater endurance in withstanding casualties. Relatedly, these democratically unconstrained and militarily less capable troop contributors also show greater willingness to deploy peacekeepers to more violent conflict zones in mission-host countries (Oestman 2023).

Empirical evidence suggests that privately incentivized and weakly democratized

UN member states are likely to send peacekeepers at a faster rate than those with greater parliamentary constraints, considering that approval procedures may take too long and thereby stall troop deployments (Lundgren, Oksamytna, and Coleman 2021). Swift mobilization of troops is an important factor in determining mission effectiveness for conflict containment. Lacking readily available forces, UN officials underscore the cruciality of timely dispatches of blue berets to conflict zones, as reflected in the HIPPO report. Inked in 2015, the report recognizes that: "responding quickly to save lives and arrest emerging conflicts can potentially avoid a larger, more costly response later" (United Nations 2015, 63). In line with the abovestated mechanisms, troops from developing African and Asian countries make up the bulk of the security force capacity necessary to conduct UN peace operations (Abiola et al. 2017; Daniel 2011). Figure 1.1 shows the top troop contributors to UN peace operations from 1992-1999, 2000-2009, and 2010-2019, respectively.[1]

## 1.4 Contributor-Specific Incentives for Peacekeeper Deployments

The present literature identifies several motivating benefits attached to UN peacekeeping involvement, which are allocated unevenly across personnel contributors on the basis of their political and economic attributes, and foreign policy preferences.

First, participation in UN peace operations may generate financial benefits for member states with lower levels of economic development. Some developing states can instrumentalize their peacekeeping involvement to generate extra revenue for wage-earners within their armed forces. The UN provides remunerations to all member states for their troop commitments, which are disproportionately higher than domestic military salaries in some countries. The remunerations are offered on a monthly basis at a standard rate of $1,448, which has steadily increased over the last decade (United Nations, n.d.). States with a low-income security workforce can extract financial benefits from these payments (Bove and Elia 2011; Gaibulloev et al. 2015). For example, Gaibulloev et al. (2015) point to the dramatic positive gap between the previous standard remuneration rates and per-soldier defense spending in countries that consistently send high volumes of troops, such as Bangladesh, Ghana, India, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Senegal.

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[1]The values on the horizontal axis show average troop deployments using Kathman's (2013) data.

17

Figure 1.1 Major Troop-Contributing Countries

### 1992-1999



### 2000-2009



### 2010-2018



Average Troop Contributions

Expectedly, developed countries find little financial motivation to participate in UN peacekeeping, as their technologically advanced militaries typically allocate larger resources to their personnel. In addition, military involvement in UN peacekeeping provides professional benefits in terms of training, equipment, and operational experience. Poorly-resourced armed forces often struggle to provide adequate training and equipment for their soldiers. States' peacekeeping involvement can enable troops to get accustomed to the operational equipment that may be domestically inaccessible, and their militaries to receive financial and in-kind donations (Boutton and D'Orazio 2020; Daniel 2011; Gaibulloev, Sandler, and Shimizu 2009).

Second, the UN can provide states with a platform to promote their national positions on both domestic and world matters in pursuit of international recognition (Claude 1966). Leaders whose countries are relatively sidelined within this organizational architecture may instrumentalize their participation in UN peace operations as a status-seeking activity, aimed at gaining prestige and recognition as 'good international citizens' (Neack 1995). Some suggest that states' involvement in UN peacekeeping may be driven by the conviction that "it is one of the few currently available ways for them to be players in world affairs and to affect international outcomes in demonstrative ways" (Bobrow and Boyer 1997, 729). Identifying three concurrent hierarchies formed along Security Council membership, financial contributions, and personnel supplies, Coleman (2020) suggests that the latter is the most permissive for 'upward mobility'. Ward and Dorussen (2016) put a parallel emphasis on the importance of states' reputational concerns in sending peacekeepers. Foreign policy congruence with other mission participants can incentivize states' decision to commit troops due to their effectiveness-oriented strategy, seeking partners with a mutual understanding of mandate objectives and implementation, which facilitates peacekeeping efforts and helps avoid mission failure and the associated reputation costs (Ward and Dorussen 2016). In doing so, states may also engage in sustainable personnel commitments by securing domestic consent (Ward and Dorussen 2016).

Third, UN peacekeeping involvement can enable contributing countries to intervene in nearby conflicts. Scholars indicate that the locational contiguity of conflict regions is a significant determinant of states' likelihood to dispatch troops to third-party peace operations (Perkins and Neumayer 2008). Intertwined with the goal of safeguarding domestic stability, security concerns are somewhat integral in affecting countries' strategic decisions regarding peacekeeper deployments. Previous research shows that states are more likely to engage in military or economic interventions in nearby civil conflicts in order to prevent regional contagion (Kathman 2011). In neighboring countries, establishing foreign military presence can be helpful in decreasing the likelihood of conflict spillover, to the extent that interveners are biased

toward the host state, thereby bolstering the government's capacity to control its territory (Peksen and Lounsbery 2012). UN peacekeeping, often reliant on host-government consent, is not exempt from this inclination of state favoritism. Some address the biased output of the UN's peacekeeping efforts, which is associated with a lower likelihood of rebel-induced violence targeting civilians, while having no significant effect on government abuse, notwithstanding how close to contingents' duty posts within mission-host countries (Fjelde, Hultman, and Nilsson 2019).

Similarly, humanitarian crises related to substantial refugee displacement increase the likelihood of third-party interventions (Regan 1998; Kathman 2011), because states' foreign policy goals may dictate intervention in proximate civil conflicts to meet their geopolitical security needs under the auspices of interstate organizations, such as the UN or other regional collectives (Bove and Elia 2011). For example, the involvement of Burkina Faso and Niger in the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was incentivized by the need to secure their border regions and prevent militant jihadist attacks from Islamic State West Africa (Albrecht and Cold-Ravnkilde 2020). Kenya and Ethiopia's participation in the UN-authorized AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was similarly motivated to provide a countermeasure against Al-Shabaab, alongside other political and economic incentives (Albrecht and Cold-Ravnkilde 2020). This strategy seems fruitful, as evidenced by the conflict-containing effect of peacekeeping (Beardsley 2011). On the other hand, extant research posits that the decision of countries' peacekeeper deployment to their UN mission host neighbors is more likely in the presence of refugee inflows they receive from these civil conflict-ridden areas (Uzonyi 2015).

## 1.5 Existing Research Gap and the Dissertation's Contribution

Over the past decade, a nascent line of research has provided evidence for another contributor-specific incentive, namely governments' efforts to ensure survival at the subnational level. While some studies have investigated domestic political incentives for participation in UN peacekeeping, researchers have also shown greater interest in the significance of such involvement on the civil-military axis. Many major UN troop-contributing countries are burdened with an unwavering legacy of military political involvement, looming over leaders with the threat of forcible removal from office. Some troop-contributing governments are posed with the classic challenge of the guardianship dilemma by their militaries on which they rely for survival, against which they cannot stay in power (McMahon and Slantchev 2015). The absence of

institutionalized control over the armed forces exposes leaders to the risk of external intervention by officers, because past instances of military political involvement serve as precursors to future occurrences (Londregan and Poole 1990; Stepan 1988).

Where officers lack a strong normative attachment to civilian supremacy, civil-military relations often take the form of bargaining interactions between the government and the armed forces (Svolik 2012). Steady large peacekeeper deployments often reflect a limited group of member states' persistent foreign policy preferences with respect to their vested interests in peacekeeping involvement (Bellamy and Williams 2013), often dictated by domestic bureaucratic mechanisms heavily influenced by civil-military interactions (Sotomayor 2010). The perks of peacekeeping under the auspices of the UN are not equally attractive to the leaders of member-state militaries. The variance in troop commitment volumes can also partly be attributed to these asymmetric interests.

On the military side, officers from underdeveloped forces can instrumentalize peacekeeping as a scaffold to grab external resources provided by the UN and major state donors in exchange of their low-cost security workforce (Adhikari 2020; Albrecht 2020; Brosig 2017; Cunliffe 2018; Kathman and Melin 2017; Levin et al. 2021; Levin, MacKay, and Nasirzadeh 2016; Lundgren 2018; Victor 2010; Welz 2022). Peacekeeping participation benefits some militaries either through UN reimbursements for personnel and equipment (Adhikari 2020; Bove and Elia 2011; Gaibulloev et al. 2015), or financial or in-kind donations from major states with private interests in ending conflicts (Boutton and D'Orazio 2020; Henke 2016; 2019a; Stojek and Tir 2015). Recent or ongoing military political grips on regimes are associated with a deeper involvement in UN peacekeeping (Levin 2023; Passmore 2022). In such contexts, armed forces frequently play a prominent role in affecting policy outcomes for troop dispatches.

On the leadership side, states that recently experienced failed coup attempts (Kathman and Melin 2017) or newly transitioned to democratic rule (Passmore 2022) contribute more troops to UN peace operations. Extant research suggests that leaders of unstable regimes can opt to instrumentalize engagement in peacekeeping to alleviate military challenges to their authority. However, this effect tends to decline over time as regimes consolidate against military interventionism (Kathman and Melin 2017; Passmore 2022). In this respect, participation in UN peacekeeping can serve as a diversionary, accommodative, and disruptive tool, which can enable governments to navigate bargaining interactions with the military in order to circumvent the threat of a military coup (Albrecht 2020; Kathman and Melin 2017; Levin 2023; Passmore 2022; Sakib and Rahman 2023b).

### 1.5.1 Coup-Avoidant Functions of Peacekeeping

As identified by previous work, UN peacekeeping offers considerable benefits resonating with strategies employed to prevent military insubordination to civilian rule (Albrecht 2020; Kathman and Melin 2017; Lundgren 2018). Confronted with the risk of coups, incumbent leaders mainly employ two approaches crafted for either changing officers' disposition or reducing their ability to intervene (Feaver 1999; Huntington 1957; Welch, Jr. 1976). The strategies aimed at changing militaries' interventionist dispositions prioritize reducing officers' incentives by diverting their focus from internal affairs or accommodating their interests through generous resource allocations or institutional prerogatives (Feaver 1999; Huntington 1957; Powell 2012; Stepan 1988; Welch, Jr. 1976). In contrast, the strategies seeking to reduce officers' interventionist abilities essentialize undermining militaries' organizational capacity by imposing coordination challenges (Belkin and Schofer 2003; Quinlivan 1999), establishing parallel counterforces (De Bruin 2018; Pilster and Böhmelt 2011), purging potential plotters (Sudduth 2017b), or fostering loyalist favoritism (Biddle and Zirkle 1996; Harkness 2016) within the security force structure. Large-scale peacekeeper deployments offer distinct yet similar functions to leaders of contributing countries seeking to avoid coups.

### 1.5.1.1 Diversion and professionalization

Diversionary strategies primarily aim to reorient the military's focus outward through dispute engagement. While leaders in established democracies can consolidate their support base through a rally-around-the-flag effect by picking wars they can accountably win (Arbatli and Arbatli 2016; Powell 2014; Reiter and Stam 2002), leaders in coup-prone countries usually seek to harmonize interests between the government and the armed forces against a common adversary, which would divert officers' attention to power projection (Miller and Elgün 2011). However, the presence of external and internal challenges poses the risk of transforming the polity into some form of a 'garrison state' with higher degrees of military political involvement, because civilian governments are inclined to delegate authority to military officers who often have monopolized expertise in security matters (Beliakova 2021; Bove, Rivera, and Ruffa 2020; Croissant et al. 2010; Lasswell 1941). Fostering professionalism within the ranks of the military, on the other hand, can yield greater autonomy and isolation from political incentives through absorption into task-oriented concerns and modernization efforts (Huntington 1957; 1991). However, greater capabilities can bolster militaries' efforts to exert influence over the

civilian leadership (Kamrava 2000).

Likewise, peacekeeper deployments from contributing militaries offer a diversionary function in preoccupying the military with external duties. Sending troops to distant conflict environments and engaging them in demanding peacekeeping tasks can keep them away from meddling in domestic politics (Albrecht 2020; Banini, Powell, and Yekple 2020; Kathman and Melin 2017). Peacekeeping contingents dispatched from developing militaries can strive to meet the UN's standards to maintain their ongoing involvement (Biswas 2024). Daily operational requirements, interactions with civilian staff and local communities, and coordinating with international contingents can cultivate a sense of professional responsibility and discipline (Albrecht 2020). Advanced training programs, skill-building with new equipment, and experiential learning can enhance the military's prestige and transform its corporate identity when widely embraced (Albrecht 2020; Kathman and Melin 2017). Still, the military's enhanced organizational capacity is likely to result in more competent coordinative abilities to orchestrate an intervention, as observed in Fiji in 2000 and 2006 (Baledrokadroka 2012).

### 1.5.1.2 Accommodation

Accommodative strategies involve appeasing the military establishment or upper echelons through resource allocation (Bove and Nisticò 2014; Huntington 1991; Leon 2014; Powell 2012; Sakib and Rahman 2023a), or by granting prerogatives on matters in which their corporate interests lie (Bove, Rivera, and Ruffa 2020; Stepan 1988). Leaders may resort to purchasing sophisticated weapon systems, offering higher salaries, and providing other material enticements to exhibit their commitment to align with the military's preferences (Huntington 1991; Powell 2012; Powell et al. 2018). However, these should be considered more as appeasement tactics carrying the risk of strengthening putschist efforts (Sudduth 2017a). While mollifying praetorian reflexes, accommodative methods can ultimately increase potential plotters' chances of success by providing them with valuable resources. These resources can prove to be significant assets once they overcome the coordination challenges required to oust the regime.

Similarly, engagement in UN peacekeeping can function as an accommodative strategy as it generates additional resources for developing militaries provided by the UN and major state donors. Small militaries can profit from reimbursement payments from the UN, which can exceed the actual salaries of deployed personnel and the costs of equipment (Andrés Peláez 2007). More importantly, contributing

countries can utilize their manpower advantage to receive military assistance from major state donors (Boutton and D'Orazio 2020). Troop deployments can provide an alternative platform for governments to substantiate their pledge to protect their militaries' corporate interests through assurances delivered at the UN level (Passmore 2022). Considering the persistent understaffing problem plaguing UN peace operations, troop-contributing militaries can expect to continue extracting private rents from their peacekeeping engagement in the long run (Brosig 2017; Passmore 2022, 281; Passmore, Shannon, and Hart 2018). Overall, governments are expected to reduce officers' interventionist tendencies by channeling a somewhat steady inflow of peacekeeping revenues accompanied with additional perks to the military.

### 1.5.1.3 Coordination challenges

Since coups require coordination among different units within armed forces, leaders may resort to implement coordination challenges within their militaries through internal subdivision on the basis of specialization (Belkin and Schofer 2003; Pilster and Böhmelt 2011). They can also impose frequent rotations of military personnel to disrupt unit cohesion, thereby preventing the development of strong bonds between soldiers and their commanding officers (Quinlivan 1999). By introducing contact barriers among military units, leaders can undermine communication channels among officers, and thereby reduce the dissemination of defiant convictions and the ability to successfully implement a plotted coup (Belkin and Schofer 2003; Quinlivan 1999). However, debilitating the military often comes at the expense of battlefield effectiveness (Bausch 2018; Pilster and Böhmelt 2011).

Earlier scholarship suggests that participation in peace operations offers an opportunity to send away troublemaking military personnel (Bobrow and Boyer 1997, 727; Findlay 1996, 119). Obtaining contributing country status enables leaders to dispatch their military personnel to remote conflict areas (Albrecht 2020; Kathman and Melin 2017). Leaders can thereby implement coordination challenges among military units. By deploying peacekeepers, leaders can station troops for periods that usually take 6 to 12 months (Passmore 2022, 282), while retaining the right to withdraw them when needed (Kathman and Melin 2017, 153). In this respect, peace operations enable leaders to impede coordination between troublemaking units through frequent rotations. Since many states often lack the opportunity to make foreign troop deployments without engaging in disputes, wars, or bilateral agreements, peacekeeping involvement provides a valuable opportunity to station military contingents abroad under the auspices of the UN (Kathman and Melin 2017, 155).

Contributing state leaders have the means to fractionalize their armed forces by dispatching sizable peacekeeping contingents, sometimes as large as full military units, and thereby hinder their military's coordinative capability to unseat the incumbent executive.

### 1.5.2 Civil-Military Relations in Troop-Contributing Countries

Despite acknowledging the importance of peacekeeper deployments in supporting civilian control strategies, scholars have largely neglected to examine the specific relationship between the two. Mostly through case studies, extant research has primarily investigated whether peacekeeping involvement fosters interventionism or makes militaries more subordinate to civilian rule. The qualitative literature provides mixed evidence. Whereas numerous case studies show that peacekeeping involvement exacerbate officers' praetorian tendencies (Brosig 2017; Cunliffe 2018; Levin, MacKay, and Nasirzadeh 2016), others provide evidence for a mollifying effect on military politicization (Banini, Powell, and Yekple 2020; Martínez and Durán 2017; Worboys 2007). More specifically, recent studies have zoomed in on mutinies and coups. Dwyer (2015), for example, reports numerous mutinies in West African militaries that occur after soldiers' homecoming from peace operations, during which low-ranking troops often resent the long deployments, delayed or uneven payments, and poorer living conditions compared to their foreign counterparts. Discerning between organizations undertaking peace operations, Schiel, Powell, and Daxecker's (2020) large-n analysis of African troop-contributing militaries detects no statistically meaningful relationship between mutinies and involvement in UN-led missions, but finds that commitments to non-UN missions have a mutiny-fostering effect.

Others have placed greater attention on the impact of peacekeeping involvement on troop-contributing militaries' inclination to stage coups. Lundgren's (2018) study finds that coup attempts are less likely to occur in developing member states that make high-volume troop commitments to UN peace operations. The study contends that UN peacekeeping has a 'disciplining effect' on resource-scarce armed forces seeking to sustain the inflow of reimbursement revenues, because overthrowing sitting governments via coups can jeopardize the UN's approval of their anticipated troop commitments (Lundgren 2018). However, more recent work by Levin et al. (2021) reveals that the effect of UN peacekeeping involvement on coup instances is context-specific. In their view, political institutions can play a decisive role in constituting civil-military dynamics in troop-contributing countries. They find that peacekeeping militaries in autocracies are more likely to attempt a coup against

regime leaders as their coercive capacity increases owing to additional resources coming from UN reimbursements. In contrast, they suggest that troop-contributing militaries in anocracies are less likely to engage in efforts to forcibly oust their governments. This is because regime hybridity may instill expectations for democratization among the public and foreign donors, and officers' anticipations for the postcoup political climate remain ambiguous (Levin et al. 2021). In sum, quantitative research has thus far prioritized mutinies and coups as the dependent variable to account for the impact of UN peacekeeping involvement on civil-military relations in troop-contributing countries.

As argued above, peacekeeping features diversionary, accommodative, and disruptive functions relevant for coup avoidance. For this reason, large troop contributions are expected to have implications for leaders' civilian control strategies as a countermeasure against militaries' praetorian tendencies. However, research efforts have largely overlooked how peacekeeping relates to the use of coup-avoidant measures across a wide universe of cases. This dissertation addresses this gap by investigating the effects of peacekeeping participation on leaders' strategies aimed at averting coups to preserve their position in office. The effectiveness of these strategies will not be my primary concern. As all strategies have their strengths and weaknesses, the focus has rather been placed on investigating whether peacekeeper deployments substitute for or complement their implementation. Recent research and present data availability have been decisive in the choice of dependent variables. In this respect, the scope of my investigation for the impact of peacekeeping involvement on civil-military relations in contributing countries is limited to one accommodative and two disruptive strategies. By leveraging data provided by recent scholarship, the dissertation narrows its focus on military participation in government (White 2017), counterbalancing (De Bruin 2021), and ethnic stacking (Harkness 2022). The empirical tests in the following chapters primarily rely on time-series cross-sectional analyses using logistic regressions. In addition, the first study complements its findings with a brief case study of Bangladesh.

The first empirical chapter studies the relationship between UN peacekeeping involvement and military participation in government. In doing so, it highlights troop commitments' accommodative function in reducing militaries' disposition to intervene in politics at the top administrative level. Allocating cabinet seats to serving officers often arises from governments' need to credibly demonstrate their commitment to accommodate militaries' corporate interests through institutional arrangements. The chapter argues that high-volume troop commitments can alleviate military pressure on leaders for credible signaling by generating economic rewards and fostering professionalization. This in turn can reduce leaders' inclination to include

active-duty officers in government positions. First, external guarantees provided by the UN and major donors for funding peacekeeping militaries can serve as an agreeable arrangement on the civil-military axis. Placated by additional resources, on the other endpoint, militaries can be disinterested to search for active political roles. Second, expansive peacekeeping engagements can professionalize contributing militaries by offering opportunities for specialized training, operational experience, and exposure to diverse environments. Professionalization can thereby steer militaries' focus away for domestic political concerns. For this reason, governments with large deployments are expected to be less inclined to grant cabinet seats to active-duty military officers. The chapter confirms this substitutive effect by providing evidence that large peacekeeper deployments are associated with a lower likelihood of military presence in government.

The second empirical chapter shifts the analytical focus toward disruptive strategies aimed at reducing militaries' ability to make political interventions. It examines how participation in UN peacekeeping affects incumbents' efforts to outweigh their militaries' coercive monopoly at the domestic level. This strategy poses a trade-off between its economic and security drawbacks and regime security. Establishing armed counterweights to the regular military is an expensive coup-proofing option, as it multiplies the costs of combat readiness across disperse units. Counterbalancing efforts also reduce military effectiveness by fractionalizing the security force structure, which is often accompanied by attempts to undermine soldiers' coordinative abilities. The chapter argues that peacekeeping under the auspices of the UN can alleviate these challenges. UN-led peace operations are often deployed with personnel capacity lower than mandated levels. This persistent manpower deficit enables contributing governments to send large contingents to distant conflict zones. Further, leaders can create coordination challenges within their militaries by stationing troops abroad. Committing peacekeepers also ensures access to reimbursement funds, outsourced training, and operational experience. Thus, peacekeeping participation does not run the risk of military ineffectiveness. By comparing the drawbacks of counterbalancing and the benefits of peacekeeping, the chapter expects major troop-contributing country leaders to be less inclined to engage in counterbalancing efforts. The findings support this argument by suggesting a negative relationship between peacekeeper deployments and the number of armed counterweights.

The third empirical chapter continues to investigate the effect of troop deployments on coup-proofing efforts. Here, the attention is centered on African state leaders' engagement in ethnic stacking. This strategy involves recruiting military personnel who share ethnic ties with the incumbent leaders. In countries where politics are shaped by ethnic divisions, peacekeeping rents from high-volume troop commitments

can enhance leaders' engagement in ethnic stacking. As ethnic power relations predominantly characterize domestic politics in African countries, external resources gained from UN reimbursements are expected to be exploited by troop-contributing incumbents to make recruitments of coethnic personnel within their militaries. In this line of reasoning, the study expects a positive relationship between the magnitude of UN troop commitments and the likelihood of engagement in ethnic stacking. The findings suggest that peacekeeping participation is likely to complement ethnic stacking practices. The dissertation closes with a brief concluding chapter which summarizes the empirical findings.

# 2. PEACE IN THE WORLD, CIVILIANS IN GOVERNMENT? ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PEACEKEEPER CONTRIBUTIONS AND MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS

## 2.1 Introduction

The backbone of the UN's existing peacekeeping force is currently embodied by contributions from non-Western developing states, which typically lack long-standing democratic traditions and a strong economy. Most troop-contributing militaries from these states do not conventionally have strong normative attachments to subordination to civilian control. Shifting the focus toward the subnational level, this chapter traces the implications of peacekeeping involvement on the civil-military axis. Specifically, the chapter investigates the impact of UN troop deployments on the likelihood of active-duty officer presence in contributing country governments. Considering that high-volume troop deployments are frequently motivated by contributor-specific benefits, I argue that sizable participations in UN peace operations signify an agreeable arrangement between the civilian leadership and the officer corps.

Civil-military arrangements allow leaders to maintain their hold on power in countries where civilian rule is not firmly institutionalized. These arrangements facilitate interactions between the political leadership and the armed forces, allowing the latter to ensure that its interests are accommodated by the former. Should the leadership fail to credibly signal such commitment, the military may respond by seizing political power via coups (Svolik 2012). This uncertainty may motivate the leadership to create an institutional framework for civil-military interactions at the government level by allocating cabinet seats to members of the officer corps (White 2023). In doing so, the leadership can enhance credibility by enabling officers to closely monitor and directly influence political decisionmaking processes, thereby overcoming

information problems (Sakib and Rahman 2023a; White 2023).

This chapter argues that by laying the groundwork for an agreeable civil-military arrangement cemented by external guarantees, participation in UN peacekeeping can reduce the need for governmental power-sharing arrangements for credible signaling. The chapter identifies two mechanisms contributing to this relationship. For one, peacekeeping participation can generate additional resources that alleviate economic grievances within developing militaries. Since military political involvement is often driven by financial discontent, peacekeeping revenues may reduce officers' inclination to pursue active political roles. For another, peacekeeping participation can foster professionalization by redirecting the military's focus outward via foreign operations, enabling soldiers to engage in skill-building and develop a task-oriented mindset. Although this might not entirely depoliticize the military, it can reduce officers' inclination to seek leading administrative roles by assuming government seats.

The chapter is divided into five parts. First, it presents accommodative strategies available to leaders facing the risk of office removal by the military. It builds on the existing argument that officer inclusion in government posts provide an opportunity for leaders to credibly signal their commitment to align with the military's preferences, while recognizing its adverse effects for civilian control in the long run. Second, it details the theoretical argument by suggesting that UN peacekeeping involvement can serve as an agreeable arrangement on the civil-military axis, which, in turn, may reduce active-duty military officers' inclination to assume positions in the cabinet. Third, it gives a detailed account on the data, which is followed by a discussion on the results. Finally, the chapter presents a brief illustrative case study of Bangladesh, which leverages anecdotal evidence to complement the statistical findings, with the purpose of bolstering the main argument by probing its plausibility (Levy 2008, 6-7). The chapter concludes by addressing the study's limitations and avenues for future research.

## 2.2 Appeasing Officers with Seats in Government

In contexts where civilian control is not firmly institutionalized, the bolstering of military strength in response to external or internal threats often translates into an increased capacity for officers to confront the leadership when their interests diverge (Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni 2010; Finer [1962] 2002; Svolik 2012). In this respect, civil-military relations can be characterized as a dynamic interplay of bargaining between the government and the military, wherein the credibility of the

leadership's commitment is crucial, as failing to signal it effectively can lead to a coup d'état (Svolik 2012). Importantly, the military's involvement in politics is not limited to the disruption of civilian rule, for that coups are an outcome that emerges from the breakdown of this bargaining process.

Extant studies suggest that accommodative strategies usually serve preexisting bargaining interactions between the political leadership and high echelons of the officer corps. This is especially so when the military possesses a strong corporate identity reflected by officers' strong institutional identification with the armed forces thanks to the collective bond of solidarity that substantiates through professional ethos marked by discipline and hierarchical chain of command, and other constitutive organizational practices (Brooks and White 2023; Huntington 1957). However, an institutionalized corporate identity is not a prerequisite for militaries to challenge the political leadership for interest accommodation, as this action can be a product of mere rent-seeking behavior. As Feaver (1999, 214) argues, some armed forces might be created for repression in support of autocratic regime security or for decoration mimicking modern state machinery. Recognizing their vitality for regime survival, some militaries may prioritize their own interests above anything else. Bargaining interactions between the civilian leadership and senior officers can also be vital for leader survival in regimes transitioning from military rule (Brooks and White 2023). Appeasement of the armed forces is an important tool for coup avoidance in transitional settings. During the 1980s, for example, the Brazilian military had the upper hand to "define the content, and delimit the boundaries, of liberalization" (Stepan 1988, 45).

Politically outweighed by officers, incumbent leaders likely strive to credibly signal their commitment to align with the military's preferences in order to evade the risk of office removal via coups. Accommodating officers may involve allocating organizational resources to the armed forces or integrating officers into politics. Officers' economic grievances related to their salaries and equipment may serve as a catalyst for coup efforts aimed at ousting the incumbent leadership. Leon (2014) argues that officers often orchestrate coups with the intention of expanding military budgets by showing that coups become more probable following periods of relatively low budgetary allocations to the armed forces. Military budgets also tend to undergo larger increases in the aftermath of successful power seizures compared to failed attempts (Leon 2014). In accordance, Powell et al. (2018) contend that high levels of defense spending can alleviate officers' concerns regarding their corporate interests at the early stages of democratization. Similarly, Bove and Nisticò (2014) show that greater levels of military political involvement are associated with larger resource allocations to military spending.

Integrating military input in policymaking does not automatically equate to accommodative efforts. Democratic leaders may align with prominent civilian-subordinate military figures in making budgetary and security decisions by putting confidence in their monopoly of expertise (Bland 1999; Flynn 2014). However, nondemocratic and transitional settings, coopting with military to set defense spending limits rather signals leaders' willingness to placate the military, aimed at mitigating the risk of deposition (Brooks and White 2022). However, this can end up relinquishing their exclusive authority over the distribution of state resources across different sectors according to their priorities, which often tilts the balance toward guns at the expense of butter (Brooks and White 2022; Passmore 2022). Substantial resource allocations to the armed forces enable transitional leaders to credibly signal their commitment to the former political elites, including military leaders, and thereby decrease the likelihood of coups (Powell et al. 2018). With this purpose, leaders may even grease the wheels of military participation in profit-making business activities in order to maintain their position in office (Izadi 2022).

However, these ad-hoc strategies are not necessarily suggestive of long-term commitments due to nonexistent institutional guarantees. In this respect, Meng (2019, 570) contends that "institutions matter, not because they establish *de jure* rule, but when they affect de facto political power." Building on this line of reasoning, Sakib and Rahman (2023a) argue that allocating government seats to active-duty officers enables the leadership to persuasively demonstrate that the military's corporate interests are accommodated by power-sharing through institutional arrangements. The presence of officers at the top administrative level gives the military a formalized platform to exert influence on policymaking processes (Sakib and Rahman 2023a; White 2023). Thereby, the military leadership "gains access to material resources, power, and prestige, allowing them to consolidate their own bases of support" (Meng 2019, 570). Given the potential risk of failure associated with coordination challenges of coup efforts, assuming government seats can serve as an agreeable arrangement on the civil-military axis (Sakib and Rahman 2023a; White 2023).

For example, to demonstrate his commitment to align with the military, the Zairian President Kenneth Kaunda engaged in exorbitant assignments of active-duty military officers to administrative roles, including cabinet seats from the early 1970s until stepping down from office (Lindemann 2011). Concurrently, Kaunda placated officers with ample wages and other enticements, and thereby effectively evaded the risk of a military takeover (Lindemann 2011, 26). Extant quantitative research suggests that the presence of military officers in civilian-led cabinets is associated with higher levels of military expenditure (Sakib and Rahman 2023a). In light of this evidence, one can reasonably assume that accommodating officers' economic demands

is a primary concern of leaders when appointing them to ministerial roles.

Governmental power-sharing approach can arguably constitute an effective strategy, albeit with associated risks. Evidence shows that sizeable increases of active-duty officers in government tend to decrease coup risk (White 2023). In contrast, minor increases and large decreases of active military officers within government are associated with increased risk of military takeover (White 2023). Moreover, appointing officers to policymaking positions in government is likely to undermine civilian control both in democratic and autocratic regimes (Beliakova 2021). This is particularly evident when the armed forces exploit their institutional prerogatives and delegated authority to contest and undermine civilian leaders' capacity to fulfill their executive responsibilities (Brooks 2019; Stepan 1988). For example, although the Egyptian military enjoyed extensive corporate privileges and held ministerial seats under President Hosni Mubarak, it became increasingly absorbed in politics, ultimately viewing Mubarak as dispensable as long as they could preserve their control over the regime (Brooks and White 2022). This section established that the military's economic interests and participation in government are intertwined, since the latter can enhance leaders' ability to credibly guarantee catering to the former. The next section discusses why UN peacekeeping involvement can serve as a viable alternative to the strategy of allocating government seats to active-duty officers, aiming to facilitate a mutually agreeable arrangement between the government and armed forces.

## 2.3 UN Peacekeeping: An Agreeable Arrangement Between the Government and Armed Forces?

The decision to dispatch troops to conflict zones outside country borders lies at the intersect of defense and foreign policymaking (Meiske and Ruggeri 2017; Sotomayor 2010), and requires at least some degree of bureaucratic consensus along the civil military-axis (Sotomayor 2010). Officers in advisory positions frequently hold obstinate views regarding foreign military interventions, and civil-military interactions and corporate interests often play an important role in determining deployment decisions (Sotomayor 2010, 173). Not all militaries vehemently support the idea of sending abroad a large number of troops under blue berets, especially when the benefits of peacekeeping involvement carry little appeal for their corporate interests (Sotomayor 2010, 162). The relatively low financial compensations offered by the UN fail to attract deployments of expensive and sophisticated military equipment

and handsomely paid security personnel from developed countries (Coleman and Nyblade 2018). By participating in UN peacekeeping, developing states can instrumentalize their troop commitments to gain access to additional financial, commodity, and skill-building resources provided by developed countries, and can then be expeditiously conveyed to the armed forces with rare instances of interference by government bureaucracy (Levin, MacKay, and Nasirzadeh 2016, 108).

The patterns of deployments from new democracies indicate that peacekeeper dispatches are a viable accommodative tool for insecure transitional leaders in democratizing states, who are expected to attend to redistributive calls for the delivery of public resources while often being compelled to accommodate the military's corporate interests (Passmore 2022). Passmore's (2022) recent study suggests that transitional democracies, especially those with a legacy of military praetorianism, are more likely to contribute large contingents to UN peace operations compared to other regimes. However, this tendency mostly decreases as the regime consolidates. The study further estimates that newly democratized states with previous coup experience deploy 711 troops on a monthly average compared to 230 troops from those without any previous instance of a coup (Passmore 2022). Some nondemocracies, on the other hand, also exhibit a notable proclivity to commit troops from their militaries. Levin (2023) finds that nondemocratic countries run by monarchical, military, or multiparty rule make significantly greater troop commitments compared to other illiberal regimes, while showing no clearly discernible difference from democracies. Monarchical and military nondemocracies, in which officers' political grip on the incumbent regime is likely tighter, may show a greater willingness to participate intensively in the UN's peacekeeping efforts due to the desirability of the associated economic benefits for the military's corporate interests (Levin 2023).

In light of previous findings, I argue that troop-contributing government leaders can placate the officer corps by channeling peacekeeping-related rewards to their militaries. By leveraging external revenues credibly guaranteed by the UN and bilateral agreements with major donors, these leaders can circumvent the adverse effects of civil-military information discrepancies regarding the credibility of their commitment to align with their militaries' preferences. Additionally, I expect that participation in UN peace operations can foster professionalism within ranks of troop-contributing militaries. Although the military may retain a certain degree of autonomy and self-interest, foreign operational engagements can shift its immediate priorities away from domestic politics and the pursuit of high-profile government positions.

### 2.3.1 Economic Rewards

Economic motives play an important role in incentivizing troop commitments to UN peace operations, especially in developing countries facing resource challenges (Bobrow and Boyer 1997; Boutton and D'Orazio 2020; Bove and Elia 2011; Gaibulloev et al. 2015; Lundgren 2018). At the subnational level, engagement in UN peace operations can serve as a strategic tool for contributing governments, enabling them to accommodate their militaries with resources obtained externally from the UN and major states (Passmore 2022). Although at times forestalled due to arrears in member state payments or prolonged bureaucratic processes, the resource inflows institutionally guaranteed by the UN and bilateral agreements with donor states can mitigate praetorian pressures on civilian governments. Lundgren (2018, 510) underscores the "disciplining effect" of the UN's financial compensations on poorer and smaller armed forces that heavily rely on these revenues. This mechanism might serve as a deterrent, preventing officers from committing overt acts of insubordination toward civilian rule in order to sustain their involvement in peace missions (Lundgren 2018). As troop-contributing military elites often view external revenue streams derived from their peacekeeping participation as economically favorable, they can be less inclined to pressure their governments for institutional arrangements that guarantee their preferences are accommodated at the government level. This in turn can alleviate governments' concerns about credibly signaling their commitment to their militaries' corporate interests by allocating cabinet seats to active-duty officers, providing them with institutional roles to influence policy decisions regarding their shares from the state budget.

Among top contributors whose personnel supplies constitute the bulk of the UN's peacekeeping force, per-soldier defense spending is often scarcely limited by budgetary constraints (Gaibulloev et al. 2015). The UN reimburses peacekeeping troops at rates that usually surpass their domestic salaries, and the resulting positive imbalance on the peacekeeping personnel's account is favorable for those intending to support their family and cover additional personal expenses. Further, reimbursement payments are typically transferred to peacekeeping troops through their respective militaries, acting as intermediaries (Adhikari 2020; Pattanaik 2021). These payments are issued by the UN at a fixed rate regardless of rank. Some troop-contributing militaries can use these funds to support their exclusive welfare programs and invest in business ventures. For example, the Nepalese military typically withholds 22 percent from each soldier's monthly reimbursement, channeling these funds into the Nepal Army Welfare Fund to assist its personnel with accommodation, education, insurance, and medical care, as well as to provide financial support

to those in need within the military (Adhikari 2020, 386). Developing states that provide lower allowances and salaries to their dispatched troops and operate with aged but serviceable gear are likely to maximize their profits from UN reimbursements (Coleman and Nyblade 2018). These financial benefits are particularly crucial for countries with smaller armies. In Uruguay, for example, UN reimbursements are reported to constitute a significant portion of the country's defense expenditure (Abiola et al. 2017). Using old but functional equipment, the Uruguayan government is reported to receive yearly reimbursements for its deployed assets amounting up to a tenth of their standard market price, fully compensating for their initial purchase within a decade, which is shorter than the average life span of most military equipment (Andrés Peláez 2007).

Thanks to donations from major states, troop-contributing countries can also obtain relatively modern military equipment, thereby enhancing the operational capabilities of their armed forces. In this respect, Coleman and Nyblade (2018) maintain that peacekeeper deployments have a conceivable rationale in countries where national policymaking processes are gravitated by the armed forces, with respect to the provision of military bonuses. Further, contributing countries obtain financial support not only through UN reimbursements but also from other sources, because "major powers with interests in establishing particular missions allocate foreign aid strategically as an inducement to persuade recipient countries to contribute more manpower to these operations, and to continue participating even when doing so becomes costly" (Boutton and D'Orazio 2020, 326). While only a select few states can directly profit from peacekeeping reimbursements for deployed security personnel and contingent-owned equipment (Coleman and Nyblade 2018), UN revenues, supplemented by financial and in-kind donations from interested major states, as well as externally funded training programs enable troop-contributing governments to outsource a portion of their defense costs (Boutton and D'Orazio 2020; Sakib and Rahman 2023b).

UN peacekeeping rents can provide troop-contributing governments with additional resources substituting significant fractions of their defense expenses (Sakib and Rahman 2023b). States can also delegate responsibilities for military training and the acquisition of arms and equipment to the UN and major states, and thereby externalize their financial obligations (Sakib and Rahman 2023b). Sakib and Rahman (2023b) present evidence that troop commitments have a negative effect on the level of defense spending. According to their view, officers within peacekeeping armies can be less motivated to press for greater outlays to the defense sector, as leaders can channel UN provisions to cover routine military running expenses, thus alleviating strain on the state budget (Sakib and Rahman 2023b, 6). By channeling

peacekeeping revenues to the armed forces, transitional leaders can achieve a better hand in the guns-versus-butter tradeoff and allocate greater resources to other sectors that would benefit the general public, which enables them to turn down critical voices within domestic opposition (Passmore 2022, 275). Similar instruments can also be employed by leaders in monarchical and military nondemocracies to accommodate the armed forces, which play a prominent role in safeguarding the regime as repressive agents (Levin 2023). The reduced levels of military spending suggest that troop-contributing governments can be under less pressure to accommodate the officer corps by 'giving them toys' (Huntington 1991; Powell et al. 2018). In this respect, one can also plausibly assume that the civilian leadership would be less inclined to allocate cabinet seats to active-duty military officers.

### 2.3.2 Professionalization

Participation in UN peace operations can enable soldiers to attain a higher level of expertise and foster professionalism by undergoing training programs offered by developed democracies and gaining operational experience in militarily-demanding conflict zones. This may facilitate the exposure of internally-oriented militaries preoccupied by domestic security tasks to modern Western military practices (Albrecht 2020; Findlay 1996; Passmore 2022). Peacekeeping involvement may foster "focused responsibilities" at the international level, and thereby reducing the military's inclination to overtly meddle in domestic policymaking processes (Welch, Jr. 1976, 32). In this respect, specialization through peacekeeping may gradually limit the range of tasks the military has previously undertaken. Similarly, Albrecht (2020, 593) suggests that "collaborating in peacekeeping operations - and hence exposure to postconflict environments - can help redirect officers' focus on the task of providing security, rather than entering the fray into politics." Although increased organizational capacities can assign a greater weight to the military in bargaining with civilian leadership, its preoccupation with peacekeeping tasks can shift the pursuit of active political roles lower on their list of immediate priorities.

The UN recognizes the need for skilled peacekeepers to establish a stable environment in mission-host countries by reducing hostilities. The 2000 Brahimi report suggests that "to be effective, the missions' personnel need materiel (equipment and logistics support), finance (cash in hand to procure goods and services), information assets (training and briefing), an operational strategy and, for operations deploying into uncertain circumstances, a military and political 'center of gravity' sufficient to enable it to anticipate and overcome one or more of the parties' second thoughts

about taking a peace process forward" (UN Security Council 2000, 15). For this purpose, the UN endorses a variety of training schemes during the deployment preparation phase, provided either by member states in peacekeepers' respective countries or by the UN Integrated Training Service within the Department of Peace Operations (DPO), while additional programs are also available throughout the course of peace missions (Curran 2017).

Economically developed countries typically use their domestic resources for peacekeeper training. For example, European Union member states rely on a wide nexus of education and training facilities spread across the continent to ensure their personnel's predeployment readiness through courses offered within the framework of European Security and Defense College (Dubois 2021). However, external assistance is available for peacekeeping-oriented skill-building efforts. Dorn and Libben (2018, 273-274) report that, between 2005 and 2012, over 500 military officers from developing countries graduated from a "three-week Tactical Operations Staff Course" offered by Canada's Department of National Defense at peacekeeping training centers in Africa. Entirely financed through the military assistance programs by the UN and other donors, these centers aim to enhance security personnel capacity with skilled professionals, and establish a platform for strengthening the network of national elites, primarily from military backgrounds, taught together as a countermeasure for future regional conflicts (Jowell 2018, 104). In this respect, military leaders may view their countries' UN peacekeeping involvement favorably in terms of granting their uniformed personnel opportunities for international exposure (Abiola et al. 2017).

At the UN level, acting upon the feedback from field personnel, the DPO has been eager to revise training programs by addressing identified weaknesses (Curran 2013). In May 2009, for example, the DPO adopted the Core Pre-Deployment Training Materials in order to provide uniformed personnel with a fundamental understanding of operational principles and guidelines, and a series of soft skills encompassing effective communication, cultural diversity, team building, and negotiation (Curran 2013, 82). Given peacekeepers' diverse national backgrounds, these modules were intended to facilitate their interactions with the local population and among themselves to increase operational effectiveness (Curran 2013, 83). In this respect, English proficiency plays an important role in enhancing peacekeepers' communication skills. For example, since 1996 the British Council Peacekeeping English Project has been providing language training for security personnel participating in peace operations, funded primarily by the United Kingdom, with additional support from Canada, Hungary, Netherlands, and Norway (Crossey 2008, 208). Despite their limitations in meeting operational needs, these programs enable militaries to expand their hu-

man capacity by developing additional skills and engaging in new responsibilities. More importantly, UN peacekeeping involvement can provide valuable opportunities for inexperienced militaries to conduct combat operations. Providing evidence that developing militaries are more likely to dispatch troops to zones of active violence, Oestman (2023, 507) argues that combat engagement may hold significance for the contributor-specific incentives of states aiming to improve their militaries' tactical capabilities through on-the-ground exposure to conflict environments. Some peacekeeping troops may enter their first combat encounter within UN peace operations (Harig 2020).

The perspectives of military personnel regarding the prestige and desirability of participating in UN peace missions also play a crucial role in determining the implications of their deployment for civil-military relations (Harig 2023). Some suggest that sending military personnel to UN peace operations enables the civilian leadership to circumvent military challenges to civilian control by diverting armed forces' focus toward outward engagements that ensure ongoing activity, likely alleviating officers' immediate concerns regarding their transforming corporate roles at the societal level (Passmore 2022, 280). Worboys (2007), for example, underscores the role of the Carlos Menem government in the 1990s in steering the Argentine military toward assuming an 'entirely new identity' through the instrumentalization of UN peacekeeping. This was not long after the country's transition from the military rule that came after the devastating defeat in 1982 against Great Britain over the Falkland Islands, which tarnished the military's image and led to significant cutbacks in defense spending (Sotomayor 2010). During the 1990s, the Argentine military achieved a greater degree of professionalism and became an "institution more narrowly focused on external missions rather than domestic politics" (Passmore 2022, 294).

Participation in UN peace operations can enable developing country leaders to credibly promise to accommodate military corporate interests through institutional guarantees provided at the international level. In doing so, they can also engage their militaries in external responsibilities that transcend domestic politics. For this reason, I expect that high volumes of troop contributions to UN peace operations are associated with a reduced likelihood of direct military involvement in government positions. However, one should keep in mind that this outcome can be a byproduct of an agreeable arrangement between the leadership and the military, rather than a firm submission to civilian rule. The military may still retain its tutelary role and exert indirect influence in political processes through backdoor exchanges with the incumbent leadership. The breakdown of these bargaining interactions could still potentially lead to coup attempts aimed at ousting the regime. The argument

does not propose a necessary improvement of civilian control, but rather a shift in the dynamics of civil-military interactions on the basis of mutual benefits. Building upon the preceding discussion, the main hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis: The greater the number of troops a country commits to UN peace missions, the lower the likelihood of active military personnel participating in its government.

## 2.4 Data

*Dependent variable.* The information on *Military Participation in Government* is obtained from White's (2017, 591) Military Participation in Government dataset, "for which researchers coded a series of variables related to the number and type of positions held by active-duty military officers in the government by country and year." White (2017, 591) informs that human coders mainly relied on the Europa World Year Book, "which contains yearly rosters of national cabinets, state councils, and other such bodies in the executive branch of government for all countries from 1964 onward." *Military Participation in Government* is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if any active-duty military officer holds a governmental position in a given country-year, and 0 if otherwise. This dichotomous indicator is sufficient for assessing the study's hypothesis, which expects that troop contributions negatively affect officers' direct political involvement by assuming executive roles. After incorporating these data with other variables in the sample with the exclusion of occupied countries, the dataset ultimately covers over 150 countries from 1992 to 2008.

*Independent variable.* Due to the heavily right-skewed distribution of member-state troop contributions, the main explanatory variable, *Peacekeepers (ln)*, is the natural log transformation of the number of military personnel deployed to UN peace operations. I used the highest monthly troop commitment in a given country-year since other variables include yearly observations. This variable relies on the information provided by the United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel Commitments dataset, which contains monthly data on UN personnel deployments by contributor countries (Kathman 2013). The data on the type and number of peacekeeper deployments are obtained from the monthly reports of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations from 1992 onward.

*Control variables.* The regime indicators were constructed using the information

from the Polity 5 dataset where *Democracy* takes the scores of 7 or above as the baseline, *Autocracy* takes the scores of -7 or below, and *Anocracy* takes the scores between -6 and 6 (Marshall and Gurr 2020). *GDP per Capita (ln)* and *Population (ln)* are the variables constructed by logging the data taken from Gleditsch (2002). *Military Expenditure per Soldier (ln)* and *Military Size (ln)* are the natural log transformations of the information retrieved from the World Bank Development Indicators Databank (World Bank). *Military Regime* is an indicator for polities ruled by military governments, relying on Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014). *Recent Coup Attempts* indicates whether a coup attempt occurred in a country within the previous decade, either successful or failed. These data are taken from Powell and Thyne (2011) who provide information on global instances of coups from 1950 onward.

Since a country's security environment might affect the government's reliance on military expertise in cabinet posts, some models incorporate information on conflict involvement. *Interstate Conflict* and *Interstate Conflict* shows whether a country is engaged in inter- or intrastate conflict relying on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset (Davies, Pettersson, and Öberg 2022; Gleditsch et al. 2002), each variable takes the value of 1 if the number of conflict-related casualties amounts to 25 or more, and 0 if otherwise. Extant literature shows a strong relationship between bad governance and large cabinets in which the allocation of ministerial positions to the regime elites can be employed as a clientelistic mechanism (Wehner and Mills 2022). Leaders who engage in elite clientelism through the allocation of cabinet posts may also seek to accommodate senior military officers in a similar manner. For this reason, some model specifications control for *Cabinet Size* using information collected from White (2017). Finally, each model specification also controls for temporal dependence (Carter and Signorino 2010). In Appendix A, Table A.1 reports these variables' in-sample descriptive statistics.

## 2.5 Findings and Discussion

Table 2.1 reports the coefficients from Models 1-4 using logistic regressions. All models are estimated with robust standard errors clustered by country. Model 1 simply includes the main explanatory variable along with the information on countries' political and socioeconomic conditions, resource- and personnelwise military capacity, and whether they are ruled by military regimes. Model 2 accounts for countries' recent coup history and security environment. Model 3 includes an additional control for the size of cabinet in order account for whether leaders are inclined

to engage in elite clientelism through the allocation of ministerial positions.

Table 2.1 Logistic Regression Estimates

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Peacekeepers (ln) | -0.107*** | -0.112*** | -0.116*** | -0.081* |
| | (0.036) | (0.037) | (0.038) | (0.045) |
| Autocracy | 1.351*** | 1.370*** | 1.048*** | 2.363*** |
| | (0.377) | (0.379) | (0.400) | (0.643) |
| Anocracy | 0.189 | 0.250 | 0.145 | 0.428 |
| | (0.233) | (0.239) | (0.236) | (0.350) |
| GDP per Capita (ln) | -0.374*** | -0.356** | -0.347** | -0.916*** |
| | (0.138) | (0.141) | (0.142) | (0.264) |
| Population (ln) | -0.040 | -0.042 | -0.108 | -0.402* |
| | (0.137) | (0.143) | (0.151) | (0.228) |
| Military Exp. per Soldier (ln) | 0.042 | 0.043 | 0.070 | 0.140 |
| | (0.057) | (0.057) | (0.059) | (0.085) |
| Military Size (ln) | 0.309*** | 0.312*** | 0.282** | 0.602*** |
| | (0.113) | (0.118) | (0.118) | (0.179) |
| Military Regime | -0.314 | -0.302 | -0.401 | -0.956 |
| | (0.444) | (0.457) | (0.474) | (0.626) |
| Recent Coup Attempts | | 0.055 | 0.096 | 0.121 |
| | | (0.230) | (0.224) | (0.322) |
| Interstate Conflict | | 1.495** | 1.611** | 1.873** |
| | | (0.699) | (0.706) | (0.786) |
| Intrastate Conflict | | -0.215 | -0.262 | -0.126 |
| | | (0.272) | (0.277) | (0.438) |
| Cabinet Size | | | 0.038** | 0.061*** |
| | | | (0.015) | (0.021) |
| Year | 0.042** | 0.043** | 0.035* | -0.003 |
| | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.025) |
| Military Participation Years | -1.230*** | -1.231*** | -1.225*** | -0.952*** |
| | (0.108) | (0.109) | (0.110) | (0.101) |
| Military Participation Years$^2$ | 0.064*** | 0.063*** | 0.063*** | 0.046*** |
| | (0.009) | (0.010) | (0.009) | (0.008) |
| Military Participation Years$^3$ | -0.001*** | -0.001*** | -0.001*** | -0.001*** |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Constant | -83.759** | -85.022** | -69.552* | 9.405 |
| | (35.726) | (36.408) | (36.555) | (48.695) |
| N | 2155 | 2155 | 2155 | 2155 |
| LL | -577.269 | -574.634 | -568.708 | -536.988 |
| AIC | 1180.537 | 1181.267 | 1171.415 | 1109.976 |
| BIC | 1254.319 | 1272.076 | 1267.899 | 1212.136 |
| Random Effects | No | No | No | Yes |

Logistic regressions with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 2.2 Logistic Regression Estimates with Lagged Values I

|  | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Peacekeepers (ln)$_{t-1}$ | -0.132*** | | | |
| | (0.042) | | | |
| Peacekeepers (ln)$_{t-2}$ | | -0.141*** | | |
| | | (0.041) | | |
| Peacekeepers (ln)$_{t-3}$ | | | -0.133*** | |
| | | | (0.044) | |
| Peacekeepers (ln)$_{t-4}$ | | | | -0.142*** |
| | | | | (0.046) |
| Autocracy | 0.953** | 1.053** | 1.083** | 0.929** |
| | (0.412) | (0.456) | (0.487) | (0.468) |
| Anocracy | 0.129 | 0.144 | 0.175 | 0.156 |
| | (0.252) | (0.261) | (0.264) | (0.275) |
| GDP per Capita (ln) | -0.307* | -0.336** | -0.340* | -0.299* |
| | (0.159) | (0.163) | (0.177) | (0.182) |
| Population (ln) | -0.090 | -0.077 | -0.069 | -0.047 |
| | (0.167) | (0.173) | (0.184) | (0.190) |
| Military Exp. per Soldier (ln) | 0.028 | 0.024 | 0.032 | 0.023 |
| | (0.075) | (0.074) | (0.078) | (0.076) |
| Military Size (ln) | 0.255* | 0.242* | 0.231 | 0.214 |
| | (0.137) | (0.139) | (0.152) | (0.164) |
| Military Regime | -0.651 | -0.441 | -0.423 | -0.291 |
| | (0.464) | (0.533) | (0.593) | (0.567) |
| Recent Coup Attempts | 0.089 | -0.028 | -0.125 | -0.199 |
| | (0.232) | (0.233) | (0.248) | (0.261) |
| Interstate Conflict | 1.736** | 1.701** | 1.833** | 1.827** |
| | (0.835) | (0.809) | (0.854) | (0.896) |
| Intrastate Conflict | -0.235 | -0.261 | -0.288 | -0.302 |
| | (0.297) | (0.309) | (0.324) | (0.335) |
| Cabinet Size | 0.045*** | 0.043*** | 0.037** | 0.037** |
| | (0.015) | (0.016) | (0.016) | (0.016) |
| Year | 0.016 | 0.004 | 0.001 | 0.004 |
| | (0.018) | (0.019) | (0.022) | (0.028) |
| Military Participation Years | -1.267*** | -1.239*** | -1.201*** | -1.210*** |
| | (0.118) | (0.117) | (0.116) | (0.123) |
| Military Participation Years$^2$ | 0.065*** | 0.063*** | 0.062*** | 0.063*** |
| | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.011) | (0.011) |
| Military Participation Years$^3$ | -0.001*** | -0.001*** | -0.001*** | -0.001*** |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Constant | -31.337 | -7.641 | -0.888 | -7.044 |
| | (35.704) | (37.645) | (44.395) | (55.512) |
| N | 2036 | 1909 | 1784 | 1661 |
| LL | -511.983 | -469.742 | -442.764 | -408.751 |
| AIC | 1057.965 | 973.483 | 919.527 | 851.501 |
| BIC | 1153.484 | 1067.907 | 1012.800 | 943.559 |

Logistic regressions with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table 2.3 Logistic Regression Estimates with Lagged Values II

|  | (9) | (10) | (11) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Peacekeepers $(\ln)_{t-5}$ | -0.124** | | |
|  | (0.050) | | |
| Peacekeepers $(\ln)_{t-6}$ | | -0.095** | |
|  | | (0.047) | |
| Peacekeepers $(\ln)_{t-7}$ | | | -0.084 |
|  | | | (0.055) |
| Autocracy | 1.003** | 1.109** | 1.257** |
|  | (0.460) | (0.475) | (0.491) |
| Anocracy | 0.166 | 0.210 | 0.249 |
|  | (0.284) | (0.281) | (0.287) |
| GDP per Capita (ln) | -0.265 | -0.292* | -0.309* |
|  | (0.182) | (0.176) | (0.179) |
| Population (ln) | -0.123 | -0.166 | -0.157 |
|  | (0.191) | (0.193) | (0.209) |
| Military Exp. per Soldier (ln) | -0.004 | -0.011 | -0.018 |
|  | (0.077) | (0.076) | (0.079) |
| Military Size (ln) | 0.245 | 0.236 | 0.208 |
|  | (0.172) | (0.173) | (0.177) |
| Military Regime | 0.124 | 0.105 | 0.075 |
|  | (0.600) | (0.583) | (0.580) |
| Recent Coup Attempts | -0.334 | -0.366 | -0.397 |
|  | (0.263) | (0.274) | (0.282) |
| Interstate Conflict | 1.954** | 2.064** | 2.345** |
|  | (0.990) | (1.024) | (1.124) |
| Intrastate Conflict | -0.258 | -0.216 | -0.147 |
|  | (0.348) | (0.357) | (0.348) |
| Cabinet Size | 0.036** | 0.030* | 0.023 |
|  | (0.017) | (0.017) | (0.018) |
| Year | 0.004 | -0.015 | -0.018 |
|  | (0.034) | (0.038) | (0.041) |
| Military Participation Years | -1.205*** | -1.219*** | -1.192*** |
|  | (0.136) | (0.149) | (0.152) |
| Military Participation Years$^2$ | 0.063*** | 0.064*** | 0.062*** |
|  | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.013) |
| Military Participation Years$^3$ | -0.001*** | -0.001*** | -0.001*** |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Constant | -7.015 | 32.621 | 38.130 |
|  | (67.958) | (76.019) | (82.578) |
| N | 1533 | 1403 | 1276 |
| LL | -377.681 | -338.902 | -308.724 |
| AIC | 789.362 | 711.805 | 651.448 |
| BIC | 880.056 | 800.993 | 739.023 |

Logistic regressions with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Model 4 is estimated with the same specification of the former, but with random effects. I employed random effects to reestimate the fully specified model in order to account for the potential impact of the variables included in the analysis, which may be unchanging or rarely varying over time (Bell and Jones 2015).

As expected, the number of peacekeepers has a negative effect on the predicted probability of military participation in government across all model specifications. *Peacekeepers*' effect on *Military Participation* remains negative and statistically different from zero at the 99 percent confidence level across Models 1-3. Estimated with random effects, Model 4 continues to provide partial support for the main hypothesis at the 90 percent confidence level. As coefficients are only informative regarding the significance and nature of the relationship, one can only infer that the effect remains consistently significant and negative in all model specifications despite the changing numbers of controls. This is in line with my theoretical expectation.[2]

Based on the estimations from Model 3, Figure 2.1 shows the substantive effect of *Peacekeepers (ln)* on the predicted probability of *Military Participation in Government*.[3] Substantively, shifting *Peacekeepers (ln)* from its minimum (0) to maximum value (9.23) leads to a 11.5 percentage-point decrease in the predicted probability of observing at least one active-duty military officer in government. Alternatively, shifting the variable one standard deviation (3.02) away from its mean (2.47) decreases the predicted probability of *Military Participation in Government*, roughly by 3.8 percentage points. *Peacekeepers (ln)* hence shows a negative effect on officers' tendency to directly intervene in politics by assuming seats at the top administrative level. The results support the hypothesized negative effect of peacekeeper deployments on military political participation in troop-contributing countries.

Looking at the control variables, unsurprisingly, *Military Participation in Government* has a strong positive association with autocracies, and a similarly positive yet statistically insignificant relationship with anocracies. The logged-*GDP per Capita* has a consistently significant and negative effect across all models on Table 2.1, suggesting that poorer countries are more likely to have officers eager to undertake

[2]I should note that the effect, although still negative, loses its significance when rerunning the full model with democracies (N=1,104) excluded from the sample (p=0.209). This insignificance can partly be attributed to autocratic leaders' heavy reliance on security forces as their regimes' repressive agents. One can infer that, in autocratic settings, peacekeeper deployments can be used to placate politicized militaries, while professionalization may enhance coercive capabilities, potentially tilting the balance of civil-military bargaining power in favor of the officer corps (Kamrava 2000). The effect remains negative and significant when the full model is reestimated without autocracies (N=236, p<0.01). Since established democracies usually refrain from making high-volume troop commitments (Coleman 2013; Duursma and Gledhill 2019), UN peacekeeping involvement most likely reduces military participation in government in transitional democracies.

[3]Substantive effects of *Peacekeepers (ln)* on the predicted probability of *Military Participation in Government* based on Model 3. Gray areas show 90 percent confidence intervals. The histogram demonstrates the distribution of *Peacekeepers (ln)*.

executive roles. On the other hand, *Population (ln)* remains steadily negative and statistically insignificant.

Figure 2.1 Substantive Effect of Peacekeepers on the Predicted Probability of Military Participation in Government



*Recent Coup Attempts* mainly exhibits a positive but insignificant effect. The variable's insignificant effect can be attributed to the simplistic measurement of the dependent variable, which considers the presence of at least one active-duty officer in the executive branch as a positive case. *Interstate Conflict* yields a steadily significant and positive effect on military political involvement. In line with previous expectations, these results show that external threats are likely to increase the role of active-duty military officers in government. *Intrastate Conflict*, however, has an insignificant effect remaining negative, across all model specifications.

Expectedly, *Cabinet Size* has a consistent and significant positive effect on *Military Participation in Government*, which confirms that elite clientelism through the allocation of ministerial positions (Wehner and Mills 2022) is associated with the political accommodation of active-duty military officers. The findings show no support for the effect of *Military Regime*. The main models also indicate that *Military Expenditure per Soldier (ln)* is positively associated with *Military Participation in Government*, but this relationship is not supported statistically. Lastly, the find-

ings provide a strong empirical support for the effect of *Military Size*, meaning that officers from larger militaries are more inclined to step into government roles.

Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show robustness checks addressing endogeneity concerns. Models 5-11 are estimated with specifications including *Peacekeepers* lagged by up to 7 years, respectively. The variable remains significant at the 99 percent confidence level across Models 5-8, and continues to be supported at conventional levels through Models 9-10. However, the negative effect of peacekeeper deployments on military political participation seemingly loses its statistical significance after 6 years, which provides insights into its longevity.

To summarize, the empirical evidence presented in this section shows that large peacekeeper deployments from contributing country militaries decrease the likelihood of observing active-duty officers serving in their governments. To evaluate the robustness of these findings, I also conducted a number of further analyses presented in Appendix A. I replaced binary regime indicators, *GDP per Capita (ln)*, and *Military Expenditure per Soldier (ln)* with *Polity5 Score*, *GDP (ln)*, and *Military Expenditure (ln)*, respectively. The hypothesized relationship remains robust across these specifications using alternative indicators. *Peacekeepers (ln)*'s effect on the predicted probability of *Military Participation in Government* continues to be negative and statistically significant.

Using fractional logistic regression estimates, I also examine the effect of UN troop contributions on *Officers in Government*, which provides information on the share of active-duty military officers in government (Papke and Wooldridge 1996). As demonstrated in Tables A.6-A.8 and Figures A.1-A.2, the findings reveal that peacekeeper deployments negatively affect not only the probability of officers' presence but also their predicted share in cabinet seats. I further controlled for the temporal dependence of *Military Participation in Government* on UN peacekeeping participation, and finally used the actual number of maximum monthly troop deployments as an alternative measure of the main explanatory variable. The effect of peacekeeper contributions remains consistently negative and statistically significant. To complement these findings, the next section investigates the relationship between troop deployments and military political involvement through a brief case study of Bangladesh.

## 2.6 Peace in the World, Absence in Government: The Case of the Bangladesh Military

With the support of the Indian army, Bangladesh gained its independence from Pakistan after achieving victory in the War of Liberation that ended on December 1971 (Haider 2009; Wilkinson 2000). The country adopted its foundational constitution in November 1972, which was followed by the first election in March 1973 in which Sheikh Mujib's Awami League Party obtained a vast majority of the seats in parliament (Huq 1973; Wilkinson 2000). Despite Mujib's efforts to personalize his rule, he was ousted by a military coup in August 1975, which led to his assassination (Baxter and Rahman 1991). What ensued was a fifteen-year military dominance in politics under General Ziaur Rahman from November 1975 to May 1981, and General Muhammad Ershad from January 1982 to December 1990. The latter phase was concluded with the resignation of Ershad, as some factions within the armed forces coopted with opposition leaders who jointly supported mass protests against the incumbent regime (Croissant et al. 2013; Wilkinson 2000).

Despite the civilianization of political authority on the facade, the fierce rivalry between Sheikh Hasina's Awami League (AL) and Khalida Zia's Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) led to the instrumentalization of nondemocratic measures as the government switched hands between these two main parties (Croissant et al. 2013). Some political institutions of the pretransition period evidently outlived their founders' tenure in office. For example, the Armed Forces Division (AFD), a remnant entity from the Ershad rule, continued its operations, now falling within the direct supervision of the Prime Minister's office (Pattanaik 2021). The AFD overshadowed the Defense Ministry in administering matters such as military purchases, officer assignments, and personnel training (Pattanaik 2021). Both parties sought to accommodate the military's corporate interests through policy formulations in order to guarantee officers' neutrality or favoritism to gain an upper hand in the political competition, which weakened the institutionalization of civilian control and increased the degree of military political involvement (Croissant et al. 2013; Islam 2010).

Since the 1990 transition, the AL and the BNP echoed similar measures previously taken by the political champions of the Bangladesh military, Generals Zia and Ershad, to ensure officer contentment. The civilian governments actively pursued to accommodate the military by allocating resources to the defense sector, cultivating military economic involvement through the Army Welfare Trust owning various business ventures in Dhaka (Adhikari 2020; Pattanaik 2021), and endorsing soldiers'

participation in UN peace missions which began in 1988 under the Ershad regime (Ahmed 2010; Islam 2010; Zaman and Biswas 2014).

Zaman and Biswas (2014, 337) portray Bangladesh's engagement in UN peacekeeping as a "consensus" between civilian bureaucracy and the security force establishment since all sides seemingly align with each other on matters regarding peacekeeper deployments. Despite the country's history with military rule and civilian governments' explicit efforts to placate the Bangladesh military, no cabinet positions have been allocated to members of the officer corps (Biswas 2024; Islam 2010). Bangladesh's committed peacekeeping participation served as an agreeable arrangement on the civil-military axis, ensuring active-duty officers' refrainment from direct involvement in politics by assuming cabinet posts. Many observers argue that this self-restraint may be partly owed to the military's corporate interests in continued involvement in UN peace operations (Hakim 1998; Islam 2010; Siddiqa 2007; Zaman and Biswas 2014), as reflected in the country's consistent status as a major personnel contributor. To date, the Bangladesh's involvement in UN peacekeeping has included over 167,000 personnel across 63 missions in roughly 40 countries (Armed Forces Division, n.d.).

The absence of officers in governmental roles can be attributed to two reasons. First, the Bangladesh military has, by and large, been content with the steady revenue inflow from UN reimbursements and peacekeeping-induced foreign aid (Biswas 2024; Krishnasamy 2003). The UN compensates Bangladeshi peacekeepers at rates that are considerably higher than their domestic salaries (Islam 2010; Zaman and Biswas 2014). Recruited peacekeepers are expected to commit a portion of this positive imbalance to military welfare organizations (Asian Centre for Human Rights 2014). As a result, the Bangladeshi military has continued to enjoy a substantial degree of financial autonomy thanks to various business ventures, ranging from five-star hotels to cement factories, owned by different military welfare bodies that partly fund their operations using peacekeeping revenues (Siddiqa 2007).

For military leaders, peacekeeping activism has also been leveraged to attract donors' hearts and minds as an aid recipient country. For example, during his trip to Haiti in 1995 to visit the Bangladeshi peacekeeping contingent, the Chief of Staff of the Bangladesh Army, Lieutenant General Abu Saleh Mohammad Nasim, had a meeting with United States President Bill Clinton who was also in the vicinity (Hossain 1996). Nasim's subsequent engagements with defense authorities in Washington resulted in an expansion in the volume of military aid in the next year's budget (Hossain 1996). Thanks to a steady inflow of external funding, military leaders have largely remained unconcerned over securing access to organizational resources.

From 2014 to 2023, for example, the Bangladesh Armed Forces received $78.5 million in military assistance from the United States, in addition to a $14.5 million package earmarked for military education and training (Biswas 2024, 1107). Having secured their economic enticements through international funding, military leaders have shown little interest in pursuing cabinet seats as institutional guarantees for their corporate interests.

Second, many senior officers associated their UN peacekeeping engagement with greater military professionalism and experience (Islam 2010; Krishnasamy 2003; Zaman and Biswas 2014). Undertaking foreign deployments under the UN banner has enabled Bangladeshi armed forces personnel to familiarize with different military practices and attain greater professionalism by acquiring new competencies necessary for peacekeeping tasks (Krishnasamy 2003). For example, Krishnasamy (2003, 40) reports that Bangladeshi troops had completed the United States Air Force's peacekeeper training program in Puerto Rico before being stationed in Haiti to embark on their mission. The program's curriculum was mapped to align with the mission's needs as it focused on technical and tactical skill development, covering areas ranging from orientation to unaccustomed weapons and other military equipment to combat in urban settings (Krishnasamy 2003). After launching of its own peacekeeping training center during the early 2000s, the Bangladesh military partnered with the UN and the United States to bolster its organizational effectiveness by investing in its pool of human resources, which increased the quality of Bangladeshi soldiers to meet UN expectations (Biswas 2024, 1096).

Continued institutional advancements have significantly elevated the professionalism of the Bangladesh military. Participation in UN peace operations has broadened the experience of Bangladeshi security personnel by exposing them to diverse geographical locations and enhancing their operational capabilities through active roles in remote conflicts (Biswas 2024). Further, the Bangladesh military's active involvement in UN peacekeeping has enhanced its domestic and international reputation (Biswas 2024). Zaman and Biswas (2014, 337) note that the Bangladesh military's "ability to perform professionally in UN peacekeeping missions abroad and earn accolades which help improve Bangladesh's image abroad has also been appreciated greatly by both politicians and the general population." Peacekeeping therefore contributed positively to the military's corporate image through the assumption of this new role (Croissant et al. 2013). The military's commitment to professionalization and international peace operations has largely separated it from domestic politics, while still maintaining a degree of influential oversight.

The Bangladesh military's disinterest in active political roles was most evident dur-

ing the military's installation of the fifth caretaker government (CTG) in 2007. Bangladesh had previous experience with one ad-hoc (December 1990-February 1991), and two constitutional (March 1996-June 1996, July 2001-October 2001) nonpartisan CTGs to facilitate the transfer of political authority through free and fair elections (Khan 2023). However, fourth CTG (October 2006-January 2007) faced heavy critique from the AL for violating the constitutional principle of non-partisanship. The political turmoil led to violent street clashes between polarized supporters (Khan 2023). Upon calls from aid donors and the UN, the military installed a new CTG (January 2007-December 2008) after pushing for the procla-mation of a state of emergency and forcing the resignation of President Iajuddin Ahmed on January 11, 2007 (Khan 2023). Lieutenant General Moeen U. Ahmed, the renowned pro-peacekeeping Chief of Staff of the Bangladesh Army, declared that they have no aspirations for direct involvement in politics and that their role is confined to support the new CTG until the successful transfer of political authority through democratic means (Ahmed 2010; Hindustan Times 2007). Although in-stalled by the military, the technocrat-dominated CTG had no active-duty officers in ministerial roles (Asian Centre for Human Rights 2014; The Economist 2007; Khan 2023).

## 2.7 Conclusion

This chapter investigated the relationship between UN peacekeeper contributions and military political involvement, with a partial focus on the presence of active-duty military officers in government posts. The study's findings suggest that sizable troop deployments to UN peace operations are associated with a lower likelihood of military participation in government. The empirical evidence supports the main argument that large personnel contributions can foster an agreeable arrangement between the leadership and armed forces. Engagement in UN peace operations can provide militaries not only with access to external resources but also with opportuni-ties for facilitating comprehensive professionalization. For this reason, the military's direct involvement in policymaking positions can become redundant or undesirable, and thereby less likely. The chapter further supplemented this argument through a case study of Bangladesh.

However, the findings do not necessarily indicate a peacekeeping-related improve-ment in governments' control of the armed forces. The study acknowledges its lim-itations in accounting for the complex patterns of military involvement in politics.

Of course, armed forces' political maneuvers extend well beyond assuming positions at the top administrative level, and officers can continue to exert influence behind closed doors to persuade the government to align with their preferences. The military elite can choose less noticeable ways in interfering policymaking processes by holding key offices at the subministerial level or within different government bodies. Alternatively, they can continue to challenge the civilian leadership from outside as an autonomous entity when they perceive a divergence of interests with the incumbent leadership. In this respect, the absence of active-duty military officers in government posts does not automatically translate into their firm subordination to civilian rule.

Future research should address these unchartered avenues to have a better understanding of the impact of peacekeeping on civil-military relations in troop-contributing countries. As well, the analytical scope should extend further than UN peace operations to encompass operations conducted by different international organizations. While the UN currently outmatches any other regional entity with respect to the resources it provides for personnel-contributing militaries, examining a broader range of peacekeeping efforts would expand our knowledge on the effect of foreign troop deployments on the civil-military axis.

# 3.    AWAY ON DUTY: PEACEKEEPER DEPLOYMENTS AND COUNTERBALANCING IN CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES

## 3.1 Introduction

Following the end of the Cold War, UN peace operations underwent a significant transformation marked by a growing emphasis on militarization. This shift was accompanied by a departure from the conventional liberal peacekeeping objectives toward the Protection of Civilians doctrine. As a result, missions became less ambitious, prioritizing short-term considerations and security-oriented goals through the utilization of coercive countermeasures (Karlsrud 2019). Another notable change was the larger mission sizes and the heightened level of fatality risk. Furthermore, partly owing to this change, most developed countries downsized their peacekeeper deployments to UN peace operations. The UN's persistent demand for personnel contributions necessitated the expansion of the pool of peacekeepers through a less selective recruitment process. To ensure an adequate supply of troops, the UN increasingly relied on contributions from the Global South, whose personnel often required investments in operational capabilities in order to fulfill peacekeeping duties. For that, with the assistance of its developed members, the UN introduced several operational training programs and reimbursements to support its peacekeeping personnel who are typically deployed from countries with either weak or nonexistent democratic institutions and struggling economies.

These supporting mechanisms, some argue, may attract personnel-contributing governments, given the organizational resources they provide, which would not otherwise be possible or as untroublesome to obtain (Bove and Elia 2011; Victor 2010). Furthermore, existing scholarship also posits that UN peacekeeping can be perceived as an avenue for military diversion (Albrecht 2020; Banini, Powell, and Yekple 2020; Victor 2010). To put another way, insecure leaders who face the risk of military involvement in politics may instrumentalize peacekeeping missions as means

to reorient the military outward. Although coup-avoidant leaders typically adopt coup-proofing strategies to ensure their political survival, they may choose to opt out of such efforts due to the associated drawbacks. As coup-proofing, particularly through counterbalancing, tends to undermine military effectiveness and deplete state resources, leaders may refrain from such strategies in favor of the comparative advantages that come with participating in UN peace operations.

This chapter investigates the relationship between peacekeeper deployments and counterbalancing efforts adopted by contributor country leaders. It tests the claim that sizable deployments with respect to the military are likely to reduce leaders' involvement in counterbalancing. The chapter unfolds across five sections. First, it offers a comprehensive overview of the mechanisms associated with counterbalancing. Then, it shifts its focus on the drawbacks associated with this strategy, followed by a discussion of the comparative advantages of participation in UN peace missions, where the main hypothesis is presented. Fourth, it provides details regarding the specifics of the data. Finally, it tests the argument that a high volume of deployment relative to the standing military is likely to diminish counterbalancing efforts. The chapter concludes by providing a brief summary and offering suggestions for future research.

## 3.2 Counterbalancing as a Coup-Proofing Strategy

The literature on civil-military relations has long focused on examining the central problematique known as the 'guardianship dilemma': the survival of political regimes hinges on their ability to repel threats through the establishment of armed forces with sufficient coercive capabilities. However, these capabilities can also pose a threat to the regime itself where civilian control of the military is not adequately institutionalized (Feaver 1996; 1999; McMahon and Slantchev 2015). In nondemocratic and transitional regimes, the absence of institutional arrangements that guarantee the military's adherence to civilian rule creates a challenging trade-off for leaders who must strike a delicate balance between building a military force "strong enough to prevail in war," but not to an extent where it can "enforce its will on the community that created it" (Feaver 1999, 214). Although military coups d'état have recently transformed into a promissory guise, driven by the apprehension of a backlash from the international community in the post-Cold War period, they continue to pose a significant threat to leaders aiming to maintain power (Bermeo 2016; Thyne et al. 2018).

This chapter narrows its focus on counterbalancing in investigating whether peace-keeper deployments can serve as a viable alternative to coup-proofing efforts by leaders in troop-contributing countries. Considering that spoiling is limited to appeasement tactics and purging is rather characterized by ad-hoc interventions, counterbalancing emerges as a distinctive approach for leaders to build the structural framework of regime security through the establishment of parallel forces (Escribà-Folch, Böhmelt, and Pilster 2020, 565-566). Harkness (2018) points out that counterbalancing lays the groundwork of organizational arrangements that facilitate the stacking of loyalists within the military or the incapacitation of its coercive capabilities.

Counterbalancing allows the incumbent leader to recalibrate the balance of power in favorable terms through the reduction of the military's coercive capabilities. Studies on coup-proofing identify two mechanisms through which counterbalancing operates to weaken the military's ability to oust the regime through coup d'état. First, counterbalancing hinders military cohesion by introducing coordination obstacles that impede unified action (Pilster and Böhmelt 2011; 2012; Powell 2012). This includes the fragmentation of the standing armed forces into discrete branches in order to foster disunity (Belkin and Schofer 2003; 2005; Pilster and Böhmelt 2011; 2012). Belkin and Schofer (2005, 144-45) emphasize the crucial importance for leaders to diligently maintain the disconnection between these factions in order to actively discourage any inclination toward engaging in a collaborative conspiracy against the regime. According to Pilster and Böhmelt (2011, 335), counterbalancing prompts "an artificial balance between these institutions," resulting in interunit alienation within the security force structure. Leaders may even go to the extent of refraining from allowing joint training routines due to the fear that such familiarization could encourage holistic integration among different branches of the armed forces (Pilster and Böhmelt 2011, 336). In Libya, for example, after surviving three major coup attempts in 1975, Muammar al-Gaddafi enforced a strict rule that prohibited military units from conducting exercises in configurations larger than the size of a battalion (Pollack 2002, 364).

Focusing on cooperation and exchange among allies on the battlefield, Reiter and Stam (1998b, 383) suggest that "at the operational level, it is likely that differences in factors such as command structure, technology, training, and communication equipment may hinder effective coordination." The same principle applies to the cooperative capacity of a country's divided coercive organizations. Some expect that the lack of effective interbranch communication may deter officers intending to instigate a coup, considering the challenges of organizing a synchronized attempt in settings where needed accomplices and presumed adversaries are abundant (Powell

2012, 1023). In this respect, counterbalancing should generate a strong disincentive, as the success of coups is mostly determined by plotters' ability to perform well-planned sequences to access and control the life veins of the state apparatus in a constrained period of time (De Bruin 2018; Malaparte 1932).

Second, counterbalancing sets the groundwork for the development of diverging interests within the security force structure. As leaders establish parallel forces as counterweights to the regular armed forces, they organize them in isolated frameworks, designated for specific and dissonant tasks. In such settings, the security force structure can be described as a patchwork comprising officers who undergo different training procedures, engage in distinct routinized practices, and receive income that is unevenly distributed such that those who have the closest ties to the leadership are typically paid the highest salaries (De Bruin 2018). Escribà-Folch, Böhmelt, and Pilster (2020, 566) emphasize the necessity of counterbalancing for the survival of personalist leaders, as it "entails the creation of a new reliable security agent to cope with... domestic threats (coups and uprisings), with which personal and mutual dependency links can be effectively established."

In Venezuela, for example, Hugo Chávez created the Bolivarian militias as an auxiliary security force outside the regular military (Norden 2021). Norden (2021, 17-18) reports that the militias were established as "a reserve force of armed civilians, responding directly to the president," as they were "created as a political force, personally loyal to the regime, armed and devoted to protecting *chavismo* against all enemies, internal or external." Owing its raison d'être to the leader who created it for self-security concerns, "a parallel military must be bound to the regime through special loyalties and social relationships" (Quinlivan 1999, 141). Such relationships are therefore manifested through intrinsic ties, as these organizations provide job security and other additional benefits that associate their members with the winning coalition of nondemocratic regimes. Building upon this rationale, these counterweight forces are expected to safeguard the regime against the threats from within, and intervene to abort putschist efforts through corresponding countermeasures such as logistical obstacles, violent resistance, and counterpropagandist broadcasts (De Bruin 2018). For example, the Kenyan Air Force's coup attempt against Daniel arap Moi in 1982 was forcefully quelled by the General Service Unit, a policing paramilitary organization formed by the Presidency (N'Diaye 2002).

## 3.3 Drawbacks of Counterbalancing

Despite the manifold benefits of counterbalancing, leaders are confronted with the complex tradeoffs and inherent costs that accompany its execution. On the one hand, the strategy of counterbalancing provides leaders with a strong hand by forming a checks-and-balances mechanism within a disintegrated security force structure. This further helps leaders set up the organizational basis that facilitates the implementation of various coup-proofing efforts with the assurance of coercive capabilities supplied by loyalist forces. However, such measures may entail vulnerability to external threats by undermining military effectiveness, impose a financial burden by consuming state resources, and carry the risk of inciting coups through overt acts against the armed forces. This section gives a comprehensive account of the drawbacks associated with counterbalancing, shedding light on why peacekeeper deployments might have an appeal as a viable alternative for the leaders aiming to implement effective coup-proofing measures for regime survival.

### 3.3.1 Fragmentation and Ineffectiveness

Counterbalancing may reduce military effectiveness on the battlefield, because undermining coup making abilities often translates into the reduction of combat capabilities. Conventional wisdom holds that leaders in nondemocratic settings resort to coup-proofing strategies because of the absence of normative subordination to civilian control, the lack of institutionalized channels for information exchange, and insufficient mechanisms to monitor officer grievances (Biddle and Long 2004; Escribà-Folch, Böhmelt, and Pilster 2020; Pilster and Böhmelt 2012; Reiter and Stam 1998a; 2002). In nondemocracies, prudent leaders may refrain from military-capacity building with the fear of high coup risk. Such leaders tend to incapacitate the military through force fragmentation, frequent reappointments, loyalty-based promotions, and poor training (Pilster and Böhmelt 2011; Quinlivan 1999).

The fragmentation of forces severely deprives the military of achieving competent combat coordination, a crucial element for executing effective combined maneuvers on the battlefield (Pilster and Böhmelt 2011). Furthermore, frequent reappointments of senior officers may hinder their ability to develop essential leadership qualities and establish mutual trust with their subordinates, both of which are necessary for successfully carrying out challenging duties that demand courage, effective communication, and cohesion (Biddle and Long 2004). Coup-avoidant leaders of-

ten delegate little authority to commanding officers, reserving such power only for those whom they consider as loyal (Brown, Farris, and McMahon 2016). Relatedly, loyalty-based promotions result in the accumulation of senior positions by officers lacking adequate commanding abilities, thereby undermining meritocracy in the armed forces (Quinlivan 1999).

On the other hand, poor operational training impedes soldiers from acquiring sufficient combat skills to effectively plan, coordinate, and execute modern warfare tactics on the battlefield (Biddle and Zirkle 1996). Further, training deficiencies also hinder soldiers from obtaining the necessary skills to operate and maintain sophisticated weapons and other costly military equipment (Biddle and Zirkle 1996). For example, the 1963 Battle of Ap Bac witnessed the South Vietnamese Army's inadequate tactical abilities, which led to their defeat at the hands of the North Vietnamese (Talmadge 2015). After undergoing years of counterbalancing by Ngo Dinh Diem, the soldiers suffered from a lack of operational discipline and shooting accuracy, hampering their ability to conduct effective combat maneuvers against the North Vietnamese Army, which led to critical casualties (Talmadge 2015). With a broader investigation, Pilster and Böhmelt (2011) similarly show that counterbalancing decreases military effectiveness on the battlefield. Moreover, the present literature provides evidence that leaders tend to seek out alliances and pursue the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction as means to compensate for reduced battlefield effectiveness that comes after counterbalancing (Brown, Farris, and McMahon 2016).

### 3.3.2 Financial Costs

Counterbalancing may increase the financial burden on the government budget as it often multiplies the costs of military expenditure. Quinlivan (1999) contends that counterbalancing requires a steady allocation of organizational resources, often in the form of subsidies, privileges, and better military equipment, to parallel forces in order to maintain their loyalty to the regime. The opaqueness of nondemocratic politics allows for routinized transactions that enable the regime to prolong such relationships with its clients on the basis of mutual interest (Quinlivan 1999).

Given the preemptive nature of coup-proofing (Böhmelt, Ruggeri, and Pilster 2017), leaders need to bear the financial costs of operational training expenses, advanced military equipment purchases, and generous salary provision in order to build the deterrent capacity of loyalist parallel forces. These investments require substantial funding but are crucial for ensuring that armed counterweights can effectively repel

coup attempts, deter other forms of military intervention in politics, and ward off other internal challenges such as riots and insurgency (Böhmelt and Clayton 2018; Quinlivan 1999). Böhmelt and Clayton (2018) highlight that the establishment and maintenance of paramilitary units often impose expensive costs that often exceed the amount allocated to the military, and therefore necessitate sufficient state capacity. In this respect, such efforts can be resource-draining especially compared to the costs related to the recruitment of progovernment militias (Böhmelt and Clayton 2018). For example, N'Diaye (2002, 625) reports that President Jomo Kenyatta's tenure in Kenya was marked by the excessive funding of paramilitary units as well as the police force, reaching twice the amount allocated to the regular armed forces.

Coup-proofing concerns may also affect leaders' budgetary decisions for counterbalancing in aid-recipient post-civil war countries. Girod (2015) shows that leaders in post-civil war settings with high coup risk are less interested in investing the nonstrategic aid revenues in the development sector, as long as they can afford noncompliance with donor demands thanks to their diverse income from natural resource rents and strategic aid. On the other hand, postconflict recipients with no alternative income are compelled to comply with donor requirements of resource allocation to development spending as they cannot otherwise sustain governmental functions without the regular inflow of nonstrategic aid revenues (Girod 2015). Diversified income provides postconflict leaders with leverage to redirect donations from development investments toward coup-proofing efforts, and this is especially so if donors prioritize strategic objectives (Girod 2015).

### 3.3.3 Effects on Coups

Civil-military relations scholarship presents contradictory evidence regarding the effectiveness of counterbalancing in deterring military coups d'état. With weak empirical evidence, one strand of the literature suggests that leaders who counterbalance the regular military are less likely to face coup attempts or be replaced by putschist efforts (Powell 2012). Others show a U-shaped relationship, making the argument of "bipolar stability," which suggests that counterbalancing decreases the likelihood of coup attempts only to a certain degree, particularly when the effective number of ground-combat forces is approximately two (Böhmelt and Pilster 2015). Introducing novel data and a new measurement approach, De Bruin (2018) demonstrates that counterbalancing decreases the probability of coup success, but newly established counterweights exacerbate coup attempts by the military. The findings imply that the establishment of parallel forces to the regular military aggravates officers to

stage a coup in the following year, but does not significantly affect future attempts in the long run. This logic suggests that, in the short run, the newly created counterweights are prone to provoke coup attempts as they may be perceived by officers as overt maneuvers against the standing armed forces, and new parallel forces are expected to fall short of steadfast incentives to effectively counter putschist efforts (De Bruin 2018).

For example, despite his position as a founding figure of the young People's Republic of Bangladesh, Sheik Mujibur Rahman's post-independence efforts to build up an armed military counterweight, *Jatiyo Rakhi Bahini*, which was abundantly staffed with 20,000 soldiers, were ensued by a bloody coup that led to his demise shortly afterward (Wilkinson 2000, 210-211). Nevertheless, in general, existing counterweights also ensure leaders with lower chances of coup success (De Bruin 2018). In addition, Powell (2019) warns that leaders who engage in counterbalancing efforts but fail to deploy counterinsurgency measures on rebels due to the high coup risk face an increased likelihood of descending into civil war. In post-civil conflict settings, on the other hand, Braithwaite and Sudduth (2016) argue that purging high-ranking opponents in the military yields a better strategy to keep the risk of ineffectiveness at a minimum, as evidenced by its effect in decreasing the probability of civil conflict recurrence.

### 3.4 Benefits of Peacekeeping

To overcome the above-mentioned drawbacks, peacekeeping can provide a viable alternative for leaders seeking to coup-proof their regime against potential threats from the regular military. Over the past decade, there has been a growing strand in peacekeeping scholarship that characterize UN peacekeeping as an impure public good, emphasizing the presence of private incentives among most personnel contributors in their engagement with peace missions (Bove and Elia 2011; Gaibulloev et al. 2015). This section looks into peacekeeping with respect to the opportunities it provides for leaders who seek to ensure regime survival in the face of a perceived coup risk. The central argument posits that peacekeeping can function in parallel to counterbalancing, offering an alternative strategy without the associated drawbacks. Importantly, one should note that these strategies are not mutually exclusive and can be employed conjointly. However, the comparative advantages offered by UN peacekeeping can influence leaders to opt out of pursuing counterbalancing strategies.

### 3.4.1 Fragmentation But Effectiveness

Troop contributions may alleviate leaders' need for counterbalancing efforts for two reasons. First, stationing soldiers abroad is likely to impede their communication and coordination with the remaining military personnel staying at the homeland. The UN consistently requires a steady influx of troops in order to demonstrate greater resolve in conflict containment by increasing its peacekeeper presence in the field. Extant research suggests that the presence of more UN troops is likely to translate into increased mission effectiveness and less violence (Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2014). The UN's constant demand for personnel provides an opportunity for leaders to contribute high volumes of troops (Passmore, Shannon, and Hart 2018), allowing them to externalize a substantial portion of the military (Kathman and Melin 2017). In a seminal study, Bobrow and Boyer (1997, 727) suggest that "some governments may benefit from sending troublesome military units and personnel to faraway places." Stationing military personnel abroad might serve as a strategy for leaders seeking to minimize the risk of officers' plotting and coordinating a coup within their home country (Albrecht 2020). Albrecht (2020, 591) argues that peacekeeper deployments can be strategically organized to disrupt interconnectedness among officers by implementing a diverse recruitment process that involves units where soldiers have no prior knowledge of one another. In this respect, implementing rotations among armed forces personnel is expected to impair unit coordination by disrupting routinized interaction patterns, and thereby reducing the risk of potential coups (Albrecht 2020).

Shortly after taking on the presidency in Ghana, for example, coup-avoidant President John Kufuor dissolved his predecessor Jerry Rawlings' most reliable unit, the Forces Reserve Battalion, reassigned a portion of its specially-trained officers to different peace operations, and reshuffled the remaining members across separate units within the Ghanaian military (Banini, Powell, and Yekple 2020, 246). Instead of establishing parallel counterweights to the repressive guardians of the Rawlings regime, Kufuor substantially engaged the Ghanaian military in UN peace operations. Remarkably, Ghana has consistently contributed an average of 23 percent of its entire military forces to UN peace operations (Passmore 2022), while maintaining relatively stable civil-military relations (Banini, Powell, and Yekple 2020). In Tunisia, on the other hand, Albrecht (2020) argues that the military's involvement in peacekeeping inadvertently led to coup-proofing, though this was initially requested by senior Tunisian officers. However, the study confirms that peacekeepers were predominantly selected from ground combat units, which have inherent logistical advantages in staging a successful coup compared to other military branches, owing

to their conventional proximity to the seat of government (Albrecht 2020; Pilster and Böhmelt 2011).

Second, reorienting soldiers toward external peace operations should keep them busy with new mission objectives requiring specialization in peacekeeping. This is in line with the conventional wisdom derived from the early studies on civil-military relations. As Welch, Jr. (1976, 25) concisely puts it: "the greater the orientation of the military toward international rather than domestic objectives, the easier may be the establishment and maintenance of civilian control." Leaders may also opt to participate in peace operations given the provided training programs, which enable the military to achieve or maintain a certain level of effectiveness on the battlefield. The UN purchases various services from private military and security companies and their subcontractors to support peacekeeping missions. These services encompass operational training programs, risk assessments, and the implementation of security protocols and other regulations in the field (Østensen 2013).

During these training programs, troops engage in a comprehensive curriculum that combines theoretical and practical instructions, facilitating the acquisition of essential technical skills related to military equipment specifics, strategic and tactical coordination, as well as an understanding of local dynamics and other relevant aspects (Østensen 2013). UN peacekeeping involvement also provide opportunities for developing militaries to gain combat experience. Given these considerations, participation in UN peace operations can effectively serve the goal of coup-proofing by partially mirroring the strategy of counterbalancing. This is so as peacekeeper deployments can facilitate the disintegration of military units and the dispatch of coup-capable ground forces. Nevertheless, UN peacekeeping distinguishes from counterbalancing by enabling the military to preserve its effectiveness to some degree, thanks to the provision of comprehensive operational training programs and soldiers' engagement in security-related duties.

### 3.4.2 Resource Generation

In developing countries, leaders can achieve partial savings in state resources by utilizing UN reimbursements as a means to appease the military through spoiling. The UN currently reimburses contributor countries at a standard rate of $1,448 per month in US dollars for each soldier, which by far exceeds the rates typically offered by governments from the Global South. Using its funding that partly comes from the donations from the EU and other developed countries such as the United States and Japan (Firsing 2014, 47), the UN also reimburses additional costs of deployment such

as "training, vaccinations, overseas allowances, uniforms, and additional equipment" (Adhikari 2020, 380). More exclusively, UN reimbursements can also be a source of profit for developing countries that offer low salaries to officers and use obsolete military equipment (Coleman and Nyblade 2018). Firsing (2014, 47), for example, emphasizes the strategic approach taken by contributor countries, noting that they can leverage negotiation power to demand expensive equipment, such as helicopters, during pre-signing discussions of the memorandum of understanding with the UN, which establishes reimbursement arrangements.

In Pakistan, for example, Krishnasamy (2002) noted that peacekeeper salaries were adjusted on the basis of national rates, which left a room for profit for the sanction-stricken government during the 1990s. Focusing on the cases of Bangladesh and Nepal, Adhikari (2020, 380) similarly argues that some contributors are "known to deduct certain percentages of the earnings from individual soldiers to contribute to the military welfare organization." In such contexts, the military has also been reported to divert reimbursement-funded welfare programs from soldier families toward business investments in a corporatist fashion (Adhikari 2020, 380). In contrast, Albrecht (2020) reveals that the Ben Ali government in Tunisia had introduced specific regulations to guarantee that UN reimbursements were channeled directly to peacekeepers, but with a distribution mechanism on the basis of their ranking. The main argument holds that, in part due to this strategy, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali was able to successfully keep the military in the barracks in spite of the of widespread protests that unfolded during the Arab Spring (Albrecht 2020).

Overall, peacekeeping may generate resources for the military. Leaders can thus employ this mechanism to appease the organizational disgruntlements in the armed forces. This logic runs in parallel with the conventional scholarship on civil-military relations that encourages leaders to spoil the military through the allocation of organizational resources (Huntington 1991; Powell 2012). Although this appeasement mechanism is expected to enhance the military's ability to stage coups in the long term, it may still attract leaders aiming to evade the costs related to counterbalancing.

### 3.4.3 Effects on Coups

Extant large-n studies show that countries are likely to increase peacekeeper deployments in the immediate aftermath of failed coup attempts, but these contributions tend to decrease in the long run (Kathman and Melin 2017). Furthermore, as Lundgren (2018) demonstrates, contributing countries that heavily rely on UN reim-

bursements with respect to their military spending are also less prone to encounter coup attempts. However, despite these findings, one should be wary of drawing immediate conclusions that participation in peacekeeping produces an overall "coup-restraining" effect. Indeed, some case studies indicate that the provision of UN reimbursements, peacekeeping training, and respective donations of modern equipment inflated the size of Fijian armed forces with enhanced capabilities, which led to the 2000 and 2006 coups (Baledrokadroka 2012; Levin, MacKay, and Nasirzadeh 2016). In addition, Dwyer (2015) extends this debate by showing that deployed peacekeepers become "troublemakers" upon coming back to their home countries through mutinies, which are primarily attributed to disgruntlements about the extended duration of missions and other operational challenges, peer imparities, and states' failure in ensuring the fair and timely distribution of peacekeeping revenues.

A recent study by Schiel, Powell, and Daxecker (2020) investigated this relationship with a larger universe of cases, and found no evidence supporting the claim that participation in UN peace missions leads to an increase in mutinies. Interestingly, the results also suggest that contributions to non-UN operations are associated with a higher likelihood of mutinies. On the other hand, Levin et al. (2021) find that troop deployments to UN peace missions tend to pacify coup attempts in anocracies, while they observe an increasing effect in autocratic settings. Although this aspect remains important, the primary focus here is on highlighting the potential appeal of peacekeeping for coup-proofing leaders due to its comparative advantages to counterbalancing, rather than examining its effectiveness in deterring coup attempts. Admittedly, peacekeeping can provoke coup efforts in some cases. However, as De Bruin (2018) shows, so can counterbalancing.

In sum, two mechanisms come forward in understanding how troop deployments to UN peace operations can divert leaders' attention from counterbalancing toward peacekeeping. For one, peacekeeping can lead to military fragmentation, potentially resulting in discoordination between different units in terms of the relative magnitude of peacekeeper deployments abroad. However, this should not cause military ineffectiveness since soldiers undergo additional training to keep up with their peacekeeping duties in challenging operational environments. For another, UN peacekeeping revenues alleviate the financial burden on leaders by offering material benefits in the form of financial gains, modern military equipment, and operational training, thus allowing them to save a considerable portion of their military budget. Considering the substantial costs associated with establishing and maintaining parallel military organizations, as well as the potential risks of compromising external security through military ineffectiveness, leaders may opt for peacekeeping as a viable alternative to counterbalancing in order to coup-proof their regimes. Hence,

the main hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis: As leaders contribute a substantial proportion of the regular military to UN peace operations, they become less likely to engage in counterbalancing efforts.

## 3.5 Data

*Dependent variable.* The dependent variable, *Counterbalancing*, relies on the data coming from De Bruin's (2018; 2021) State Security Forces dataset, which covers 110 countries from 1960 to 2010. In this compilation, De Bruin (2018, 1440; 2021) collects information on armed counterweights to the regular military, including "presidential guards, interior troops, militarized police, border guards, and national militia." De Bruin (2018, 1440) focuses on parallel armed forces in which "operational control rests with the executive, interior ministry, or other government body besides the defense ministry, which controls the military." In the dataset, a counterweight force should be "independent from military command," and stationed "within sixty miles of the capital, which ensures it has at least the possibility of being able to intercept a coup" (De Bruin 2018, 1440). The variable is a binary indicator that takes the value of 1 if at least one armed counterweight is employed by the incumbent executive in a given year. After incorporating this information with other data in the sample, and excluding the occupied countries from the analysis, the sample ultimately covers 102 countries from 1992 to 2010, leaving 1893 observations.

*Explanatory variables.* The first main explanatory variable, *Large Contributor (1% or more)*, provides information on whether the share of peacekeepers constitutes 1 percent or more of the uniformed personnel in a country's armed forces. The second main explanatory variable, *Large Contributor (3% or more)*, uses a 3 percent threshold. Instead of merely focusing on the numerical count of peacekeeping troops, the explanatory variables consider the relative size of personnel contributions in relation to the regular armed forces, which provides greater insight into the comparative magnitude of these deployments. In this regard, this measurement allows for assessing peacekeeper deployments on the basis of contributors' personnel resource capacity.

More importantly, by adopting this approach, one can better understand the significance of deployments in relation to their impact on interunit coordination, which should be influenced by peacekeeper' proportion within the total size of the military personnel. The data on troop contributions come from Kathman's (2013) United

Nations Peacekeeping Personnel Commitments dataset, containing monthly information on countries' personnel contributions to UN peace operations. The dataset provides disaggregated data on the type and magnitude of peacekeeper deployments, retrieved from the reports of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, starting from 1992.

To complement the country-level annual data from other variables, I accounted for maximum monthly troop contributions, which represent the highest commitment of a country in a given year. The information on the total number of military personnel is taken from the World Bank Development Indicators Databank (World Bank). Out of the 63 missing values, 31 were imputed through linear interpolation. The remaining cases corresponded to country-year instances where contributors did not deploy any troops, and the share of peacekeepers was thus recoded as 0. Figure 3.1 illustrates how the dependent variable, *Counterbalancing*, is distributed across different values of the share of peacekeepers in the military.[4]

*Control variables.* The regime indicators were constructed using the information from the Polity 5 dataset where *Democracy* takes the scores of 7 or above as the baseline, *Anocracy* takes the scores between -6 and 6, and *Autocracy* takes the scores of -7 or below (Marshall and Gurr 2020). *GDP per Capita (ln)* is the log transformation of the GDP per capita data provided by Gleditsch (2002). *Population (ln)* similarly contains the log transformation of how many people are located in a country. The models also control for the log transformations of *Military Expenditure per Soldier* and *Military Size*, which indicate the level of a country's defense spending per military personnel and the headcount of individuals employed within its armed forces.

*Recent Coup Attempts* takes the value of 1 if a coup attempt occurred in a country within last ten years, irrespective of its success. I rely on the event data provided by Powell and Thyne's (2011) dataset covering global instances of coups starting from 1950. *Interstate Conflict* and *Interstate Conflict* indicate a country's involvement in inter- or intrastate conflict based on the information gathered from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset (Davies, Pettersson, and Öberg 2022; Gleditsch et al. 2002). These variables are coded as 1 if the number of battle-related deaths reaches 25 or more, and 0 if otherwise.

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[4]Distribution of *Counterbalancing* by the percentage of peacekeepers in military. White dashed lines indicate the medians.

Figure 3.1 Distribution of Counterbalancing by Peacekeeper Percentage in Military



Previous research posits that former French colonies are more inclined to pursue counterbalancing strategies compared to others (Mehrl and Choulis 2021). For that, *French Colony* is added as a binary control indicating whether a country has history with French colonial rule based on the data obtained from ICOW Colonial History dataset (Hensel 2018). Further, as the present literature shows that personalist regimes are more likely to counterbalance their regular armed forces (Escribà-Folch, Böhmelt, and Pilster 2020), the variable *Personalist* is included to control for whether a country is classified as a personalist regime in a given year. For this, the information is taken from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz's (2014) Autocratic Regime dataset. All models control for temporal dependence. In Appendix B, Table B.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the analysis.

## 3.6 Findings and Discussion

Tables 3.1 and 3.2 report coefficients from Models 1-8 estimated using logistic regression. All models are estimated with country clusters and robust standard errors. Model 1 includes the first main explanatory variable, *Large Troop Contributor (1%*

*or more)*, regime indicators, socioeconomic circumstances, the level of resource allocations to the armed forces, and the number of military personnel.

Table 3.1 Logistic Regression Estimates I

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Large Contributor (1% or more) | -1.098** | -1.082** | -1.082** | -0.497 |
| | (0.498) | (0.500) | (0.484) | (0.924) |
| Autocracy | 1.445* | 1.428* | 1.329* | 1.139 |
| | (0.784) | (0.786) | (0.796) | (1.060) |
| Anocracy | 0.537 | 0.565 | 0.461 | 0.884 |
| | (0.564) | (0.581) | (0.547) | (0.748) |
| GDP per Capita (ln) | -0.235 | -0.286 | -0.336 | -0.673 |
| | (0.293) | (0.313) | (0.315) | (0.463) |
| Population (ln) | 0.360 | 0.354 | 0.296 | 0.316 |
| | (0.297) | (0.292) | (0.254) | (0.378) |
| Military Exp. per Soldier (ln) | 0.114 | 0.120 | 0.123 | 0.231 |
| | (0.080) | (0.083) | (0.092) | (0.147) |
| Military Size (ln) | 0.089 | 0.096 | 0.158 | 0.261 |
| | (0.272) | (0.261) | (0.209) | (0.251) |
| Recent Coup Attempts | | -0.340 | -0.352 | -0.674 |
| | | (0.647) | (0.638) | (0.692) |
| Interstate Conflict | | 0.408 | 0.363 | -0.004 |
| | | (0.899) | (0.920) | (0.704) |
| Intrastate Conflict | | -0.057 | -0.151 | 0.051 |
| | | (0.547) | (0.560) | (0.588) |
| French Colony | | | -0.322 | -0.151 |
| | | | (1.042) | (1.503) |
| Personalist | | | 1.577** | 1.573* |
| | | | (0.617) | (0.816) |
| Year | 0.084* | 0.083* | 0.083* | 0.068 |
| | (0.044) | (0.045) | (0.044) | (0.062) |
| Counterbalancing Years | -2.123*** | -2.118*** | -2.094*** | -1.793*** |
| | (0.403) | (0.415) | (0.421) | (0.415) |
| Counterbalancing Years$^2$ | 0.102*** | 0.102*** | 0.101*** | 0.076*** |
| | (0.023) | (0.023) | (0.023) | (0.023) |
| Counterbalancing Years$^3$ | -0.001*** | -0.001*** | -0.001*** | -0.001*** |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Constant | -167.318* | -165.313* | -164.508* | -133.290 |
| | (88.278) | (90.765) | (87.357) | (123.499) |
| N | 1893 | 1893 | 1893 | 1893 |
| LL | -126.221 | -125.970 | -124.659 | -116.111 |
| AIC | 276.442 | 281.940 | 283.319 | 268.222 |
| BIC | 342.993 | 365.129 | 377.599 | 368.049 |
| Random Effects | No | No | No | Yes |

Logistic regressions with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

\* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01

Table 3.2 Logistic Regression Estimates II

| | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Large Contributor (3% or more) | -1.819*** | -1.775*** | -1.840*** | -2.559*** |
| | (0.601) | (0.601) | (0.581) | (0.883) |
| Autocracy | 1.676** | 1.658** | 1.563* | 1.269 |
| | (0.774) | (0.786) | (0.814) | (1.034) |
| Anocracy | 0.638 | 0.673 | 0.575 | 1.048 |
| | (0.561) | (0.596) | (0.553) | (0.704) |
| GDP per Capita (ln) | -0.247 | -0.301 | -0.360 | -0.673 |
| | (0.295) | (0.315) | (0.323) | (0.455) |
| Population (ln) | 0.390 | 0.381 | 0.321 | 0.322 |
| | (0.317) | (0.313) | (0.271) | (0.381) |
| Military Exp. per Soldier (ln) | 0.118 | 0.123 | 0.126 | 0.242* |
| | (0.081) | (0.085) | (0.091) | (0.143) |
| Military Size (ln) | 0.009 | 0.022 | 0.082 | 0.168 |
| | (0.303) | (0.286) | (0.231) | (0.291) |
| Recent Coup Attempts | | -0.314 | -0.321 | -0.626 |
| | | (0.614) | (0.610) | (0.684) |
| Interstate Conflict | | 0.584 | 0.527 | 0.115 |
| | | (0.672) | (0.688) | (0.615) |
| Intrastate Conflict | | -0.111 | -0.222 | -0.093 |
| | | (0.550) | (0.551) | (0.583) |
| French Colony | | | -0.447 | -0.440 |
| | | | (1.096) | (1.553) |
| Personalist | | | 1.874*** | 1.697** |
| | | | (0.631) | (0.853) |
| Year | 0.082** | 0.083** | 0.085** | 0.078 |
| | (0.041) | (0.041) | (0.040) | (0.062) |
| Counterbalancing Years | -2.171*** | -2.171*** | -2.147*** | -1.828*** |
| | (0.425) | (0.441) | (0.450) | (0.426) |
| Counterbalancing Years$^2$ | 0.104*** | 0.104*** | 0.103*** | 0.078*** |
| | (0.024) | (0.025) | (0.025) | (0.023) |
| Counterbalancing Years$^3$ | -0.001*** | -0.001*** | -0.001*** | -0.001*** |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Constant | -163.485** | -164.556** | -167.627** | -152.038 |
| | (81.853) | (81.842) | (79.974) | (122.089) |
| N | 1893 | 1893 | 1893 | 1893 |
| LL | -126.129 | -125.888 | -124.305 | -114.653 |
| AIC | 276.259 | 281.777 | 282.610 | 265.306 |
| BIC | 342.810 | 364.965 | 376.891 | 365.132 |
| Random Effects | No | No | No | Yes |

Logistic regressions with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Model 2 incorporates information regarding the threat environment faced by leaders, which is assessed by the instance of a recent coup attempt on the government within the past ten years, as well as the indicators revealing countries' involvement in an interstate or intrastate conflict. On the other hand, Model 3 additionally controls for two indicators that the literature has previously identified as determinants of

leaders' counterbalancing efforts: *French Colony* and *Personalist.* Whereas the former denotes whether a country was previously colonized by France, the latter indicates whether a country is a personalist autocracy. Model 4 reestimates the previous model with the same specifications but uses random effects. Since the specifications control for some variables that may be time-invariant or rarely time-varying but can significantly impact the dependent variable, I used random effects to reestimate the fully specified model (Bell and Jones 2015). Models 5-8 follow the same specifications but employ the threshold of 3 percent in accounting for the magnitude of peacekeeper deployments compared to the regular military.

Consistent with the hypothesis, large contingent deployments, both at the thresholds of 1 and 3 percent, are negatively associated with the predicted probability of *Counterbalancing* across all model specifications. The results provide mixed support for the negative effect of *Large Contributor (1% or more)*, as the variable fails to achieve statistical significance in Model 8, which is estimated using random effects. Considering the low threshold, one can infer that the relative magnitude of peacekeepers at this level may not be sufficient to substitute the strategy of counterbalancing, but rather serve as a complementary countermeasure adopted by coup-avoidant leaders. *Large Contributor (3%)* is consistently negative and statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level across Models 5-8. The significance and direction of its effect remain consistent despite the inclusion or exclusion of different controls.

Provided that the coefficients are derived from logistic regression estimates, they are not substantively informative apart from indicating the significance and direction of the relationship between the main explanatory and dependent variables. For this reason, based on the estimates from Models 3 and 7, Figure 3.2 illustrates the substantive effects of *Large Contributor* at 1 and 3 percent thresholds on the predicted probability of *Counterbalancing* in order to complement the initial interpretation.[5] While *GDP per Capita (ln)*, *Population (ln)*, *Military Expenditure per Soldier (ln)*, and *Military Size (ln)* are taken at their respective means, all the remaining indicators are taken at their respective medians. Deploying 1 percent or more uniformed military personnel to UN peace operations leads to a slight decrease of roughly 2.1 percentage points in the predicted probability of contributing leaders' engagement in *Counterbalancing.* This effect is statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level (p=0.092).

Turning to the contribution variable with a higher threshold, sending 3 percent or more of military troops results in approximately a 5 percentage-point decline in the

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[5]Substantive effects of *Large Contributor (1% or more, 3% or more)* on the predicted probability of *Counterbalancing* based on Models 3 and 7. Caps show 90 percent confidence intervals.

predicted probability of observing armed counterweights, which similarly remains statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level (p=0.071). Notably, the graph on the righthand side demonstrates wider confidence intervals due to the low number of observations. Since only a small group of militaries are intensely engaged in UN peacekeeping, these estimates are expected. The results offer some support for my theoretical argument, emphasizing the stark cost-benefit contrasts between participation in UN peacekeeping and engagement in counterbalancing.

Figure 3.2 Substantive Effects of Large Contributor (1%, 3%) on the Predicted Probability of Counterbalancing



Returning to the control variables, the results provide support for the findings of Pilster and Böhmelt (2012), suggesting that coup-proofing is not a commonplace democratic practice. Nondemocratic leaders are indeed more inclined to engage in counterbalancing efforts within the security force structure. While the effect of *Autocracy* remains positive in all specifications, it loses significance in Models 4 and 8 estimated with random effects. The relationship between *Anocracy* and counterbalancing remains positive across all models but fails to achieve statistical significance. The logged *GDP per Capita* remains unchangingly insignificant and negative. The logged *Population*, on the other hand, demonstrates a positive association though fails to reach statistical significance in any of the specifications. Models also control for *Military Expenditure per Soldier (ln)* and *Military Size (ln)*. While the former shows a positive effect on the dependent variable receiving empirical support only in Model 8, the latter's effect remains positive but insignificant.

Interestingly, leaders' security environment does not seem a decisive factor in the establishment of parallel forces. Despite *Recent Coup Attempts*' persistent negative impact on the dependent variable, this association fails to receive statistical support. While remaining insignificant, the direction of this relationship is in line with the previous findings suggesting that leaders in high-risk environments for coups are less likely to pursue coup-proofing strategies (Sudduth 2017a). Countries' involvement in interstate or intrastate conflicts show a stark contrast in the direction of association, however, both indicators are steadily insignificant.

*French Colony*, on the other hand, does attain statistical significance, failing to support the impact of colonial legacy on counterbalancing efforts. This finding contradicts with the study conducted by Mehrl and Choulis (2021), which points to how extensive enlistments of locals by French colonialists into the fragmented security force structure in most colonies resulted in the continuation of such practices even after independence. In addition, the results suggest a positive effect of personalist attributes on leaders' efforts to counterbalance the standing armed forces. Personalist leaders may be urged to exploit loyalist ties through organizational arrangements, as the regime's survival relies solely on coercive deterrents due to the lack of ideological attachments among political elites within its winning coalition (Escribà-Folch, Böhmelt, and Pilster 2020, 562). In such contexts, leaders' heavy reliance on parallel forces may prevent them from choosing to opt out of counterbalancing strategies. The effect of *Personalist* is empirically supported at conventional levels in Models 3 and 8, at the 90 percent confidence level in Model 4, and at the 99 percent confidence level in Model 7, respectively.

In light of the empirical evidence presented in this chapter, one can conclude that leaders who contribute greater shares of uniformed military personnel to UN peace operations are less likely to engage in counterbalancing efforts. To validate these findings, Appendix B reports a number of robustness checks for the main models. In these analyses, Polity5 scores are used in place of regime indicators to control for variations in countries? political regimes. As well, models also employ *GDP (ln)* instead of *GDP per Capita (ln)* as a different measure of economic strength. To account for countries? overall defense spending, I also leveraged *Military Expenditure (ln)* as an alternative to *Military Expenditure per Soldier (ln)*. The effect of large troop contributions at the 1 percent and 3 percent thresholds on the predicted probability of *Counterbalancing* is consistent with the main models in both direction and statistical significance.

Further, the fully specified models are reestimated employing different thresholds of 2 percent and 5 percent. While large troop contributions remain negatively associated

with *Counterbalancing*, this effect loses its statistical significance at the 5 percent threshold. Lastly, I also used the actual percentage of peacekeepers in contributing countries' militaries instead of binary troop contribution indicators. Based on these values, *Peacekeeper/Military* similarly exhibits a negative effect that is statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level. Overall, sizable troop dispatches exhibit a small but substitutive effect on counterbalancing, which can be attributed to the benefits of UN peacekeeping involvement in generating additional resources to developing contributors troubled with budgetary constraints, and in establishing coordination challenges among military units without necessarily undermining their combat effectiveness.

## 3.7 Conclusion

Extant research has so far focused on analyzing troop contributions to UN peace operations predominantly in terms of mere numbers. Yet it has done so without giving much attention to their relative magnitude with respect to regular armed forces. In this study, peacekeeper deployments were operationalized by focusing on their proportion within the military. This choice allowed for a more precise assessment of the role that mission participation plays in leaders' efforts to coup-proof their regimes. In doing so, the study could focus on deployments' relative magnitude, and hence became better equipped to investigate whether leaders utilize blue beret dispatches from the regular military to UN peace operations, aiming to reshuffle troops, undermine unit cohesion, and appease the military by exploiting the financial opportunities provided by UN peacekeeping. The study's findings imply that leaders who contribute a substantial proportion of their regular military to UN peace operations are less inclined to engage in counterbalancing efforts, reflected by the absence of established armed counterweights within the security force structure. To put another way, a greater share of blue berets within the military translates into reduced reliance on external guardians to protect the regime.

While I do not propose that peacekeeping and counterbalancing are mutually exclusive, peacekeeping may act as a substitute for counterbalancing, aimed at mitigating the risk of irregular removal from office. This indicates that a state's involvement in UN peacekeeping involvement can be integrated into a broader strategic agenda for coup avoidance. Two primary reasons are identified as contributing to this trend. First, leaders may find participation in UN peacekeeping attractive as it allows them to create coordination obstacles among soldiers by stationing large batches of troops

outside the country, especially compared to the total size of standing military personnel. Furthermore, leaders can circumvent the toll that counterbalancing takes on military effectiveness thanks to the UN-offered comprehensive programs of operational training and military equipment donations from developed states. Second, participation in UN peace operations allows leaders to avoid the costs associated with counterbalancing. Creating and sustaining parallel counterweights to the regular armed forces can often raise defense spending and place a significant financial burden on the government budget. UN reimbursements offered for peacekeeping personnel allow developing country leaders to appease the military with spoils while concurrently cutting the costs of the defense budget. Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that these strategies can also be employed complementarily.

Although the focus here has been placed on UN missions, there remains a gap in our understanding with respect to the relationship between coup-proofing and non-UN peacekeeping participations. Scholarship on civil-military relations would benefit a closer attention to the complex interplay between coup-proofing efforts and participation in different types of peacekeeping missions. The existing literature has yet to explore other potential factors that influence contributor countries to commit substantial portions of their standing troops to peacekeeping operations.

Of course, the scope of coup-proofing extends beyond strategies related to counterbalancing. Leaders have the option to employ other instruments, including the strategic placement of loyalists in key positions and entities, as well as purging potential challengers from the government or military. So far, many studies focused on the use of these strategies in leaders' efforts to consolidate power and minimize the risk of coups d'état. Future research may also probe the connection between peacekeeper deployments and purges in security forces that target prospective opponents, or other coup-proofing strategies. This exploration would provide a broader understanding of the relationship between peacekeeping and coup-proofing. By investigating how deployments converge with these strategies, scholars can shed light on the complex dynamics of this relationship and account for its deeper implications for civil-military relations in peacekeeping countries.

# 4. PEACEKEEPING ABROAD, FAVORING LOYALISTS AT HOME? AN ASSESSMENT OF ETHNIC STACKING IN AFRICAN CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES

## 4.1 Introduction

Coups are an unmistakable reality in African politics. Since 2020, the region has seen 9 military coups in Burkina Faso (2), Chad (1), Gabon (1), Guinea (1), Mali (2), Niger (1), and Sudan (1) (Vines 2024). The legacy of military interventions, economic challenges, and political institutions significantly contribute to this trend (Singh 2022). While some of these coups disrupted democratic transitions after long periods of dictatorial rule, others targeted autocratic attempts at aggrandizing executive power (Vines 2024). Since independence, African autocrats have employed various regime-securing strategies to keep their militaries at bay. Typically lacking sufficient resources to placate the officer corps generously (Henk and Rupiya 2001), they often sought to establish personal paramilitary forces to deter attempts to overthrow the regime (N'Diaye 2002) and skew their militaries' composition along ethnic lines to cultivate communal loyalties (Horowitz 1985).

The latter strategy is mainly employed by leaders in countries where ethnic cleavages are salient (Harkness 2016). Given their limited resources to sustain patronage networks, most African autocrats have faced constraints in choosing the groups to force alliances with. In ethnically heterogenous countries, many of them aimed to instrumentalize communal ties in establishing patron-client relationships, while leaving ethnic outgroups economically disadvantaged and politically disenfranchised (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009). To thwart the threats of removal by putschist efforts or public dissent, they sought to foster ethnic loyalties on the civil-military axis. As Harkness (2018, 33) observes: "the military is an important source of employment and patronage and has often, but certainly not always, been dominated by particular ethnic groups in Africa." Examples include the Kalenjinization of the

previously Kikuyu-dominated Kenyan military under President Daniel arap Moi (Stubbs 2015), or the establishment of Kakwa and Nubian-dominated Ugandan security forces under President Idi Amin (Lindemann 2011).

While autocratic leaders of resource-scant African countries frequently sought to rely on their militaries as repressive agents of their regimes, they also aimed to attract external funding to feed their clientelistic networks (Victor 2010). For this purpose, some leaders leveraged their 'comparative advantage in manpower' (Bove and Elia 2011) by meeting major state demands for troop commitments within the framework of UN, regional, and state-led peace and stabilization operations in conflict-ridden countries. In exchange for supplying the requested forces, otherwise disinterested contributors receive comprehensive training programs, financial assistance, commercial agreements, and other political fringe benefits (Henke 2019a). Narrowing its focus on UN peace operations, this chapter investigates the relationship between peacekeeping troop deployments and ethnic stacking practices engaged by African leaders. Building on previous research on private material benefits attached to UN peacekeeping participation (Boutton and D'Orazio 2020; Henke 2019a; Victor 2010), this chapter posits that large-scale UN troop deployments are likely to increase the probability of ethnic stacking engagement by leaders.

The chapter is divided into five sections. First, it briefly outlines the historical background of African ethnic militaries, tracing their origins to colonial practices. Second, it provides an overview of how ethnic stacking functions as a coup-proofing practice. Third, it presents the theoretical expectations for the positive association between peacekeeper contributions and ethnic stacking. Then, it offers detailed information about the data specifics. Finally, it tests whether large-scale UN troop deployments tend to increase the likelihood of ethnic stacking. The chapter closes by summarizing the study's findings and contemplating on its limitations.

## 4.2 Colonial Origins of Ethnic Militaries

The complexities of African politics are hardly separable from the enduring legacy of colonialism, which profoundly influenced state formation across the continent during the 1950s and 1960s. Some suggest that while current European borders are a product of autogenous historical development spanning across centuries, those that partition African territories can mainly be characterized as "geometrical drawing-board boundaries" that were "supposed to proceed over hundreds of kilometres, ideally in a dead-straight line even over the most difficult terrain" (Demhardt 1998,

110-111). Others highlight that the modern conception of territorial sovereignty did not develop indigenously in the European heartland, but evolved from the colonial practice of delineating spatial boundaries in the Americas, which was later adopted into European interstate politics (Branch 2012).

Nevertheless, many scholars agree on the artificiality of African territorial demarcations (Davidson 1992; Demhardt 1998; Herbst 2014; Miles 2015; Young 2012). The boundaries of African colonial territories were largely drawn with European disregard for geographical terrain and local populations, due to a limited understanding of the African landscape and a reluctance to invest in exploring the continent's interior (Demhardt 1998, 111). Instead, colonial powers prioritized consolidating authority over coastal settlements to secure trade revenues from transit routes (Demhardt 1998). Although they did not completely turn a blind eye to communal residencies in all territorial partitions, as exemplified by the clauses in the Anglo-French treaty that determined the border between Benin and Nigeria, most boundaries were primarily designed to apportion resources, with less consideration given to governing indigenous communities (Griffiths 1986, 207; Miles 2015). Many ethnic groups continued to inhabit areas separated by artificial lines.

Despite their arbitrary origins in colonial diplomatic negotiations, these boundaries remained largely unchanged in the postindependence period, inherited by newly formed African states (Demhardt 1998; Griffiths 1986; Young 2012, 303). Some nations emerged from the colonial partitioning of cohesive ethnic clusters by Great Britain and France, which hindered the European-inspired process of nation-building on the ground of territorial identity in ethnically-heterogenous African postcolonial states (Davidson 1992; Miles 2015). The arbitrariness of African borders resulted in what Geertz (1973) terms as "suffocation" by incorporating diverse ethnic communities into a unified nation-state, and "dismemberment" by dividing these groups between neighboring countries.

To bolster their political control over remote lands, European colonialists employed modest-sized indigenous militaries dominated by groups that are considered reliable loyalists (Welch, Jr. 1975). Initially formulated in India by the British, the 'martial race' doctrine mandated the recruitment of rank-and-file soldiers from local ethnic groups trusted in loyalty and considered fit for combat service (Bayo Adekson 1979; Harkness 2016). Later refined by Frederick D. Lugard, a British colonial administrator in Nigeria, the policy maintained monopolizing indigenous militaries with allegiant but politically sidelined ethnic groups within a divide-and-rule framework to counterweigh groups with significant political power (Barany 2014, 598-600; Bayo Adekson 1979, 153-154).

As a result, British colonial military recruitment policy systematically discriminated against ethnic groups that had either achieved some form of precolonial political organization or firmly defied British efforts to broaden control (Ray 2013). While this became a widespread practice in most British settlements, similar policies were also implemented by Belgian and French colonial officials in Africa (Bayo Adekson 1979, 159-161). For example, while the British favored the Masai over the Kikuyu in Kenya and the Acholi over the Baganda in Uganda, the French relied on the Sara in Chad and the Mossi in Burkina Faso (then Upper Volta), and the Belgians prioritized Bangala, Tetela, and Zande in the Congo (Bayo Adekson 1979, 151-152, 160-161). While these groups held lower ranks within indigenous militaries, senior command posts were exclusively reserved for ethnic Europeans (Bayo Adekson 1979).

## 4.3 Ethnic Stacking as a Coup-Proofing Practice

Following decolonization, numerous African ethnic groups[6] that were historically isolated began relocating to urban centers in pursuit of better livelihoods, career opportunities, and infrastructure, while they simultaneously found themselves embroiled in fierce political struggles (Jenkins and Kposowa 1992, 274). The dynamics of intergroup relations among different ethnicities have been affected by their varying proportions within the national population (Posner 2004). However, further evidence suggests that intergroup rivalries and atrocities have primarily been driven by economic underdevelopment, intergroup inequalities, and the absence of civil society mechanisms that could otherwise facilitate broader accommodation of public interest and the provision of tangible rewards with nonethnic considerations (Baldwin and Huber 2010; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Franck and Rainer 2012; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009, 321).

Ethnic rivalries also took a toll on civil-military relations in African countries. They have incentivized coups particularly in cases where political elites and populations dominant ethnic groups hold nearly equivalent proportions within the population (Jenkins and Kposowa 1990). Another catalyst for military takeovers can be the unequal distribution of wealth among ethnic communities, particularly when it homogeneously impacts group members (Houle and Bodea 2017). Close interethnic competitions for government power can also instigate putschist efforts (Jenkins and Kposowa 1992). In postindependence Nigeria, for example, government has switched

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[6]In her seminal work, Enloe (1980, 9) defines an ethnic group as "a collectivity whose members share a belief in common descent which is, in turn, legitimated and sustained through cultural expression."

hands between leaders from Northern Hausa, Angi, Fulani, and Kanuri, and Southern Igbo and Yoruba ethnic groups from 1960 to 1999 (Ejiogu 2007). During this period, 7 out of 11 Nigerian leaders were removed from office by coups, primarily incentivized by interethnic competition (Ejiogu 2007). In this respect, sharing government power with other groups can be considered a domestic security risk by incumbent elites. Although power-sharing arrangements can mutually benefit ethnic political cliques, the absence of credible guarantees for adhering to these pacts may lead to competitive spirals making all sides cautious of one another's hidden ambitions to seize state authority (Roessler 2011, 301-302). To avoid losing power via takeovers, ethnic elites may strive to restrict other groups' access to positions wielding control over the state's coercive capacity (Roessler 2011, 302). However, disenfranchising ethnic groups from assuming government roles increases the risk of sparking civil war and rebellion (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Roessler 2011).

Political representation is an important determinant of the coup proneness of prominent ethnic segments within the military. Ethnic segments within resourceful and heterogenous armed forces can also be more willing to precipitate irregular changes of government via coups (Jenkins and Kposowa 1992). Extant research suggests that leaders are more secure from putschist efforts by militarily prominent ethnic groups when these groups are granted substantial political representation, and that, politically excluded but militarily prominent ethnic groups are more inclined to stage coups (Johnson and Thurber 2020, 122). As the previous literature reveals, ethnic groups can leverage their salience within the military to attain dominance in domestic politics through forcible transitions of power (Jenkins and Kposowa 1992; Johnson and Thurber 2020). For example, the southern Fon dominance in Beninese politics was overthrown by the 1967 and 1972 coups orchestrated by northern lower-ranking officers, resulting in a reshuffling of the higher echelons of the officer corps to incorporate fellow northerners (Allen 2019, 249; Decalo 1973).

In this climate, many African leaders in multiethnic postcolonial states have continued the colonial practice of leveraging common roots in their postindependence efforts to build national armed forces. In doing so, they aimed to secure the allegiance of coethnic officers through clientelism, which was inherited from colonial military recruitment patterns that entrenched beliefs in the connection between shared identity ties and the military's political reliability to safeguarding the regime (Bou Nassif 2015, 256; Ejiogu 2007; Harkness 2016, 593; 2018, 38-39; Welch, Jr. 1975). Ethnic stacking is a strategy employed by insecure leaders in multiethnic countries to shield their political vulnerabilities against internal challenges by fostering ingroup loyalties within their regimes' coercive apparatus. This strategy involves shaping

the composition of the security forces structure in line with preferred societal backgrounds by instrumentalizing identity-based recruitments, promotions, and purges to tilt the ethnic balance in favor of ingroup members (Quinlivan 1999; Harkness 2016; Horowitz 1985). To achieve mutual ethnic alignment within their force structure, Harkness (2016, 594) notes that, African incumbents either sought to populate their armed forces with personnel from a common background or invested in loyal auxiliary forces prior to nullifying the preexisting military's coercive capacity.

Ethnic incongruence between civilian and military leadership can create permissive conditions for identity-driven military political involvements (Horowitz 1985, 458). The paradox of exploiting shared affiliations for regime security has been the heightened risk of political unrest by ethnic outsiders within the military, as this strategy extends beyond enlisting coethnic personnel to determining which groups come to dominate the armed forces and who gets removed or relegated from key positions (Harkness 2016, 594). When multiethnic country leaders prioritize office survival at the expense of defense necessities, ethnically diverse military personnel can suffer from "segregation, exclusion, even ongoing humiliation and brutalization" (Peled 1998, 2).

As a result, pursuits of ethnic force formation likely marginalize officers with divergent ties, lead to their violent responses in the form of putschist efforts, and fuel ethnicity-based power struggles within states' force structures, which involve capturing key positions and engaging in intergroup extrusions (Harkness 2016, 594). In this respect, incumbent leaders' decision to staff and uprank coethnic personnel in ethnically heterogenous militaries can pave the way to future atrocities. Wary of being stripped of their existing clientelistic prerogatives, military leaders can often be cautious regarding changes in the ethnicity of leadership (Harkness 2016). In three-fourths of cases, militaries ethnically aligned with the old regime responded with coups when incumbents hailing from another group assumed office (Harkness 2016, 603).

However, if leaders can successfully navigate these challenges and procure their ethnic guardians, militaries structured around identity-based strategies can play a pivotal role in enabling and consolidating autocratic regimes by fostering communal loyalties. Comparing the Ugandan and Zambian cases, Lindemann (2011, 6) suggests that "coup avoidance is most likely when government and army either exhibit the same ethnic bias or are both ethnically balanced." Establishing proportionate ethnic representation along the civil-military axis has helped secure civilian politics in Zambia from military takeovers (Lindemann 2011). In contrast, Uganda's experience with military coups has been inconsistent across different leadership periods. While

the nonconsecutive governments of Milton Obote and the short-lived military regime under the Uganda National Liberation Front experienced four coups, the autocratic regimes of Idi Amin and Yoweri Museveni avoided this pattern by cultivating ethnic alliances within their militaries (Lindemann 2011).

Comparing the coup-avoidant strategies of military bribing, counterbalancing, and ethnic stacking, Makara (2013) argues that building congruent communal ties within the officer corps is the most effective way to secure regime allegiance from the armed forces. In this, military allegiance is understood not merely by the absence of military coups, but also by its continuing function as a coercive agent of repression during periods of mass upheaval. Although resource allocations and armed counter-weights can pacify praetorian reflexes for interventionism through accommodation or deterrence, these strategies also entail the risk of factionalizing the security force structure by unevenly distributing rents through selective patronage (Makara 2013, 340). As a result, disadvantaged groups within security institutions may opt to defect at times of social unrest.

On the other hand, the exploitation of shared communal backgrounds can foster a 'community of trust,' guaranteeing military loyalty in the face of common sub-national adversaries (Makara 2013). In doing so, nondemocratic incumbents can reduce uncertainty about officers' disposition to protect their rule by consolidating the belief within their armed forces that the regime's breakdown could lead to a political void allowing commonly abhorred outgroup members to ascend to power (Bou Nassif 2015, 256). For that, successful establishment of ethnic dominance within the military composition alongside the implementation of other coup-proofing tactics plays a decisive role (Morency-Laflamme and McLauchlin 2020). During the Arab Spring, for example, the Alawite-dominated Syrian military continued its repressive function, while the partially dominated Yemeni forces and the nondominated Egyptian military defected from the regime (Makara 2013). Coethnic militaries have also shown more inclination to side with the regime during mass upheavals in Africa, however, only under the specific condition that no coup attempts have taken place within the past decade (Morency-Laflamme and McLauchlin 2020).

Further, ethnically skewed militaries often pose a serious challenge to democratization efforts in diversely populated African countries, as they view democratic transitions as a danger to their rents and privileges in multiethnic societies. This is because transferring political power to other ethnic groups poses a risk of dismissal by an outsider executive (Allen 2019; Harkness 2016, 592; 2017). African incumbents who shielded themselves from foreign and domestic challenges by fostering ethnic or personal loyalism within their armed forces are more likely to en-

gage in autocratic self-aggrandizement, compared to those with heterogenous militaries (Harkness 2017). Harkness (2017) shows that 82 percent of African presidents with coethnic militaries sought to prolong their tenure beyond constitutional limits, whereas only a 31 percent of those without. The lack of an ethnically loyal security apparatus often resulted in unsuccessful attempts by incumbents to overstep the constitutional boundaries of their designated tenure (Harkness 2017, 802). Overall, the discriminatory practices of ethnic stacking are inherently autocratic in yielding a reliance on exclusive patron-client linkages. The next section discusses the material benefits associated with UN troop contributions, which can be instrumentalized by leaders to engage in ethnic stacking efforts.

## 4.4 Peacekeeping Rents and Ethnic Patronage Networks

Since independence, African autocrats have typically relied on clientelistic networks through which they distribute rents to their regime's political and military elites to secure their positions in power (Lemarchand 1972; Lindemann 2011). Countries where leaders exploit salient ethnic ties to foster loyalties from communal groups also adhere to this practice (Harkness 2018). For this purpose, for example, leaders can offer employments to provide a steady source of income to regime loyalists, often with additional expedition grants, lodgments, official vehicles for personal use, medical coverage, and scholarships for children (Bayart 1993, 75; Henk and Rupia 2001, 9). Developing country leaders with scarce resources usually seek external rents to feed clientelistic linkages that safeguard their regimes (Welz 2022).

Foreign-supplied military and development aid packages and troop remunerations can be channeled to narrow winning coalitions of autocrats. For "the military skills of the selectorate play an important role in warding off threats to the leader from the disenfranchised" (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 46), autocrats' support base must include the regime's armed forces. The officer corps can function as a coercive countermeasure to dishearten or repel domestic challenges, while their contentment with the regime is also important in reducing their incentives to stage coups to oust or defect from the incumbent executive (Victor 2010, 219). For this reason, ensuring the backing of their armed forces and powerful state sponsors is a top priority for most autocratic leaders in Africa, as their political fate heavily depends on these pillars (Victor 2010, 219).

Especially after the Cold War, many developed UN members have assumed positions as 'pivotal' states by taking center stage in the generation of UN peacekeeping forces

(Henke 2016; 2019a). For example, UN officials pinpointed potential contributors to the UN-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) to facilitate bilateral deals between willing troop suppliers and the United States. Pressured by its oil lobby to gain access to Sudan's lucrative oil reserves, the United States was prepared to provide financial compensation to incentivize personnel commitments (Henke 2016, 471, 475). To persuade Rwanda, the United States proposed training the Rwandan contingent before stationing, along with a $20 million package to cover the costs of "equipment and transportation" to complement the standard military assistance amounting up to $7 million (Henke 2016, 485). A parallel function was assumed by Australia during the recruitment process of UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) (Henke 2016, 471).

For their participation in UN peace operations and those conducted by regional organizations, African militaries have benefited from extensive military training programs provided by the United States, reaching over 200,000 troops (Brosig 2015, 163). The literature presents evidence that external funding allocations increase the likelihood of developing countries' participation in UN peacekeeping and the size of their peacekeeper deployments (Boutton and D'Orazio 2020). In this respect, 'pivotal' state engagements can facilitate the process of peacekeeping force formation. Boutton and D'Orazio (2020, 313) argue that "these aid transactions between major powers and contributing states play a key role in generating and maintaining peacekeeping forces."

Similarly, Oestman (2022) finds that UN peace missions are more abundantly staffed if they receive more material support from the United States. Rich state sponsors often provide necessary external sources to embolden the regime's capacity to maintain state control through funding, defense hardware, combat training, commercial partnerships (Victor 2010, 219). But in Africa, as Henk and Rupiya (2001, 2, 19) argue, financial planning for military expenses has typically been an "informal and closed process" in which "mechanisms for preventing waste, fraud, and abuse in security spending are relatively weak." In this respect, deployment-related resource allocations might as well be channeled to patronage networks to placate coethnic militaries.

Feeding loyal ties within the military is vital to uphold its function as a repressive apparatus to overcome internal challenges to regime authority, such as rebellions or mass protests. As loyalists become majority within the armed forces, for example, leaders can secure their militaries' allegiance to their regimes' survival by accommodating them with rents and other prerogatives, and thereby reduce their inclination to engage in coups or defection during the instances of popular dissent.

Victor (2010) finds that countries with low horizontal legitimacy, which refers to a higher populational proportion of ethnic groups split by borders demarcated by colonial architecture, commit more peacekeeping troops and participate in more UN peace operations.

According to Victor (2010, 222), this engagement can be attributed to African leaders' inclination to safeguard the existing regional status quo against the territorial dissolution of conflict-ridden states, which could inspire future breakaway attempts by separatist movements. In this vein, one might also expect leaders in countries with salient ethnic cleavages to instrumentalize troop deployments to gain access to external rents with which they can placate their coethnic militaries and expand their engagement in discriminative recruitment, promotion, and purging practices. Leaders can more easily eliminate potential adversaries among officers from different ethnic background, utilizing the support of their economically placated militaries. In this respect, peacekeeping rents can bolster clientelistic networks built on ethnic kinship by maintaining the codependence between autocratic leaders and their armed forces, ensuring regime survival on one side and exclusive rewards on the other.

For example, to bolster his regime and advance his political priorities, the Chadian President Idris Déby Itno leveraged the country's military through troop deployments to cooperate with major states, simultaneously enhancing the combat capacity of the Chadian Armed Forces (Tchie 2022, 341). President Déby actively participated in third-party interventions to instrumentalize troop deployments to alleviate military dissent, obtain external funding some of which he could channel to his domestic clients, and pander to Western powers, such as France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, to evade criticism from the international community on the account of his autocratic crackdown on internal contestation (Welz 2022). Chad was a large-scale personnel supplier to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) with on average 1,400 troops (Tchie 2023).

After deploying troops to Mali, Chad received "military assistance and educational training, to ensure self-sustainability and establish forces capable of conducting military operations to restore territorial integrity" in the Sahel region, within the framework of the European Union Training Mission, which was followed by additional training programs from France and the United Kingdom (Tchie 2023, 378). Thanks to his personnel commitments to MINUSMA, which began in 2013, along with other third-party interventions, Chadian President Déby was able to secure substantial external funding through foreign aid and UN reimbursements (Welz 2022, 383).

Welz (2022, 398) estimates that 1,090 Chadian uniformed peacekeepers committed to UN missions in 2014 generated roughly $17.4 million in reimbursement funding. Similar amounts of aid also poured in from France and the United States (Welz 2022, 398). While the author suspects that external monetary inflows may have been directed to his domestic clients (Welz 2022, 398), troop deployments allowed President Déby to placate factions within his military and assign commanding posts to his coethnics from the Bideyat (Tubu), a subgroup of Zaghawa (Tchie 2022; Welz 2022, 398-399). Between 2014 and 2017, Chadian defense spending surged by 40%, which provided Déby with means to expand his clientelistic network through additional recruitment and promotion of coethnics within the military (Tchie 2022, 354).

In sum, African leaders can leverage their manpower for UN troop deployments in exchange of private resources offered by major states. These resources can be transferred to coethnic political and military elites, and utilized for expanding or consolidating the support base. UN troop deployments, therefore, can embolden African leaders' ethnic stacking efforts. Based on this discussion, the main hypothesis suggests:

Hypothesis: The greater the number of peacekeepers an African country commits to UN peace operations, the higher the likelihood that its leader will engage in ethnic stacking.

## 4.5 Data

*Dependent variable.* The dependent variable, *Ethnic Stacking*, provides information on whether a leader in office opted to stack the armed forces with personnel from their ethnic group or communities aligned with the regime. The data exclusively cover African countries, encompassing the period from their attainment of independence to 2018, and are taken from Harkness' (2022) Ethnic Stacking in Africa dataset. After integrating the data with explanatory and control variables, the sample covers the period between 1992 and 2018. The variable takes on the value of 1 if "the leader selectively recruited coethnics (and possibly allied groups) into the officer corps of the military or into an elite presidential guard or other paramilitary unit" (Harkness 2022, 612), and 0 if otherwise. The author highlights that such "practice also entails the purposeful exclusion of other identity groups from the military, including via purges, demotions, or declining to hire or promote on the basis of ascriptive identity" (Harkness 2022, 612).

*Independent variable.* The main independent variable, *Peacekeepers (ln)* provides information about the number of troops contributed to UN peace operations. The data come from Kathman's (2013) United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel Commitments dataset, which includes data on contributor countries' personnel deployments to UN missions on a monthly basis. These data are available from 1992 relying on the monthly reports of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The monthly data are aggregated using the maximum monthly troop deployment to UN peace missions in a given country-year to account for the highest level of uniformed personnel commitment.

As high-volume personnel commitments to UN peace operations often flow in from a small group of privately-incentivized contributing states, the distribution of the data on countries' peacekeeping troop deployments is positively skewed. For this reason, the country-year values of dispatched troops are transformed using the natural log function in statistical analysis. The payment process of UN reimbursements, allowances, and external deals with major states to troop-contributing countries can face delays due to outstanding arrears and bureaucratic formalities, which can impede timely financial transactions. Therefore, I used the lagged values of *Peacekeepers (ln)* to attain accurate timing and mitigate concerns related to endogeneity.

*Control variables.* Since discriminatory policies based on ethnic considerations are inherently nondemocratic, the models control for countries' regime type. In this respect, *Autocracy* and *Anocracy* are binary regime indicators that were constructed by using Polity5 scores. *Autocracy* indicates the scores of -7 or below, *Anocracy* indicates the scores between -6 and 6, while *Democracy* indicates the scores of 7 or above as the baseline (Marshall and Gurr 2020). The models also control for countries' levels of economic development, human resources, military advancement, and manpower, using the respective variables *GDP per Capita (ln)*, *Population (ln)*, *Military Expenditure per Soldier (ln)*, and *Military Size (ln)*. These variables are derived from the natural-log transformations of data collected from the World Bank Development Indicators Databank (World Bank).

Harkness (2022, 621) argues that "ethnic stacking is largely a tool of autocratic power consolidation," which may serve for leaders who "design coercive and other institutions based on perceived threats from both rival elites and the excluded masses." In this respect, the repressive instruments of autocratic ethnopolitics should be manifested similarly at the endpoints of countries' civil-military axis. Leaders who engineer their armed forces along ethnic lines likely do so to complement similar measures implemented in national politics. For this reason, I accounted for *Ethnic Exclusion*, which provides information on politically excluded ethnic groups. The

variable sums the population shares of ethnic groups excluded from national politics, which are coded as "powerless, discriminated, and self-exclusion" (Vogt et al. 2015, 1331), and is bounded between 0 and 1. Military challenges to regime authority may affect leaders' coup-proofing strategies. To account for this, models include *Recent Coup Attempts*, which takes the value of 1 if a coup attempt occurred in a country within last ten years, irrespective of its success. For that, I relied on the event data coded by Powell and Thyne's (2011) Global Instances of Coups dataset.

Countries' security environment may also play an important role in determining decisions regarding the military. The models, therefore, incorporate *Interstate Conflict* and *Intrastate Conflict*, which indicate whether a country is engaged in inter- or intrastate conflict in a given year, using information sourced from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset (Davies, Pettersson, and Öberg 2022; Gleditsch et al. 2002). These variables take on the value of 1 if the number of battle-related deaths reaches 25 or more, and 0 if otherwise. As previously discussed, many African states have inherited ethnicity-oriented recruitment patterns from their former colonial rulers. Both Britain and France followed similar policies by entrusting the rank-and-file positions in their remote militaries to ethnic groups they considered politically reliable. Countries' history under British or French rule may influence their ethnic recruitment strategies. For this reason, *British Colony* and *French Colony* are included as binary controls indicating whether a country was formerly colonized by Britain or France, based on the information taken from ICOW Colonial History dataset (Hensel 2018). In Appendix C, Table C.1 demonstrates the descriptive statistics for the variables incorporated in the main models and robustness checks.

## 4.6 Findings and Discussion

Table 4.1 reports the coefficients from Models 1-4, based on logistic regressions. The main models are estimated with country-clustered robust standard errors, and they all incorporate temporal dependence controls (Carter and Signorino 2010). Model 1 is estimated using the main independent variable, incorporating information on countries' political and socioeconomic circumstances, military spending per soldier, and the number of military personnel. In addition, it accounts for the extent of political exclusion experienced by domestic ethnic groups. Model 2 incorporates data on countries' recent experiences with coups, as well as their internal and external security environments, by including information on their involvement in interstate or intrastate conflicts.

Table 4.1 Logistic Regression Estimates

|  | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Peacekeepers (ln)$_{t-1}$ | 0.297** | 0.297** | 0.276** | 0.276** |
|  | (0.128) | (0.125) | (0.139) | (0.139) |
| Autocracy | 7.697*** | 7.749*** | 7.189*** | 7.189*** |
|  | (1.459) | (1.592) | (1.353) | (1.353) |
| Anocracy | 1.540* | 1.525* | 1.302 | 1.302 |
|  | (0.862) | (0.910) | (0.906) | (0.906) |
| GDP per Capita (ln) | 0.366 | 0.387 | 0.143 | 0.143 |
|  | (0.384) | (0.410) | (0.410) | (0.410) |
| Population (ln) | -0.465 | -0.458 | -0.898** | -0.898** |
|  | (0.481) | (0.500) | (0.443) | (0.443) |
| Military Exp. per Soldier (ln) | 0.081 | 0.084 | 0.138 | 0.138 |
|  | (0.156) | (0.158) | (0.156) | (0.156) |
| Military Size (ln) | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.254 | 0.254 |
|  | (0.354) | (0.382) | (0.393) | (0.393) |
| Ethnic Exclusion | 2.056** | 2.065** | 2.734** | 2.733** |
|  | (1.008) | (1.020) | (1.072) | (1.072) |
| Recent Coup Attempts |  | 0.207 | -0.032 | -0.033 |
|  |  | (0.601) | (0.621) | (0.621) |
| Interstate Conflict |  | 5.754*** | 5.294*** | 5.295*** |
|  |  | (1.509) | (1.594) | (1.594) |
| Intrastate Conflict |  | -0.017 | 0.320 | 0.320 |
|  |  | (0.598) | (0.651) | (0.651) |
| British Colony |  |  | 1.698** | 1.698** |
|  |  |  | (0.846) | (0.846) |
| French Colony |  |  | 1.968*** | 1.968*** |
|  |  |  | (0.704) | (0.704) |
| Year | 0.005 | 0.006 | 0.016 | 0.016 |
|  | (0.033) | (0.035) | (0.041) | (0.041) |
| Ethnic Stacking Years | -4.489*** | -4.489*** | -4.135*** | -4.136*** |
|  | (0.960) | (0.974) | (0.914) | (0.914) |
| Ethnic Stacking Years$^2$ | 0.251*** | 0.251*** | 0.228*** | 0.228*** |
|  | (0.058) | (0.059) | (0.057) | (0.057) |
| Ethnic Stacking Years$^3$ | -0.004*** | -0.004*** | -0.003*** | -0.003*** |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Constant | -4.894 | -8.442 | -23.313 | -23.342 |
|  | (63.542) | (67.902) | (79.409) | (79.404) |
| N | 1197 | 1197 | 1197 | 1197 |
| LL | -80.214 | -79.974 | -75.216 | -75.216 |
| AIC | 186.427 | 191.949 | 186.433 | 186.433 |
| BIC | 252.566 | 273.350 | 278.009 | 278.009 |
| Random Effects | No | No | No | Yes |

Logistic regressions with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Model 3 includes additional controls for African countries' former colonial rulers to account for the effect of colonial practices. Model 4, lastly, reestimates the previous model with country random effects. To reestimate the fully specified model, I chose random effects to control for the effect of the incorporated variables with rare or no temporal variance in the sample (Bell and Jones 2015). As expected, *Peacekeeper (ln)* has a positive effect on the predicted probability of *Ethnic Stacking* across all model specifications. The effect of UN peacekeeper deployments on *Ethnic Stacking* remains positive and statistically significant at conventional levels across Models 1-4. Logistic regression coefficients solely indicate the significance and direction of this effect. For this reason, one can comment on the relationship between the variables of interest consistently receives statistical support and maintains the same direction across all model specifications, regardless of the inclusion or exclusion of different controls, which aligns with my theoretical expectation. To provide a substantive interpretation of the relationship between UN peacekeeper deployments and leaders' engagement in ethnic stacking practices, Figure 1 demonstrates the effect of *Peacekeepers (ln)* on the predicted probability of *Ethnic Stacking*.[7]

Figure 4.1 Substantive Effect of Peacekeepers on the Predicted Probability of Ethnic Stacking



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
[7]Substantive effects of *Peacekeepers (ln)* on the predicted probability of *Ethnic Stacking* based on Model 3. Gray areas indicate 90 percent confidence intervals. The histogram illustrates the distribution of *Peacekeepers (ln)*.

Taking socioeconomic, military, and ethnic exclusion indicators at their respective means, and the remaining variables at their respective medians, moving *Peacekeepers (ln)* from its minimum (0) to maximum value (9.02) results in roughly a 7.5 percentage-point increase in the predicted probability of *Ethnic Stacking.* On the other hand, one standard deviation (3.14) change above the mean value of *Peacekeepers (ln)* (2.46) increases the predicted probability of *Ethnic Stacking*, approximately by 2.6 percentage points. *Peacekeepers (ln)* hence demonstrates a positive effect on leaders' inclination to stack loyalists within their militaries to manipulate the ethnic composition. The results provide empirical support for my theoretical expectation that African leaders who deploy a greater number of UN peacekeepers are more likely to engage in ethnic stacking practices.

Turning to the control variables, expectedly, *Autocracy* shows a strong positive effect on *Ethnic Stacking.* In contrast, the positive effect of Anocracy is only partially supported across Models 1 and 2 at the 90 percent confidence level. While the level of economic development, indicated by *GDP per Capita (ln)* shows a positive association with ethnic stacking practices, this relationship does not achieve statistical significance. Although my argument assumed that economic underdevelopment should incentivize ethnic exclusionism, the findings do not support this claim. In this respect, one might consider that ethnic stacking practices can persist despite changes in economic development, owing to the path dependency of existing politicized ethnic cleavages. *Population (ln)*, on the other hand, stays consistently negative but only reaches statistical significance in Models 3 and 4, following the inclusion of data on colonial legacy. These estimates lend partial support for to the claim that ethnic stacking may occur less frequently in larger countries. The variable *Recent Coup Attempts* displays an effect that is directionally inconsistent and statistically insignificant. Exploiting ethnic loyalties for coup-proofing purposes does not appear to be systematically affected by recent military takeover attempts. This could be attributed to varying response patterns among African governments when confronted with a salient praetorian threat.

*Interstate Conflict* demonstrates a significant and positive effect on *Ethnic Stacking*, supported at the 99 percent confidence level. This is understandable, as African countries' interstate conflicts have often been impacted by artificial boundaries that arbitrarily divide ethnic groups or by disputes between states arising from contested identity and territorial claims, where one gained independence from another (Englebert, Tarango, and Carter 2002; Victor 2010). External challenges arising from ethnic group partitions may incentivize leaders to protect their security sector from ethnic groups with transnational loyalties. *Intrastate Conflict*, however, exhibits an insignificant effect that remains inconsistent in direction. Colonial legacy, on the

other hand, is a significant determinant of ethnic stacking practices. In Models 3 and 4, experiences with British and French colonial rule show a positive and statistically significant effect on *Ethnic Stacking*, with empirical support at the 95 and 99 confidence levels, respectively. These findings confirm the previous literature on the colonial origins of ethnic militaries (Bayo Adekson 1979; Harkness 2016; 2018; Horowitz 1985).

Overall, the evidence provided in this section suggests that leaders are more inclined to engage in ethnic stacking practices in African countries with larger uniformed personnel contributions to UN peace operations. In Appendix C, a series of robustness checks are performed to verify that this relationship holds up across different model specifications. For this purpose, I leveraged Polity5 scores instead of binary regime indicators to account for more nuanced variances in political regimes. I also included the natural-log transformation of *GDP* as an alternative economic indicator. I then employed *Military Expenditure*, again, by using its natural-logged values. In addition, I controlled for countries' ethnic and religious fractionalization utilizing the time-invariant data provided by Fearon and Laitin (2003). Lastly, I used the actual number of troop contributions instead of their natural-logged values. The results are robust to these specifications using different indicators. The effect of UN peacekeeper deployments on the predicted probability of *Ethnic Stacking* continues to be positive and statistically significant.

## 4.7 Conclusion

Since gaining independence, African countries have often grappled with the persistent risk of military interventionism. In this challenging climate, many African autocrats employed various coup-proofing strategies to safeguard their regimes from putschist efforts. Drawing on the established model inherited from the colonial period, some leaders sought to exert control over their armed forces by favoring politically reliable ethnic groups, whether their own or allied. As sustaining patronage networks within the state and security sectors requires ample resources, economically developing African autocrats frequently relied on external funding from major state donors (Victor 2010). Previous research indicates that foreign troop deployments can serve as an important leverage in these bargaining interactions (Boutton and D'Orazio 2020; Henke 2016; 2019a). By providing contributor-specific benefits, UN operations can offer a desirable avenue of opportunity for African leaders to gain access to additional rents and perks. This enables them to outsource defense

costs and receive external funding and material support, either through the UN or through external deals with major member-state donors.

This chapter investigated the relationship between peacekeeper deployments and ethnic stacking, with the theoretical expectation that large-scale involvement in the UN's peacekeeping efforts can generate resources that African leaders can channel into their ethnic patronage networks within the security sector. This poses a significant challenge to international efforts aimed at sustaining global peace and security, as well as to major states that seek to incentivize troop-contributing countries with material benefits. The findings appear to suggest a positive association between African countries' UN troop contributions and their leaders' engagement in ethnic stacking, though certain limitations are noted. First, to empirically strengthen the causal argument, it is necessary to utilize numerical data to account for actual changes in the ethnic personnel composition of African militaries. A recent effort by Johnson and Thurber (2020) has introduced the Security-Force Ethnicity dataset, which provides information on the ethnic composition of Middle Eastern militaries. However, these militaries are less involved in peace operations compared to their African and South-Asian counterparts. In order to establish a more robust causal link, there remains a need for disaggregated data covering African countries and other regions.

Second, this chapter centralized its attention on UN peace operations, but regional operations have increasingly gained prominence under the auspices of the African Union and state-led initiatives. As Tchie (2022) argues, these regional operations are more robust in instrumentalizing military measures and are primarily tasked with stabilizing and protecting host-state governments against security threats with a clear bias, rather than monitoring armistices or facilitating peace settlements. Given their increased militarization, these operations can shift the regional balance of power in favor of troop-contributing states by providing operational experience in more demanding conflict theaters, access to Western military training programs, monetary and in-kind support, and commercial side-deals. Nevertheless, as the findings of this chapter indicate, major state donors should be more selective when incentivizing troop contributors, ensuring that their regional and global security objectives are not achieved at the expense of bolstering the patronage networks of autocratic leaders in troop-contributing countries.

# 5. CONCLUSION

The use of militarized instruments in active conflict zones has become a significant aspect of the UN's peacekeeping efforts in recent decades. This shift was driven by the need for robust countermeasures against the ongoing bloodshed of civilians in highly volatile conflict zones, prompted by the UN's introspective evaluations following the catastrophic failures in the immediate post-Cold War period. As the fatality risk of UN peacekeeping involvement have increased, developed democracies have grown more reluctant to deploy large numbers of security personnel with heavily-invested equipment and training. Since the late 1990s, the personnel burden of UN peace operations has largely shifted to privately incentivized developing countries, which often lack strong democratic traditions and militaries firmly subordinate to civilian rule. As discussed earlier, the majority of the UN's standing peacekeeping force is supplied by countries from the Global South. Some of these countries contribute substantial numbers of uniformed personnel from their militaries to UN peace operations, driven either by their status-seeking agenda, regional security concerns, or economic interests.

Major states seeking to restore peace in conflict-ridden countries often use the UN framework or bilateral agreements to incentivize troop deployments. Since UN peace missions are often significantly understaffed compared to the mandated levels, the demand for peacekeeping personnel allows willing personnel contributors to leverage their 'comparative advantage in manpower' to negotiate for various rewards (Bove and Elia 2011). By generating additional funding, in-kind donations, opportunities to outsource defense costs, and operational experience, large-scale peacekeeper deployments have domestic implications for civil-military relations in contributing countries. Recent research has focused on civil-military incentives and implications of participation in UN peace operations, emphasizing the appeal of this involvement for governments as a coup-avoidance measure (Albrecht 2020; Banini, Powell, and Yekple 2020; Kathman and Melin 2017; Passmore 2020). Existing work highlights the effectiveness of peacekeeping participation in reducing the likelihood of coups

(Lundgren 2018), while also acknowledging that its impact varies depending on the political institutions of troop-contributing countries (Levin et al. 2021).

Building on previous literature, I identified three key functions of sizable troop deployments to UN peace operations that are particularly relevant to coup-avoidant leaders in contributing countries: (1) diversion and professionalization; (2) accommodation; and (3) coordination challenges. First, engaging in peacekeeping can redirect officers' focus toward security-related tasks, while the demanding operational requirements and provided training programs can enhance military professionalization. Second, external funding from the UN and major donor states can be crucial for leaders aiming to pacify their praetorian militaries, as it enables the allocation of additional resources without straining the state budget. Finally, leaders can also instrumentalize their countries' involvement in UN peacekeeping to impose coordination challenges among trouble-making uniformed personnel by sending sizable contingents to distant conflict zones. With these functions considered, the dispatch of blue berets from the military is argued to affect leaders' strategic choices for avoiding irregular removal from office through military coups.

This dissertation combined three studies to advance existing knowledge by investigating how involvement in UN peacekeeping affects the implementation of coup-avoidant strategies. For this purpose, it leveraged readily accessible data sourced from the recent coup-proofing literature. The empirical chapters focused on military participation in government as an accommodative strategy, as well as counterbalancing and ethnic stacking as disruptive coup-proofing measures to thwart challenges from praetorian militaries. The studies relied primarily on regression analyses to examine the impact of peacekeeping on the adoption of these strategies, while the first study complemented its findings with a brief case study of Bangladesh.

The first empirical chapter investigated how UN peacekeeper deployments affect militaries' inclination to assume government seats. The findings suggest that large-scale troop contributions to UN peace operations reduce the likelihood of observing active-duty military officers in government. The chapter identified two accommodative functions of peacekeeping involvement that might be at play in producing this effect. First, since officers' involvement in politics typically arises from their concerns over the military's corporate interests, their pursuit of administrative roles to influence policymaking processes may stem from material demands.

Extant research highlights that when military officers attempt to seize political authority through irregular interventions or seek governmental roles to lay in their weight as tutelary guardians in some political decisions, this activism is often incentivized by the prospect of gaining greater access to state resources (Powell 2012;

Sakib and Rahman 2023a; White 2023). In this respect, participation in UN peace-keeping can reduce these praetorian incentives for direct involvement in national politics by generating an inflow of rents and perks supplied by the UN and major donor states. These resources can then be channeled to military elites within the officer corps to address material grievances, thereby alleviating pressure on leaders to allocate government seats to active-duty officers as a means of institutional guarantee.

Second, peacekeeping can also serve as a pathway to greater military professionalism, which in turn can reduce the military's interest in domestic politics. Engagement in external operations can shift the military's focus away from internal concerns, while efforts to meet the UN's operational standards can transform the military's corporate identity. Successfully fulfilling these newly assumed roles can bolster the military's prestige and thereby reduce uncertainties regarding its status in society. As militaries strive to enhance their organizational capacity and gain operational experience on the ground, officers' shifting priorities may lead them to distance themselves from pursuing active political roles, resulting in a reduced interest in holding seats in government. The first empirical chapter's findings from regression analyses using country-year data, complemented by the case study of Bangladesh, substantiate this argument. However, one should recognize that the absence of military presence in government does not necessarily indicate effective civilian control. Military leaders can continue to exert influence over political decisionmaking at the subministerial level, through other government agencies, or behind closed doors. Nevertheless, the study's findings suggest that dedicated peacekeeping engagements can affect patterns of civil-military interaction, reducing the likelihood of governmental power-sharing.

The second empirical chapter scrutinized the relationship between the relative size of peacekeeper deployments within the military and leaders' counterbalancing efforts in contributing countries. Present case studies suggest that participation in peace operations can produce intended (Banini, Powell, and Yekple 2020) or inadvertent (Albrecht 2020) coup-proofing effects. However, scholarly efforts to date have not fully addressed the impact of peacekeeping involvement on leaders' coup-proofing practices across a wide range of cases. The chapter contributes further insight to this debate by revealing findings that suggest governments committing greater percentages of their troops to peace operations are less likely to engage in counterbalancing efforts.

Participation in UN peacekeeping provides internationally legitimate grounds for contributing states to dispatch large numbers of troops to remote conflict theaters,

a move that might otherwise be daunting for the domestically-oriented militaries of developing countries, which are typically inexperienced in warfare. Foreign troop deployments allow leaders to impose challenges to their militaries' coordinative capacity to orchestrate successful coups. In this respect, peacekeeping can be a more preferable coup-proofing alternative than counterbalancing. To explain this substitutive relationship, the chapter identified the comparative benefits and drawbacks between peacekeeping and counterbalancing. Two underlying mechanisms come forward that likely shape leaders' decisions to send troublemaking soldiers abroad, rather than to establish armed counterweights to their regular militaries.

First, counterbalancing can be a costly enterprise. Recruiting loyalists to paramilitary forces and developing their deterrent capacity can require substantial time and monetary resources. Further, overt acts of counterbalancing "might prompt the military to resort to a coup immediately" (Sudduth 2017a, 5). In contrast, UN peacekeeping participation, as argued above, can alleviate leaders' economic concerns over funding the security sector. Peacekeeping-related revenues can help alleviate budgetary constraints and placate the armed forces. Second, factionalizing security forces may not only decapitate their coordinative capacity to stage a coup, but also to achieve favorable outcomes on the battlefield (Pilster and Böhmelt 2011). Participation in peace operations, on the other hand, can improve military effectiveness by providing troop contingents with opportunities to gain operational experience and access externally funded training programs. Therefore, peacekeeping can reduce developing country leaders' reliance on counterbalancing as a coup-proofing strategy.

Tracing the origins of ethnic militaries to the colonial period, the third empirical chapter explored the association between UN troop commitments and ethnic stacking practices. While the first two studies are based on theoretical expectations of substitutive effects, this latter study argued for a complementary impact. This is because, as discussed extensively in previous chapters, peacekeeping can serve as a significant source of revenue for developing states, and these resources might as well be directed toward ethnic militaries. Due to the availability of data and the region's notable engagement in peacekeeping, the chapter focused on African countries' troop deployment patterns and their leaders' attempts to restructure their militaries on the grounds of ethnic considerations. Where ethnic cleavages are politically salient, loyalty ties can be arranged with respect to shared communal affiliations. In many African countries, leaders seeking to consolidate their positions in office have resorted to fostering ingroup loyalties within the security force structure.

Therefore, nondemocratic leaders of multiethnic countries may adopt discrimina-

tive measures in recruiting and promoting military personnel, seeking to bolster or expand their loyalty base within the regime's repressive apparatus. Peacekeeper deployments can possibly be instrumentalized as means to access external resources to further consolidate ethnic clientelistic linkages. The findings similarly indicate a positive association. Nevertheless, the positive correlation between large peacekeeper deployments and ethnic stacking does not necessarily indicate a robust causal link. To further test the theoretical claims presented in the third empirical chapter, it is essential to obtain disaggregate data. The data at hand provides aggregate information to gauge ethnic stacking by identifying instances of ethnic favoritism in recruitment and promotions, alongside discriminatory practices such as purges or other exclusionary measures. A plausible causal link, therefore, can be established by utilizing detailed information on changes in the ethnic composition of African militaries along with the patterns of promotion within the officer corps, thereby uncovering accountable variations in ethnic stacking practices.

Overall, this dissertation contributes to the existing knowledge by rethinking the relationship between peacekeeping involvement and civil-military relations in troop-contributing countries. In seeking to move beyond debates centered solely on coups marking the breakdown of civil-military interactions, the studies in this dissertation investigated how coup-avoidant leaders can strategically utilize foreign troop deployments under the auspices of the UN. Although the focus here has been placed primarily on UN-led operations, future scholarship on peacekeeping and civil-military relations would benefit from examining whether similar dynamics apply to security personnel commitments to operations embodied by regional organizations and state-led coalitions. This is especially important considering the recent rise of regional initiatives amid declining UN engagement in conflict management through peacekeeping.

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Table A.1 In-Sample Descriptive Statistics

|  | Obs. | Mean | SD | Min. | Max. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Military Participation in Government | 2155 | 0.362 | 0.481 | 0 | 1 |
| Officers in Government | 2155 | 0.034 | 0.082 | 0 | 0.844 |
| Peacekeepers (ln) | 2155 | 2.475 | 3.024 | 0 | 9.232 |
| Peacekeepers (in 100s) | 2155 | 4.026 | 11.137 | 0 | 102.140 |
| Democracy | 2155 | 0.466 | 0.499 | 0 | 1 |
| Anocracy | 2155 | 0.425 | 0.494 | 0 | 1 |
| Autocracy | 2155 | 0.110 | 0.312 | 0 | 1 |
| Polity5 Score | 2155 | 3.400 | 6.476 | -10 | 10 |
| GDP per Capita (ln) | 2155 | 8.462 | 1.294 | 5.094 | 11.083 |
| GDP (ln) | 2155 | 11.057 | 1.879 | 6.402 | 16.392 |
| Population (ln) | 2155 | 9.503 | 1.360 | 6.811 | 14.082 |
| Military Exp. per Soldier (ln) | 2155 | 8.884 | 2.199 | 0 | 13.683 |
| Military Expenditure (ln) | 2155 | 19.601 | 4.111 | 0 | 27.211 |
| Military Size (ln) | 2155 | 11.033 | 1.546 | 6.685 | 15.235 |
| Military Regime | 2155 | 0.038 | 0.190 | 0 | 1 |
| Recent Coup Attempts | 2155 | 0.191 | 0.393 | 0 | 1 |
| Interstate Conflict | 2155 | 0.016 | 0.126 | 0 | 1 |
| Intrastate Conflict | 2155 | 0.184 | 0.387 | 0 | 1 |
| Cabinet Size | 2155 | 23.432 | 8.959 | 5 | 72 |
| Year | 2155 | 2000.025 | 4.844 | 1992 | 2008 |
| Military Participation Years | 2155 | 10.209 | 13.463 | 0 | 44 |
| Peacekeeping Participation | 2155 | 0.476 | 0.500 | 0 | 1 |
| Peacekeeping Participation Years | 2155 | 3.387 | 4.588 | 0 | 16 |

Table A.1 presents the in-sample descriptive statistics of all variables incorporated in the models estimated in Chapter 2 and Appendix A.

Table A.2 Descriptive Statistics

|  | Obs. | Mean | SD | Min. | Max. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Military Participation in Government | 2606 | 0.368 | 0.482 | 0 | 1 |
| Officers in Government | 2606 | 0.033 | 0.081 | 0 | 0.864 |
| Peacekeepers (ln) | 2615 | 2.179 | 2.943 | 0 | 9.232 |
| Peacekeepers (in 100s) | 2615 | 3.456 | 10.268 | 0 | 102.140 |
| Democracy | 2614 | 0.423 | 0.494 | 0 | 1 |
| Anocracy | 2614 | 0.439 | 0.496 | 0 | 1 |
| Autocracy | 2614 | 0.138 | 0.345 | 0 | 1 |
| Polity5 Score | 2614 | 2.844 | 6.656 | -10 | 10 |
| GDP per Capita (ln) | 2615 | 8.391 | 1.292 | 4.889 | 11.541 |
| GDP (ln) | 2615 | 10.696 | 2.014 | 5.414 | 16.392 |
| Population (ln) | 2615 | 9.213 | 1.517 | 5.838 | 14.082 |
| Military Exp. per Soldier (ln) | 2301 | 8.915 | 2.149 | 0 | 13.683 |
| Military Expenditure (ln) | 2348 | 19.417 | 4.130 | 0 | 27.211 |
| Military Size (ln) | 2500 | 10.806 | 1.639 | 6.685 | 15.235 |
| Military Regime | 2393 | 0.036 | 0.185 | 0 | 1 |
| Recent Coup Attempts | 2615 | 0.203 | 0.403 | 0 | 1 |
| Interstate Conflict | 2615 | 0.014 | 0.118 | 0 | 1 |
| Intrastate Conflict | 2615 | 0.169 | 0.375 | 0 | 1 |
| Cabinet Size | 2606 | 23.355 | 9.010 | 5 | 72 |
| Year | 2615 | 2000.009 | 4.895 | 1992 | 2008 |
| Military Participation Years | 2606 | 10.056 | 13.325 | 0 | 44 |
| Peacekeeping Participation | 2615 | 0.420 | 0.494 | 0 | 1 |
| Peacekeeping Participation Years | 2615 | 3.793 | 4.773 | 0 | 16 |

Table A.2 reports the descriptive statistics of all variables included both in the main models and additional robustness checks in Chapter 2 and Appendix A.

Table A.3 Robustness Checks I

| | (A1) | (A2) | (A3) | (A4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Peacekeepers (ln) | -0.108*** | -0.114*** | -0.119*** | -0.087* |
| | (0.037) | (0.037) | (0.038) | (0.046) |
| Polity5 Score | -0.057*** | -0.059*** | -0.042** | -0.097*** |
| | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.019) | (0.032) |
| GDP per Capita (ln) | -0.293** | -0.288** | -0.300** | -0.740*** |
| | (0.137) | (0.141) | (0.143) | (0.238) |
| Population (ln) | -0.015 | -0.014 | -0.090 | -0.317 |
| | (0.137) | (0.141) | (0.149) | (0.219) |
| Military Exp. per Soldier (ln) | 0.039 | 0.040 | 0.070 | 0.132 |
| | (0.054) | (0.054) | (0.057) | (0.082) |
| Military Size (ln) | 0.293*** | 0.305*** | 0.283** | 0.546*** |
| | (0.112) | (0.116) | (0.117) | (0.173) |
| Military Regime | -0.345 | -0.286 | -0.360 | -0.801 |
| | (0.428) | (0.443) | (0.472) | (0.567) |
| Recent Coup Attempts | | 0.076 | 0.102 | 0.066 |
| | | (0.225) | (0.221) | (0.303) |
| Interstate Conflict | | 1.522** | 1.636** | 1.873** |
| | | (0.687) | (0.699) | (0.776) |
| Intrastate Conflict | | -0.326 | -0.356 | -0.258 |
| | | (0.263) | (0.267) | (0.410) |
| Cabinet Size | | | 0.038** | 0.057*** |
| | | | (0.015) | (0.021) |
| Year | 0.044** | 0.045** | 0.037** | 0.002 |
| | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.024) |
| Military Participation Years | -1.239*** | -1.239*** | -1.232*** | -0.968*** |
| | (0.107) | (0.108) | (0.109) | (0.101) |
| Military Participation Years$^2$ | 0.064*** | 0.064*** | 0.063*** | 0.047*** |
| | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.008) |
| Military Participation Years$^3$ | -0.001*** | -0.001*** | -0.001*** | -0.001*** |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Constant | -88.143** | -89.148** | -72.891** | -1.613 |
| | (35.334) | (35.922) | (36.615) | (47.274) |
| N | 2155 | 2155 | 2155 | 2155 |
| LL | -579.582 | -576.280 | -570.494 | -540.685 |
| AIC | 1183.164 | 1182.560 | 1172.988 | 1115.371 |
| BIC | 1251.271 | 1267.693 | 1263.797 | 1211.855 |
| Random Effects | No | No | No | Yes |

Logistic regressions with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.3 reports coefficients from Models A1-A4, which are estimated with specifications including Polity5 scores instead of binary regime indicators. The main explanatory variable, *Peacekeepers (ln)*, remains steadily negative and statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level across Models A1-A3. In Model A4, estimated with random effects, it continues to be supported at 90 percent. *Polity5 Score* exhibits a statistically significant negative association with the dependent variable, *Military Participation in Government.*

Table A.4 Robustness Checks II

| | (A5) | (A6) | (A7) | (A8) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Peacekeepers (ln) | -0.107*** | -0.112*** | -0.116*** | -0.081* |
| | (0.036) | (0.037) | (0.038) | (0.045) |
| Autocracy | 1.351*** | 1.370*** | 1.048*** | 2.363*** |
| | (0.377) | (0.379) | (0.400) | (0.643) |
| Anocracy | 0.189 | 0.250 | 0.145 | 0.428 |
| | (0.233) | (0.239) | (0.236) | (0.350) |
| GDP (ln) | -0.374*** | -0.356** | -0.347** | -0.916*** |
| | (0.138) | (0.141) | (0.142) | (0.264) |
| Population (ln) | 0.335** | 0.314* | 0.239 | 0.515** |
| | (0.155) | (0.167) | (0.172) | (0.260) |
| Military Exp. per Soldier (ln) | 0.042 | 0.043 | 0.070 | 0.140 |
| | (0.057) | (0.057) | (0.059) | (0.085) |
| Military Size (ln) | 0.309*** | 0.312*** | 0.282** | 0.602*** |
| | (0.113) | (0.118) | (0.118) | (0.179) |
| Military Regime | -0.314 | -0.302 | -0.401 | -0.956 |
| | (0.444) | (0.457) | (0.474) | (0.626) |
| Recent Coup Attempts | | 0.055 | 0.096 | 0.121 |
| | | (0.230) | (0.224) | (0.322) |
| Interstate Conflict | | 1.495** | 1.611** | 1.873** |
| | | (0.699) | (0.706) | (0.786) |
| Intrastate Conflict | | -0.215 | -0.262 | -0.126 |
| | | (0.272) | (0.277) | (0.438) |
| Cabinet Size | | | 0.038** | 0.061*** |
| | | | (0.015) | (0.021) |
| Year | 0.042** | 0.043** | 0.035* | -0.003 |
| | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.025) |
| Military Participation Years | -1.230*** | -1.231*** | -1.225*** | -0.952*** |
| | (0.108) | (0.109) | (0.110) | (0.101) |
| Military Participation Years$^2$ | 0.064*** | 0.063*** | 0.063*** | 0.046*** |
| | (0.009) | (0.010) | (0.009) | (0.008) |
| Military Participation Years$^3$ | -0.001*** | -0.001*** | -0.001*** | -0.001*** |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Constant | -86.346** | -87.479** | -71.949** | 3.077 |
| | (35.582) | (36.245) | (36.419) | (48.719) |
| N | 2155 | 2155 | 2155 | 2155 |
| LL | -577.269 | -574.634 | -568.708 | -536.988 |
| AIC | 1180.537 | 1181.267 | 1171.415 | 1109.976 |
| BIC | 1254.319 | 1272.076 | 1267.899 | 1212.136 |
| Random Effects | No | No | No | Yes |

Logistic regressions with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

While specifications across Main Models 1-4 include *GDP per Capita (ln)*, the models shown in Table A.4 are estimated with *GDP (ln)* instead. *Peacekeepers (ln)* remains negative and significant across Models A5-A8, the level of economic activity, indicated by *GDP (ln)*, demonstrates a significant negative effect on the predicted probability of *Military Participation in Government*, supported at a 99 percent confidence level in Models A5 and A8, and at conventional levels in Models A6 and A7. The significance and the negative direction of the effect suggests that militaries in countries with larger economies are less likely to take on government roles.

Table A.5 Robustness Checks III

| | (A9) | (A10) | (A11) | (A12) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Peacekeepers (ln) | -0.107*** | -0.112*** | -0.117*** | -0.081* |
| | (0.036) | (0.037) | (0.038) | (0.045) |
| Autocracy | 1.362*** | 1.381*** | 1.058*** | 2.401*** |
| | (0.377) | (0.380) | (0.400) | (0.653) |
| Anocracy | 0.192 | 0.254 | 0.149 | 0.441 |
| | (0.234) | (0.240) | (0.237) | (0.351) |
| GDP per Capita (ln) | -0.356*** | -0.338** | -0.319** | -0.854*** |
| | (0.129) | (0.133) | (0.134) | (0.249) |
| Population (ln) | -0.031 | -0.034 | -0.097 | -0.370 |
| | (0.136) | (0.142) | (0.150) | (0.226) |
| Military Expenditure (ln) | 0.022 | 0.023 | 0.040 | 0.080* |
| | (0.028) | (0.028) | (0.029) | (0.043) |
| Military Size (ln) | 0.280** | 0.282** | 0.231** | 0.491*** |
| | (0.110) | (0.117) | (0.116) | (0.172) |
| Military Regime | -0.305 | -0.294 | -0.392 | -0.954 |
| | (0.443) | (0.457) | (0.473) | (0.629) |
| Recent Coup Attempts | | 0.056 | 0.097 | 0.132 |
| | | (0.229) | (0.224) | (0.322) |
| Interstate Conflict | | 1.501** | 1.624** | 1.895** |
| | | (0.698) | (0.704) | (0.786) |
| Intrastate Conflict | | -0.219 | -0.269 | -0.136 |
| | | (0.271) | (0.277) | (0.438) |
| Cabinet Size | | | 0.038** | 0.063*** |
| | | | (0.015) | (0.021) |
| Year | 0.043** | 0.043** | 0.035* | -0.004 |
| | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.018) | (0.025) |
| Military Participation Years | -1.229*** | -1.231*** | -1.225*** | -0.950*** |
| | (0.108) | (0.109) | (0.110) | (0.101) |
| Military Participation Years$^2$ | 0.064*** | 0.063*** | 0.063*** | 0.046*** |
| | (0.009) | (0.010) | (0.009) | (0.008) |
| Military Participation Years$^3$ | -0.001*** | -0.001*** | -0.001*** | -0.001*** |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Constant | -84.131** | -85.300** | -69.440* | 10.276 |
| | (35.650) | (36.252) | (36.314) | (48.821) |
| N | 2155 | 2155 | 2155 | 2155 |
| LL | -577.285 | -574.617 | -568.565 | -536.475 |
| AIC | 1180.569 | 1181.234 | 1171.131 | 1108.950 |
| BIC | 1254.351 | 1272.042 | 1267.615 | 1211.109 |
| Random Effects | No | No | No | Yes |

Logistic regressions with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Models A9-A12, as shown in Table A.5, are estimated accounting for *Military Expenditure (ln)* instead of *Military Expenditure per Soldier (ln)*. The coefficients of *Peacekeeper (ln)* are consistent with those in Main Models 1-4. *Military Expenditure (ln)*, on the other hand, exhibits a positive effect but receives empirical support only in Model A12, which uses random effects for estimation.

Table A.6 Fractional Logistic Regression Estimates

|  | (A13) | (A14) | (A15) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Peacekeepers (ln) | -0.108** | -0.098** | -0.095** |
|  | (0.046) | (0.040) | (0.038) |
| Autocracy | -0.165 | -0.160 | -0.314 |
|  | (0.319) | (0.318) | (0.363) |
| Anocracy | -0.140 | -0.193 | -0.249 |
|  | (0.158) | (0.161) | (0.163) |
| GDP per Capita (ln) | -0.183* | -0.184* | -0.183* |
|  | (0.096) | (0.099) | (0.095) |
| Population (ln) | 0.029 | 0.026 | -0.001 |
|  | (0.117) | (0.114) | (0.119) |
| Military Exp. per Soldier (ln) | 0.124* | 0.120* | 0.127** |
|  | (0.071) | (0.070) | (0.064) |
| Military Size (ln) | 0.090 | 0.074 | 0.041 |
|  | (0.151) | (0.146) | (0.124) |
| Military Regime | 1.504*** | 1.450*** | 1.372*** |
|  | (0.518) | (0.510) | (0.434) |
| Recent Coup Attempts |  | -0.032 | -0.029 |
|  |  | (0.160) | (0.152) |
| Interstate Conflict |  | -0.262 | -0.200 |
|  |  | (0.351) | (0.300) |
| Intrastate Conflict |  | 0.220 | 0.209 |
|  |  | (0.174) | (0.167) |
| Cabinet Size |  |  | 0.018 |
|  |  |  | (0.013) |
| Year | 0.003 | 0.003 | -0.001 |
|  | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.012) |
| Military Participation Years | -0.936*** | -0.942*** | -0.933*** |
|  | (0.100) | (0.101) | (0.100) |
| Military Participation Years$^2$ | 0.051*** | 0.051*** | 0.051*** |
|  | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.010) |
| Military Participation Years$^3$ | -0.001*** | -0.001*** | -0.001*** |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Constant | -9.687 | -9.309 | -0.041 |
|  | (24.166) | (24.446) | (23.998) |
| N | 2155 | 2155 | 2155 |
| LL | -247.443 | -247.146 | -246.480 |
| AIC | 520.887 | 526.293 | 526.960 |
| BIC | 594.669 | 617.101 | 623.444 |

Fractional logistic regressions with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

* $p<0.1$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$

Whereas main models account for whether at least one active-duty military officer holds a government position, Tables A.6-A.8 show estimates of the models taking the share of active-duty military officers in government as the dependent variable. Since I am modeling for a fractional response variable, which is continuous and bounded by 0 and 1, standard linear models may not be appropriate for estimating the effect of peacekeeper deployments on the share of active-duty military officers in government (Papke and Wooldridge 1996). Therefore, Models A13-A23 use fractional logistic regressions for additional robustness checks. The main explanatory variable, *Peacekeeper (ln)*, remains consistently negative and statistically significant at conventional levels.

Figure A.1 Substantive Effect of Peacekeepers on the Predicted Share of Active-Duty Officers in Government



To better understand the relationship between *Peacekeeper (ln)* and *Officers in Government*, Figure A.1 depicts the substantive effect of the former on the latter.[8] Except *GDP per Capita*, *Population (ln)*, *Military Expenditure per Soldier (ln)*, and *Military Size (ln)*, all variables are taken at their respective medians. Shifting the main explanatory variable from its minimum (0) to its maximum (9.23) value results

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[8]Substantive effect of *Peacekeepers (ln)* on the predicted share of *Officers in Government* based on Model A15. Gray areas show 90 percent confidence intervals. The histogram shows the distribution of *Peacekeepers (ln)*.

in roughly a 1.8 percentage-point reduction in the predicted share of active-duty military officers in government. In addition, Figure A.2 illustrates the average marginal effects of *Peacekeepers (ln)* on the predicted share of *Officers in Government.*.[9] The effect is negative and statistically significant across the in-sample values of *Peacekeepers (ln)*. As demonstrated, *Peacekeepers (ln)*'s effect on the conditional mean of the dependent variable decreases as it increases. In other words, while the magnitude of the effect is larger at lower values of *Peacekeepers (ln)*, it becomes progressively smaller at higher values.

Figure A.2 Average Marginal Effects of Peacekeepers on the Predicted Share of Active-Duty Officers in Government



Returning to the control variables, both *Autocracy* and *Anocracy* fail to achieve statistical significance. Both variables' effects have also changed direction, turning from positive to negative. *GDP per Capita (ln)* continues to have a negative effect, which is significant at the 90 percent confidence level. The effect of *Population* is inconsistent in direction and not statistically significant. The level of *Military Expenditure per Soldier* is positively associated with the share of *Officers in Government*. Though positive, the size of a country's military does not have a meaningful relationship with the extent of active-duty military officers holding seats

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[9] Average marginal effects of *Peacekeepers (ln)* on *Officers in Government* based on Model A15. Caps show 95 percent confidence intervals.

in government. Expectedly, *Military Regime* is steadily positive and significant at the 99 percent confidence level.

Surprisingly, the *Recent Coup Attempts* variable has a negative but statistically insignificant effect on *Officers in Government*. Although the main models show a positive and significant effect of *Interstate Conflict* on the predicted probability of *Military Participation in Government*, its effect on the predict share of *Officers in Government* is insignificant and steadily negative. This is understandable considering that while civilian governments may seek to leverage the often monopolized expertise of military officers in warfare at the highest administrative level, such as defense ministries, engagement in interstate conflict should not necessarily increase the extent of military participation in government. In contrast, *Intrastate Conflict* has a positive association with the dependent variable, which fails to receive empirical support. While the effect of *Cabinet Size* was positive and significant across Main Models 3-4, the estimates from Model A15 do not provide empirical support for its impact on *Officers in Government*, despite remaining positive. *Year* is not statistically significant in any of the models.

Table A.7 Fractional Logistic Regression Estimates with Lagged Values I

|  | (A16) | (A17) | (A18) | (A19) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Peacekeepers (ln)$_{t-1}$ | -0.098** | | | |
|  | (0.040) | | | |
| Peacekeepers (ln)$_{t-2}$ | | -0.106*** | | |
|  | | (0.041) | | |
| Peacekeepers (ln)$_{t-3}$ | | | -0.107** | |
|  | | | (0.043) | |
| Peacekeepers (ln)$_{t-4}$ | | | | -0.106*** |
|  | | | | (0.041) |
| Autocracy | -0.420 | -0.405 | -0.398 | -0.449 |
|  | (0.353) | (0.332) | (0.312) | (0.292) |
| Anocracy | -0.274 | -0.263 | -0.295* | -0.290* |
|  | (0.170) | (0.175) | (0.177) | (0.176) |
| GDP per Capita (ln) | -0.159 | -0.154 | -0.153 | -0.120 |
|  | (0.097) | (0.097) | (0.096) | (0.089) |
| Population (ln) | -0.003 | 0.008 | 0.011 | 0.023 |
|  | (0.118) | (0.114) | (0.110) | (0.102) |
| Military Exp. per Soldier (ln) | 0.112* | 0.103 | 0.095 | 0.083 |
|  | (0.066) | (0.073) | (0.077) | (0.074) |
| Military Size (ln) | 0.039 | 0.028 | 0.027 | 0.021 |
|  | (0.119) | (0.107) | (0.102) | (0.093) |
| Military Regime | 1.489*** | 1.670*** | 1.784*** | 1.885*** |
|  | (0.445) | (0.457) | (0.518) | (0.575) |
| Interstate Conflict | -0.221 | -0.300 | -0.361 | -0.598* |
|  | (0.298) | (0.307) | (0.322) | (0.329) |
| Intrastate Conflict | 0.155 | 0.099 | 0.083 | 0.067 |
|  | (0.148) | (0.147) | (0.155) | (0.163) |
| Recent Coup Attempts | -0.084 | -0.139 | -0.217 | -0.262 |
|  | (0.160) | (0.164) | (0.179) | (0.187) |
| Cabinet Size | 0.020 | 0.018 | 0.017 | 0.016 |
|  | (0.013) | (0.012) | (0.012) | (0.012) |
| Year | -0.004 | -0.004 | -0.010 | -0.010 |
|  | (0.012) | (0.013) | (0.014) | (0.014) |
| Military Participation Years | -0.948*** | -0.920*** | -0.895*** | -0.971*** |
|  | (0.105) | (0.105) | (0.107) | (0.115) |
| Military Participation Years$^2$ | 0.052*** | 0.050*** | 0.049*** | 0.052*** |
|  | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.010) |
| Military Participation Years$^3$ | -0.001*** | -0.001*** | -0.001*** | -0.001*** |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Constant | 5.968 | 5.999 | 17.684 | 16.824 |
|  | (24.187) | (24.787) | (26.782) | (27.390) |
| N | 2036 | 1909 | 1784 | 1661 |
| LL | -227.320 | -208.085 | -192.039 | -174.616 |
| AIC | 488.640 | 450.170 | 418.079 | 383.232 |
| BIC | 584.158 | 544.594 | 511.351 | 475.290 |

Fractional logistic regressions with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.8 Fractional Logistic Regression Estimates with Lagged Values II

|  | (A20) | (A21) | (A22) | (A23) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Peacekeepers (ln)$_{t-5}$ | -0.099** | | | |
|  | (0.041) | | | |
| Peacekeepers (ln)$_{t-6}$ | | -0.090** | | |
|  | | (0.041) | | |
| Peacekeepers (ln)$_{t-7}$ | | | -0.089** | |
|  | | | (0.042) | |
| Peacekeepers (ln)$_{t-8}$ | | | | -0.063 |
|  | | | | (0.040) |
| Autocracy | -0.404 | -0.326 | -0.259 | -0.141 |
|  | (0.286) | (0.279) | (0.285) | (0.306) |
| Anocracy | -0.282 | -0.254 | -0.244 | -0.237 |
|  | (0.185) | (0.188) | (0.198) | (0.214) |
| GDP per Capita (ln) | -0.101 | -0.092 | -0.087 | -0.117 |
|  | (0.086) | (0.084) | (0.086) | (0.094) |
| Population (ln) | 0.017 | 0.032 | 0.029 | 0.012 |
|  | (0.103) | (0.103) | (0.103) | (0.111) |
| Military Exp. per Soldier (ln) | 0.065 | 0.059 | 0.048 | 0.055 |
|  | (0.069) | (0.069) | (0.067) | (0.070) |
| Military Size (ln) | 0.011 | -0.029 | -0.032 | -0.029 |
|  | (0.090) | (0.088) | (0.090) | (0.098) |
| Military Regime | 1.952*** | 2.023*** | 2.086*** | 2.079*** |
|  | (0.609) | (0.626) | (0.662) | (0.711) |
| Interstate Conflict | -0.588** | -0.533* | -0.481 | -0.574 |
|  | (0.292) | (0.324) | (0.400) | (0.559) |
| Intrastate Conflict | 0.092 | 0.096 | 0.110 | 0.131 |
|  | (0.170) | (0.166) | (0.167) | (0.166) |
| Recent Coup Attempts | -0.325 | -0.373 | -0.467 | -0.567* |
|  | (0.211) | (0.243) | (0.293) | (0.332) |
| Cabinet Size | 0.015 | 0.014 | 0.010 | 0.009 |
|  | (0.012) | (0.011) | (0.010) | (0.010) |
| Year | -0.011 | -0.020 | -0.026 | -0.034 |
|  | (0.015) | (0.017) | (0.018) | (0.023) |
| Military Participation Years | -0.966*** | -0.957*** | -0.924*** | -0.928*** |
|  | (0.118) | (0.119) | (0.118) | (0.127) |
| Military Participation Years$^2$ | 0.052*** | 0.051*** | 0.049*** | 0.050*** |
|  | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.010) |
| Military Participation Years$^3$ | -0.001*** | -0.001*** | -0.001*** | -0.001*** |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Constant | 19.843 | 38.406 | 50.682 | 65.768 |
|  | (29.881) | (33.615) | (35.682) | (45.448) |
| N | 1533 | 1403 | 1276 | 1146 |
| LL | -159.125 | -144.842 | -131.229 | -116.893 |
| AIC | 352.250 | 323.684 | 296.458 | 267.786 |
| BIC | 442.944 | 412.872 | 384.033 | 353.534 |

Fractional logistic regressions with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Tables A.7 and A.8 show the coefficients from Models A16-A23, which estimated with the lagged values of Peacekeepers (ln) by 1 to 8 years, respectively. The effect of Peacekeepers (ln) on the Share of Officers in Government loses its significance after 7 years.

Table A.9 Logistic Regression Estimates with Peacekeeping Participation Years

|  | (A24) | (A25) | (A26) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Peacekeepers (ln) | -0.120*** | -0.123*** | -0.115** |
|  | (0.046) | (0.045) | (0.045) |
| Autocracy | 1.933*** | 1.916*** | 1.592*** |
|  | (0.502) | (0.503) | (0.517) |
| Anocracy | 0.500 | 0.500 | 0.351 |
|  | (0.346) | (0.349) | (0.346) |
| GDP per Capita (ln) | -0.631*** | -0.637*** | -0.601*** |
|  | (0.186) | (0.190) | (0.187) |
| Population (ln) | -0.054 | -0.059 | -0.108 |
|  | (0.196) | (0.199) | (0.207) |
| Military Exp. per Soldier (ln) | 0.027 | 0.031 | 0.040 |
|  | (0.074) | (0.076) | (0.074) |
| Military Size (ln) | 0.440*** | 0.494*** | 0.441** |
|  | (0.168) | (0.176) | (0.176) |
| Military Regime | 0.095 | 0.024 | -0.107 |
|  | (0.643) | (0.648) | (0.695) |
| Year | -0.036 | -0.035 | -0.044* |
|  | (0.026) | (0.026) | (0.027) |
| Recent Coup Attempts |  | 0.349 | 0.375 |
|  |  | (0.294) | (0.292) |
| Interstate Conflict |  | -0.650 | -0.517 |
|  |  | (0.516) | (0.511) |
| Intrastate Conflict |  | -0.236 | -0.227 |
|  |  | (0.300) | (0.303) |
| Cabinet Size |  |  | 0.037 |
|  |  |  | (0.023) |
| Peacekeeping Years | 0.001 | 0.005 | 0.009 |
|  | (0.104) | (0.107) | (0.109) |
| Peacekeeping Years$^2$ | 0.015 | 0.015 | 0.015 |
|  | (0.017) | (0.018) | (0.018) |
| Peacekeeping Years$^3$ | -0.001 | -0.001 | -0.001 |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Constant | 71.081 | 68.408 | 86.687 |
|  | (51.528) | (52.445) | (52.708) |
| N | 2155 | 2155 | 2155 |
| LL | -1085.696 | -1079.810 | -1067.706 |
| AIC | 2197.393 | 2191.620 | 2169.413 |
| BIC | 2271.175 | 2282.428 | 2265.897 |

Logistic regressions with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table A.9 presents Models A24-A26 estimated with the inclusion of *Peacekeeping Years* as an alternative control for temporal dependence. The variable counts the years passed since a country's last troop deployment to a UN peace operation. While *Peacekeeping Years* does not have a statistically significant effect on the dependent variable, the coefficients of *Peacekeeper (ln)* remain negative and statistically significant.

Table A.10 Logistic Regression Estimates with Non-Log-Transformed Values

| | (A27) | (A28) | (A29) | (A30) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Peacekeepers (in 100s) | -0.035*** | -0.038*** | -0.042*** | -0.042*** |
| | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.012) |
| Autocracy | 1.425*** | 1.452*** | 1.063*** | 2.304*** |
| | (0.384) | (0.384) | (0.405) | (0.651) |
| Anocracy | 0.216 | 0.271 | 0.144 | 0.438 |
| | (0.238) | (0.241) | (0.239) | (0.354) |
| GDP per Capita (ln) | -0.393*** | -0.371*** | -0.366** | -0.913*** |
| | (0.140) | (0.143) | (0.145) | (0.261) |
| Population (ln) | -0.043 | -0.046 | -0.118 | -0.368* |
| | (0.137) | (0.140) | (0.149) | (0.215) |
| Military Exp. per Soldier (ln) | 0.035 | 0.036 | 0.067 | 0.139 |
| | (0.058) | (0.058) | (0.060) | (0.085) |
| Military Size (ln) | 0.319*** | 0.315*** | 0.284** | 0.613*** |
| | (0.115) | (0.119) | (0.119) | (0.174) |
| Military Regime | 0.011 | -0.013 | -0.086 | -0.743 |
| | (0.542) | (0.533) | (0.532) | (0.706) |
| Recent Coup Attempts | | 0.059 | 0.103 | 0.165 |
| | | (0.232) | (0.226) | (0.328) |
| Interstate Conflict | | 1.631** | 1.788*** | 1.307** |
| | | (0.661) | (0.684) | (0.621) |
| Intrastate Conflict | | -0.161 | -0.215 | -0.090 |
| | | (0.270) | (0.277) | (0.437) |
| Cabinet Size | | | 0.045*** | 0.067*** |
| | | | (0.015) | (0.020) |
| Year | 0.048*** | 0.048*** | 0.040** | -0.000 |
| | (0.018) | (0.019) | (0.019) | (0.026) |
| Military Participation Years | -1.234*** | -1.236*** | -1.231*** | -0.963*** |
| | (0.109) | (0.109) | (0.110) | (0.100) |
| Military Participation Years$^2$ | 0.064*** | 0.064*** | 0.063*** | 0.046*** |
| | (0.009) | (0.010) | (0.010) | (0.008) |
| Military Participation Years$^3$ | -0.001*** | -0.001*** | -0.001*** | -0.001*** |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Constant | -94.210*** | -95.575** | -78.790** | 2.898 |
| | (36.511) | (37.258) | (37.225) | (52.362) |
| N | 2155 | 2155 | 2155 | 2155 |
| LL | -574.168 | -571.184 | -563.290 | -533.279 |
| AIC | 1174.337 | 1174.368 | 1160.580 | 1102.558 |
| BIC | 1248.119 | 1265.177 | 1257.064 | 1204.718 |
| Random Effects | No | No | No | Yes |

Logistic regressions with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Since large-scale troop deployments to UN peace operations usually come from a small number of states, all models so far have accounted for the natural log transformation of Peacekeepers. Although the variable is heavily right-skewed, the main models are also reestimated here using the number of Peacekeepers instead of its log transformation. Table A.10 reports the coefficients from Models A27-A30, which are estimated using countries' troop contributions measured in hundreds as the main explanatory variable. In line with our theoretical expectation, the coefficients on Peacekeepers (in 100s) are steadily negative and statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level.

Table B.1 In-Sample Descriptive Statistics

|  | Obs. | Mean | SD | Min. | Max. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Counterbalancing | 1893 | 0.724 | 0.447 | 0 | 1 |
| Large Contributor (1% or more) | 1893 | 0.142 | 0.349 | 0 | 1 |
| Large Contributor (2% or more) | 1893 | 0.085 | 0.279 | 0 | 1 |
| Large Contributor (3% or more) | 1893 | 0.059 | 0.236 | 0 | 1 |
| Large Contributor (5% or more) | 1893 | 0.034 | 0.182 | 0 | 1 |
| Democracy | 1893 | 0.456 | 0.498 | 0 | 1 |
| Anocracy | 1893 | 0.434 | 0.496 | 0 | 1 |
| Autocracy | 1893 | 0.110 | 0.313 | 0 | 1 |
| Polity5 Score | 1893 | 3.375 | 6.358 | -10 | 10 |
| GDP per Capita (ln) | 1893 | 8.449 | 1.279 | 4.889 | 10.996 |
| GDP (ln) | 1893 | 11.242 | 1.979 | 5.679 | 16.392 |
| Population (ln) | 1893 | 9.700 | 1.427 | 5.899 | 14.092 |
| Military Exp. per Soldier (ln) | 1893 | 8.959 | 2.114 | 0 | 13.061 |
| Military Expenditure (ln) | 1893 | 19.881 | 4.075 | 0 | 27.327 |
| Military Size (ln) | 1893 | 11.230 | 1.621 | 0 | 15.235 |
| Recent Coup Attempts | 1893 | 0.199 | 0.399 | 0 | 1 |
| Interstate Conflict | 1893 | 0.016 | 0.127 | 0 | 10 |
| Intrastate Conflict | 1893 | 0.227 | 0.419 | 0 | 1 |
| French Colony | 1893 | 0.119 | 0.324 | 0 | 1 |
| Personalist | 1893 | 0.130 | 0.336 | 0 | 1 |
| Year | 1893 | 2001.023 | 5.454 | 1992 | 2010 |
| Counterbalancing Years | 1893 | 8.317 | 15.418 | 0 | 50 |

Table B.1 shows the in-sample descriptive statistics of the variables included in the models presented in Chapter 3 and Appendix B.

Table B.2 Descriptive Statistics

|  | Obs. | Mean | SD | Min. | Max. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Counterbalancing | 1936 | 0.720 | 0.449 | 0 | 1 |
| Large Contributor (1% or more) | 1936 | 0.138 | 0.345 | 0 | 1 |
| Large Contributor (2% or more) | 1936 | 0.083 | 0.276 | 0 | 1 |
| Large Contributor (3% or more) | 1936 | 0.058 | 0.234 | 0 | 1 |
| Large Contributor (5% or more) | 1936 | 0.034 | 0.180 | 0 | 1 |
| Peacekeeper/Military | 1936 | 0.794 | 3.111 | 0 | 45.357 |
| Democracy | 1936 | 0.457 | 0.498 | 0 | 1 |
| Anocracy | 1936 | 0.429 | 0.495 | 0 | 1 |
| Autocracy | 1936 | 0.115 | 0.319 | 0 | 1 |
| Polity5 Score | 1936 | 3.339 | 6.391 | -10 | 10 |
| GDP per Capita (ln) | 1936 | 8.461 | 1.276 | 4.889 | 10.996 |
| GDP (ln) | 1936 | 11.234 | 1.986 | 5.679 | 16.392 |
| Population (ln) | 1936 | 9.681 | 1.431 | 5.899 | 14.092 |
| Military Exp. per Soldier (ln) | 1892 | 8.964 | 2.105 | 0 | 13.061 |
| Military Expenditure (ln) | 1904 | 19.868 | 4.067 | 0 | 27.327 |
| Military Size (ln) | 1904 | 11.226 | 1.621 | 0 | 15.235 |
| Recent Coup Attempts | 1936 | 0.195 | 0.396 | 0 | 1 |
| Interstate Conflict | 1936 | 0.016 | 0.126 | 0 | 1 |
| Intrastate Conflict | 1936 | 0.223 | 0.416 | 0 | 1 |
| French Colony | 1936 | 0.118 | 0.322 | 0 | 1 |
| Personalist | 1936 | 0.130 | 0.336 | 0 | 1 |
| Year | 1936 | 2001.009 | 5.474 | 1992 | 2010 |
| Counterbalancing Years | 1936 | 8.570 | 15.638 | 0 | 50 |

Table B.2 reports the descriptive statistics of all variables included both in the main models and additional robustness checks in Chapter 3 and Appendix B.

Table B.3 Robustness Checks I

| | (B1) | (B2) | (B3) | (B4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Large Contributor (1% or more) | -1.102** | -0.478 | | |
| | (0.470) | (0.879) | | |
| Large Contributor (3% or more) | | | -1.774*** | -2.363*** |
| | | | (0.526) | (0.830) |
| Polity5 Score | -0.036 | 0.001 | -0.045 | -0.006 |
| | (0.049) | (0.073) | (0.049) | (0.071) |
| GDP per Capita (ln) | -0.361 | -0.840* | -0.389 | -0.863* |
| | (0.324) | (0.495) | (0.338) | (0.486) |
| Population (ln) | 0.270 | 0.265 | 0.292 | 0.260 |
| | (0.238) | (0.372) | (0.255) | (0.380) |
| Military Exp. per Soldier (ln) | 0.105 | 0.209 | 0.105 | 0.219 |
| | (0.089) | (0.138) | (0.087) | (0.135) |
| Military Size (ln) | 0.186 | 0.319 | 0.116 | 0.249 |
| | (0.197) | (0.228) | (0.214) | (0.248) |
| Recent Coup Attempts | -0.421 | -0.751 | -0.412 | -0.721 |
| | (0.583) | (0.661) | (0.556) | (0.647) |
| Interstate Conflict | 0.195 | -0.192 | 0.362 | -0.095 |
| | (0.943) | (0.700) | (0.734) | (0.627) |
| Intrastate Conflict | -0.129 | 0.142 | -0.169 | 0.018 |
| | (0.530) | (0.561) | (0.508) | (0.553) |
| French Colony | -0.213 | 0.001 | -0.299 | -0.230 |
| | (1.038) | (1.472) | (1.084) | (1.509) |
| Personalist | 1.575*** | 1.784** | 1.847*** | 1.873** |
| | (0.589) | (0.843) | (0.578) | (0.872) |
| Year | 0.081* | 0.069 | 0.083** | 0.080 |
| | (0.043) | (0.064) | (0.039) | (0.063) |
| Counterbalancing Years | -2.082*** | -1.768*** | -2.131*** | -1.798*** |
| | (0.411) | (0.397) | (0.439) | (0.403) |
| Counterbalancing Years$^2$ | 0.100*** | 0.075*** | 0.103*** | 0.077*** |
| | (0.023) | (0.022) | (0.025) | (0.022) |
| Counterbalancing Years$^3$ | -0.001*** | -0.001*** | -0.001*** | -0.001*** |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Constant | -159.993* | -132.470 | -163.057** | -152.770 |
| | (85.709) | (126.727) | (77.675) | (124.569) |
| N | 1893 | 1893 | 1893 | 1893 |
| LL | -125.539 | -116.822 | -125.383 | -115.570 |
| AIC | 283.077 | 267.643 | 282.766 | 265.140 |
| BIC | 371.812 | 361.924 | 371.501 | 359.420 |
| Random Effects | No | Yes | No | Yes |

Logistic regressions with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table B.3 shows coefficients from Models B1-B4, which are estimated with specifications including Polity5 scores instead of binary regime indicators. *Large Contributor (%1 or more)* remains negative and statistically significant at conventional levels in Model B1 but fails to reach statistical significance in Model B2. *Large Contributor %3 or more*, on the other hand, exhibits a statistically significant negative effect on the dependent variable, *Counterbalancing*, supported at 99 percent confidence level in Models B3 and B4. *Polity5 Score* fails to achieve statistical significance. In contrast, *Personalist*, is steadily negative and statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level in Models B1 and B3, and at conventional levels in Models B2 and B4. This indicates that the variants of nondemocracies are better predictors of counterbalancing efforts, rather than mere regime types, as suggested by previous literature.

Table B.4 Robustness Checks II

|  | (B5) | (B6) | (B7) | (B8) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Large Contributor (1% or more) | -1.082** | -0.497 |  |  |
|  | (0.484) | (0.924) |  |  |
| Large Contributor (3% or more) |  |  | -1.840*** | -2.559*** |
|  |  |  | (0.581) | (0.883) |
| Autocracy | 1.329* | 1.139 | 1.563* | 1.269 |
|  | (0.796) | (1.060) | (0.814) | (1.034) |
| Anocracy | 0.461 | 0.884 | 0.575 | 1.048 |
|  | (0.547) | (0.748) | (0.553) | (0.704) |
| GDP (ln) | -0.336 | -0.673 | -0.360 | -0.673 |
|  | (0.315) | (0.463) | (0.323) | (0.455) |
| Population (ln) | 0.632* | 0.990** | 0.681* | 0.994* |
|  | (0.376) | (0.495) | (0.394) | (0.510) |
| Military Exp. per Soldier (ln) | 0.123 | 0.231 | 0.126 | 0.242* |
|  | (0.092) | (0.147) | (0.091) | (0.143) |
| Military Size (ln) | 0.158 | 0.261 | 0.082 | 0.168 |
|  | (0.209) | (0.251) | (0.231) | (0.291) |
| Recent Coup Attempts | -0.352 | -0.674 | -0.321 | -0.626 |
|  | (0.638) | (0.692) | (0.610) | (0.684) |
| Interstate Conflict | 0.363 | -0.004 | 0.527 | 0.115 |
|  | (0.920) | (0.704) | (0.688) | (0.615) |
| Intrastate Conflict | -0.151 | 0.051 | -0.222 | -0.093 |
|  | (0.560) | (0.588) | (0.551) | (0.583) |
| French Colony | -0.322 | -0.151 | -0.447 | -0.440 |
|  | (1.042) | (1.503) | (1.096) | (1.553) |
| Personalist | 1.577** | 1.573* | 1.874*** | 1.697** |
|  | (0.617) | (0.816) | (0.631) | (0.853) |
| Year | 0.083* | 0.068 | 0.085** | 0.078 |
|  | (0.044) | (0.062) | (0.040) | (0.062) |
| Counterbalancing Years | -2.094*** | -1.793*** | -2.147*** | -1.828*** |
|  | (0.421) | (0.415) | (0.450) | (0.426) |
| Counterbalancing Years$^2$ | 0.101*** | 0.076*** | 0.103*** | 0.078*** |
|  | (0.023) | (0.023) | (0.025) | (0.023) |
| Counterbalancing Years$^3$ | -0.001*** | -0.001*** | -0.001*** | -0.001*** |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Constant | -166.827* | -137.942 | -170.114** | -156.683 |
|  | (87.358) | (123.766) | (80.281) | (122.660) |
| N | 1893 | 1893 | 1893 | 1893 |
| LL | -124.659 | -116.111 | -124.305 | -114.653 |
| AIC | 283.319 | 268.222 | 282.610 | 265.306 |
| BIC | 377.599 | 368.049 | 376.891 | 365.132 |
| Random Effects | No | Yes | No | Yes |

Logistic regressions with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Main Models 1-4 are estimated using specifications that incorporate *GDP per Capita (ln)*. Table B.4 presents the results from Models B5-B8, which have been reestimated accounting for *GDP (ln)* instead. *Large Contributor (%1 or more)* exhibits a negative effect that is statistically significant at conventional levels in Model B5, while remaining insignificant in Model B6. *Large Contributor (%3 or more)* is consistently negative and statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level across Models B7-B8. *GDP (ln)* remains steadily negative but fails to achieve statistical significance.

Table B.5 Robustness Checks III

| | (B9) | (B10) | (B11) | (B12) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Large Contributor (1% or more) | -1.064** | -0.454 | | |
| | (0.478) | (0.923) | | |
| Large Contributor (3% or more) | | | -1.787*** | -2.461*** |
| | | | (0.578) | (0.882) |
| Autocracy | 1.296 | 1.136 | 1.513* | 1.265 |
| | (0.790) | (1.059) | (0.807) | (1.033) |
| Anocracy | 0.457 | 0.863 | 0.568 | 1.030 |
| | (0.553) | (0.747) | (0.557) | (0.709) |
| GDP per Capita (ln) | -0.260 | -0.532 | -0.273 | -0.511 |
| | (0.310) | (0.438) | (0.311) | (0.429) |
| Population (ln) | 0.314 | 0.344 | 0.346 | 0.369 |
| | (0.275) | (0.405) | (0.293) | (0.414) |
| Military Expenditure (ln) | 0.040 | 0.078 | 0.038 | 0.078 |
| | (0.038) | (0.055) | (0.038) | (0.054) |
| Military Size (ln) | 0.098 | 0.154 | 0.017 | 0.037 |
| | (0.247) | (0.323) | (0.266) | (0.363) |
| Recent Coup Attempts | -0.331 | -0.633 | -0.302 | -0.586 |
| | (0.629) | (0.690) | (0.604) | (0.683) |
| Interstate Conflict | 0.393 | 0.034 | 0.570 | 0.160 |
| | (0.945) | (0.718) | (0.717) | (0.632) |
| Intrastate Conflict | -0.163 | 0.042 | -0.222 | -0.090 |
| | (0.546) | (0.582) | (0.535) | (0.575) |
| French Colony | -0.370 | -0.203 | -0.492 | -0.492 |
| | (0.995) | (1.461) | (1.048) | (1.507) |
| Personalist | 1.551** | 1.542* | 1.826*** | 1.650* |
| | (0.628) | (0.822) | (0.647) | (0.857) |
| Year | 0.085** | 0.069 | 0.087** | 0.078 |
| | (0.043) | (0.061) | (0.040) | (0.061) |
| Counterbalancing Years | -2.101*** | -1.789*** | -2.154*** | -1.824*** |
| | (0.428) | (0.425) | (0.458) | (0.437) |
| Counterbalancing Years$^2$ | 0.101*** | 0.076*** | 0.104*** | 0.078*** |
| | (0.024) | (0.024) | (0.025) | (0.024) |
| Counterbalancing Years$^3$ | -0.001*** | -0.001*** | -0.001*** | -0.001*** |
| | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Constant | -167.273** | -133.498 | -171.382** | -152.139 |
| | (85.345) | (121.688) | (79.014) | (121.038) |
| N | 1893 | 1893 | 1893 | 1893 |
| LL | -125.005 | -116.543 | -124.707 | -115.153 |
| AIC | 284.010 | 269.085 | 283.415 | 266.306 |
| BIC | 378.291 | 368.912 | 377.696 | 366.133 |
| Random Effects | No | Yes | No | Yes |

Logistic regressions with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

* $p<0.1$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$

As demonstrated in Table B.5, Models B9-B12 are estimated using *Military Expenditure (ln)* instead of *Military Expenditure per Soldier (ln)*. In Models B9, B11, and B12, the coefficients of the main explanatory variables, *Large Contributor (1% or more, 3% or more)*, continue to indicate a statistically significant negative effect on *Counterbalancing*. In contrast, *Large Contributor (%1 or more)* fails to achieve statistical significance in Model B10. Meanwhile, *Military Expenditure (ln)* remains unchangingly positive but statistically insignificant. However, the direction of this relationship suggests that establishing armed counterweights to the regular military can be a costly endeavor.

Table B.6 Logistic Regression Estimates with Alternative Thresholds

|  | (B13) | (B14) | (B15) | (B16) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Large Contributor (2% or more) | -1.401*** | -1.899*** |  |  |
|  | (0.523) | (0.688) |  |  |
| Large Contributor (5% or more) |  |  | -2.276*** | -3.337** |
|  |  |  | (0.759) | (1.414) |
| Autocracy | 1.534* | 1.257 | 1.568* | 1.282 |
|  | (0.825) | (1.050) | (0.803) | (1.016) |
| Anocracy | 0.568 | 1.047 | 0.577 | 1.037 |
|  | (0.559) | (0.718) | (0.538) | (0.694) |
| GDP per Capita (ln) | -0.362 | -0.671 | -0.338 | -0.660 |
|  | (0.322) | (0.450) | (0.322) | (0.455) |
| Population (ln) | 0.325 | 0.339 | 0.287 | 0.271 |
|  | (0.264) | (0.381) | (0.287) | (0.399) |
| Military Exp. per Soldier (ln) | 0.124 | 0.246* | 0.123 | 0.240* |
|  | (0.092) | (0.146) | (0.091) | (0.143) |
| Military Size (ln) | 0.107 | 0.181 | 0.080 | 0.166 |
|  | (0.218) | (0.287) | (0.231) | (0.290) |
| Recent Coup Attempts | -0.324 | -0.605 | -0.303 | -0.593 |
|  | (0.616) | (0.682) | (0.616) | (0.694) |
| Interstate Conflict | 0.500 | 0.076 | 0.579 | 0.198 |
|  | (0.700) | (0.614) | (0.675) | (0.628) |
| Intrastate Conflict | -0.230 | -0.088 | -0.188 | -0.016 |
|  | (0.558) | (0.586) | (0.559) | (0.570) |
| French Colony | -0.433 | -0.394 | -0.519 | -0.472 |
|  | (1.094) | (1.558) | (1.087) | (1.554) |
| Personalist | 1.713*** | 1.629* | 2.098*** | 1.767** |
|  | (0.625) | (0.839) | (0.660) | (0.898) |
| Year | 0.081** | 0.076 | 0.087** | 0.082 |
|  | (0.041) | (0.062) | (0.040) | (0.062) |
| Counterbalancing Years | -2.149*** | -1.823*** | -2.132*** | -1.817*** |
|  | (0.459) | (0.431) | (0.443) | (0.419) |
| Counterbalancing Years$^2$ | 0.103*** | 0.078*** | 0.102*** | 0.078*** |
|  | (0.025) | (0.024) | (0.024) | (0.023) |
| Counterbalancing Years$^3$ | -0.001*** | -0.001*** | -0.001*** | -0.001*** |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Constant | -160.246** | -148.620 | -171.368** | -159.595 |
|  | (80.723) | (122.374) | (79.533) | (123.468) |
| N | 1893 | 1893 | 1893 | 1893 |
| LL | -124.969 | -114.953 | -123.956 | -114.394 |
| AIC | 283.938 | 265.907 | 281.912 | 264.788 |
| BIC | 378.218 | 365.733 | 376.193 | 364.614 |
| Random Effects | No | Yes | No | Yes |

Logistic regressions with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table B.6 presents estimates where the main explanatory variable, *Large Contributor*, is constructed by measuring the relative magnitude of troop deployments using

different thresholds of 2 percent and 5 percent. When employing the 2 percent threshold, *Large Contributor*'s effect on *Counterbalancing* is steadily negative and statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level across Models B13-B14. On the other hand, the contribution variable with the 5 percent threshold remains negative and statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level in Model B15 and at conventional levels in Model B16.

Figure B.1 Substantive Effects of Large Contributor (2%, 5%) on the Predicted Probability of Counterbalancing



To interpret the substantive significance of the relationship between these alternative indicators and the dependent variable, Figure B.1 illustrates their effects on the predicted probability of *Counterbalancing*[10]. *GDP per Capita, Population (ln), Military Expenditure per Soldier (ln)*, and *Military Size (ln)* are taken at their respective means, while all other controls are taken at their respective medians. Sending 2 percent or more of uniformed military personnel to UN peace operations leads to roughly a 3.1 percentage-point reduction in the predicted probability of leaders' engagement in *Counterbalancing*, which is statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level (p=0.065). In contrast, dispatching 5 percent or more of military troops results in approximately a 7.7 percentage-point decline in the predicted probability of *Counterbalancing*, but this effect fails to reach statistical significance (p=0.168).

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[10]Substantive effects of *Large Contributor (2%, 5%)* on the predicted probability of *Counterbalancing* based on Models B13 and B15. Caps show 90 percent confidence intervals.

Table B.7 Logistic Regression Estimates with Percentage Values

|  | (B13) | (B14) | (B15) | (B16) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Peacekeeper/Military | -0.134* | -0.134* | -0.148** | -0.213* |
|  | (0.079) | (0.075) | (0.073) | (0.124) |
| Autocracy | 1.572** | 1.545* | 1.414* | 1.124 |
|  | (0.800) | (0.806) | (0.832) | (1.049) |
| Anocracy | 0.503 | 0.539 | 0.418 | 0.880 |
|  | (0.572) | (0.597) | (0.558) | (0.739) |
| GDP per Capita (ln) | -0.272 | -0.337 | -0.401 | -0.707 |
|  | (0.297) | (0.318) | (0.325) | (0.439) |
| Population (ln) | 0.398 | 0.393 | 0.308 | 0.305 |
|  | (0.340) | (0.337) | (0.311) | (0.412) |
| Military Exp. per Soldier (ln) | 0.113 | 0.120 | 0.127 | 0.244* |
|  | (0.081) | (0.085) | (0.090) | (0.140) |
| Military Size (ln) | 0.034 | 0.041 | 0.122 | 0.218 |
|  | (0.318) | (0.306) | (0.278) | (0.349) |
| Recent Coup Attempts |  | -0.424 | -0.443 | -0.707 |
|  |  | (0.635) | (0.625) | (0.669) |
| Interstate Conflict |  | 0.628 | 0.578 | 0.092 |
|  |  | (0.705) | (0.730) | (0.628) |
| Intrastate Conflict |  | -0.074 | -0.193 | -0.025 |
|  |  | (0.543) | (0.547) | (0.565) |
| French Colony |  |  | -0.423 | -0.333 |
|  |  |  | (1.052) | (1.518) |
| Personalist |  |  | 1.999*** | 1.698* |
|  |  |  | (0.716) | (0.907) |
| Year | 0.075* | 0.076* | 0.076* | 0.071 |
|  | (0.043) | (0.042) | (0.041) | (0.061) |
| Counterbalancing Years | -2.161*** | -2.154*** | -2.124*** | -1.806*** |
|  | (0.434) | (0.444) | (0.450) | (0.419) |
| Counterbalancing Years$^2$ | 0.104*** | 0.103*** | 0.102*** | 0.077*** |
|  | (0.024) | (0.025) | (0.025) | (0.023) |
| Counterbalancing Years$^3$ | -0.001*** | -0.001*** | -0.001*** | -0.001*** |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Constant | -149.565* | -150.484* | -150.155* | -137.603 |
|  | (85.309) | (84.459) | (80.651) | (120.590) |
| N | 1892 | 1892 | 1892 | 1892 |
| LL | -126.750 | -126.356 | -124.625 | -115.035 |
| AIC | 277.501 | 282.713 | 283.249 | 266.070 |
| BIC | 344.046 | 365.894 | 377.521 | 365.887 |
| Random Effects | No | No | No | Yes |

Logistic regressions with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Because only a small group of states typically commit high volumes of troops to UN peace operations, the variable *Peacekeeper/Military*, which contains information on the percentage of deployed peacekeepers in contributing militaries is positively skewed. To reduce bias, the relative size of peacekeepers is measured by binary indicators at different thresholds. For additional robustness checks, Table B.7 shows the coefficients from Models B13-B16, which are estimated incorporating *Peacekeeper/Military*. The variable exhibits a consistently negative and statistically significant effect on the predicted probability of *Counterbalancing* at the 90 percent confidence level in Models B13, B14, and B16, and at conventional levels in Model B15.

**APPENDIX C**

Table C.1 In-Sample Descriptive Statistics

|  | Obs. | Mean | SD | Min. | Max. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ethnic Stacking | 1197 | 0.406 | 0.491 | 0 | 1 |
| Peacekeepers (ln) | 1197 | 2.590 | 3.172 | 0 | 9.030 |
| Peacekeepers (in 100s) | 1197 | 4.872 | 10.741 | 0 | 83.510 |
| Democracy | 1197 | 0.200 | 0.400 | 0 | 1 |
| Anocracy | 1197 | 0.767 | 0.423 | 0 | 1 |
| Autocracy | 1197 | 0.033 | 0.180 | 0 | 1 |
| Polity5 Score | 1197 | 1.311 | 5.223 | -7 | 10 |
| GDP per Capita (ln) | 1197 | 7.073 | 0.960 | 5.248 | 9.563 |
| GDP (ln) | 1197 | 23.164 | 1.470 | 19.520 | 26.935 |
| Population (ln) | 1197 | 16.088 | 1.313 | 12.878 | 19.106 |
| Military Exp. per Soldier (ln) | 1197 | 8.719 | 1.304 | 0 | 13.247 |
| Military Expenditure (ln) | 1197 | 18.584 | 2.230 | 0 | 23.066 |
| Military Size (ln) | 1197 | 9.902 | 1.532 | 0 | 13.672 |
| Ethnic Exclusion | 1197 | 0.172 | 0.236 | 0 | 0.915 |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | 1135 | 0.622 | 0.253 | 0.036 | 0.925 |
| Religious Fractionalization | 1135 | 0.451 | 0.218 | 0 | 0.783 |
| Recent Coup Attempts | 1197 | 0.294 | 0.456 | 0 | 1 |
| Interstate Conflict | 1197 | 0.009 | 0.095 | 0 | 1 |
| Intrastate Conflict | 1197 | 0.246 | 0.431 | 0 | 1 |
| British Colony | 1197 | 0.328 | 0.470 | 0 | 1 |
| French Colony | 1197 | 0.391 | 0.488 | 0 | 1 |
| Year | 1197 | 2005.599 | 7.474 | 1993 | 2018 |
| Ethnic Stacking Years | 1197 | 17.468 | 20.214 | 0 | 76 |

Table C.1 reports the in-sample descriptive statistics of the variables included both in the main models and additional robustness checks in Chapter 4 and Appendix C.

Table C.2 Descriptive Statistics

|  | Obs. | Mean | SD | Min. | Max. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ethnic Stacking | 1438 | 0.383 | 0.486 | 0 | 1 |
| Peacekeepers (ln) | 1438 | 2.188 | 3.061 | 0 | 9.030 |
| Peacekeepers (in 100s) | 1438 | 4.092 | 9.972 | 0 | 83.510 |
| Democracy | 1382 | 0.185 | 0.389 | 0 | 1 |
| Anocracy | 1382 | 0.745 | 0.436 | 0 | 1 |
| Autocracy | 1382 | 0.070 | 0.256 | 0 | 1 |
| Polity5 Score | 1382 | 0.932 | 5.335 | -9 | 10 |
| GDP per Capita (ln) | 1362 | 7.126 | 0.988 | 5.248 | 9.719 |
| GDP (ln) | 1362 | 22.947 | 1.580 | 18.867 | 26.935 |
| Population (ln) | 1438 | 15.751 | 1.576 | 11.167 | 19.106 |
| Military Exp. per Soldier (ln) | 1334 | 8.666 | 1.351 | 0 | 13.247 |
| Military Expenditure (ln) | 1353 | 18.467 | 2.171 | 0 | 23.066 |
| Military Size (ln) | 1369 | 9.832 | 1.615 | 0 | 13.672 |
| Ethnic Exclusion | 1412 | 0.158 | 0.230 | 0 | 0.915 |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | 1288 | 0.609 | 0.257 | 0.036 | 0.925 |
| Religious Fractionalization | 1288 | 0.437 | 0.225 | 0 | 0.783 |
| Recent Coup Attempts | 1438 | 0.306 | 0.461 | 0 | 1 |
| Interstate Conflict | 1438 | 0.010 | 0.098 | 0 | 1 |
| Intrastate Conflict | 1438 | 0.238 | 0.426 | 0 | 1 |
| British Colony | 1438 | 0.325 | 0.468 | 0 | 1 |
| French Colony | 1438 | 0.376 | 0.484 | 0 | 1 |
| Year | 1438 | 2005.062 | 7.799 | 1992 | 2018 |
| Ethnic Stacking Years | 1438 | 17.217 | 19.428 | 0 | 76 |

Table C.2 exhibits the descriptive statistics of all variables included both in the main models and additional robustness checks in Chapter 4 and Appendix C.

Table C.3 Robustness Checks I

| | (C1) | (C2) | (C3) | (C4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Peacekeepers (ln)$_{t-1}$ | 0.305** | 0.297** | 0.277** | 0.277** |
| | (0.119) | (0.118) | (0.115) | (0.115) |
| Polity5 Score | -0.284*** | -0.284*** | -0.275*** | -0.275*** |
| | (0.047) | (0.051) | (0.049) | (0.049) |
| GDP per Capita (ln) | 0.274 | 0.280 | 0.046 | 0.046 |
| | (0.321) | (0.354) | (0.426) | (0.426) |
| Population (ln) | -0.235 | -0.218 | -0.557 | -0.557 |
| | (0.316) | (0.342) | (0.400) | (0.400) |
| Military Exp. per Soldier (ln) | 0.021 | 0.027 | -0.001 | -0.001 |
| | (0.161) | (0.164) | (0.237) | (0.237) |
| Military Size (ln) | -0.064 | -0.063 | 0.122 | 0.122 |
| | (0.253) | (0.263) | (0.335) | (0.335) |
| Ethnic Exclusion | 0.913 | 0.923 | 1.489 | 1.489 |
| | (1.018) | (1.024) | (1.092) | (1.092) |
| Recent Coup Attempts | | 0.186 | 0.054 | 0.054 |
| | | (0.559) | (0.523) | (0.523) |
| Interstate Conflict | | 3.791** | 3.168** | 3.168** |
| | | (1.560) | (1.419) | (1.419) |
| Intrastate Conflict | | -0.122 | 0.158 | 0.158 |
| | | (0.533) | (0.553) | (0.553) |
| British Colony | | | 1.552 | 1.552 |
| | | | (0.984) | (0.984) |
| French Colony | | | 1.728*** | 1.728*** |
| | | | (0.629) | (0.629) |
| Year | 0.019 | 0.022 | 0.040 | 0.040 |
| | (0.033) | (0.035) | (0.041) | (0.041) |
| Ethnic Stacking Years | -4.176*** | -4.164*** | -3.819*** | -3.819*** |
| | (0.914) | (0.910) | (0.791) | (0.791) |
| Ethnic Stacking Years$^2$ | 0.251*** | 0.251*** | 0.227*** | 0.227*** |
| | (0.061) | (0.061) | (0.054) | (0.054) |
| Ethnic Stacking Years$^3$ | -0.004*** | -0.004*** | -0.004*** | -0.004*** |
| | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Constant | -32.258 | -38.263 | -70.907 | -70.915 |
| | (65.098) | (68.213) | (79.930) | (79.929) |
| N | 1197 | 1197 | 1197 | 1197 |
| LL | -72.008 | -71.848 | -68.289 | -68.289 |
| AIC | 168.017 | 173.696 | 170.578 | 170.578 |
| BIC | 229.067 | 250.010 | 257.067 | 257.067 |
| Random Effects | No | No | No | Yes |

Logistic regressions with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table C.3 shows coefficients from Models C1-C4, which are estimated with specifications including Polity5 scores instead of binary regime indicators. *Peacekeepers (ln)*, remains consistently positive and statistically significant at conventional levels. *Polity5 Score* exhibits a negative and statistically significant effect on the predicted probability of *Ethnic Stacking* at the 99 percent confidence level. *Ethnic Exclusion*, unexpectedly, fails to reach statistical significance, though it remains positive.

Table C.4 Robustness Checks II

|  | (C5) | (C6) | (C7) | (C8) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Peacekeepers (ln)$_{t-1}$ | 0.297** | 0.297** | 0.276** | 0.276** |
|  | (0.128) | (0.125) | (0.139) | (0.139) |
| Autocracy | 7.694*** | 7.747*** | 7.189*** | 7.189*** |
|  | (1.459) | (1.593) | (1.354) | (1.354) |
| Anocracy | 1.541* | 1.526* | 1.302 | 1.302 |
|  | (0.862) | (0.911) | (0.907) | (0.907) |
| GDP (ln) | 0.370 | 0.391 | 0.146 | 0.146 |
|  | (0.382) | (0.408) | (0.410) | (0.410) |
| Population (ln) | -0.834 | -0.847 | -1.043** | -1.043** |
|  | (0.518) | (0.517) | (0.410) | (0.410) |
| Military Exp. per Soldier (ln) | 0.079 | 0.083 | 0.137 | 0.137 |
|  | (0.156) | (0.159) | (0.157) | (0.157) |
| Military Size (ln) | 0.066 | 0.065 | 0.253 | 0.253 |
|  | (0.353) | (0.381) | (0.393) | (0.393) |
| Ethnic Exclusion | 2.047** | 2.055** | 2.731** | 2.731** |
|  | (1.008) | (1.021) | (1.074) | (1.074) |
| Recent Coup Attempts |  | 0.209 | -0.031 | -0.031 |
|  |  | (0.601) | (0.621) | (0.621) |
| Interstate Conflict |  | 5.754*** | 5.294*** | 5.295*** |
|  |  | (1.509) | (1.594) | (1.594) |
| Intrastate Conflict |  | -0.016 | 0.320 | 0.320 |
|  |  | (0.597) | (0.651) | (0.651) |
| British Colony |  |  | 1.696** | 1.696** |
|  |  |  | (0.849) | (0.849) |
| French Colony |  |  | 1.966*** | 1.966*** |
|  |  |  | (0.705) | (0.705) |
| Year | 0.005 | 0.006 | 0.016 | 0.016 |
|  | (0.033) | (0.035) | (0.041) | (0.041) |
| Ethnic Stacking Years | -4.487*** | -4.487*** | -4.135*** | -4.135*** |
|  | (0.960) | (0.974) | (0.914) | (0.914) |
| Ethnic Stacking Years$^2$ | 0.251*** | 0.251*** | 0.228*** | 0.228*** |
|  | (0.058) | (0.059) | (0.057) | (0.057) |
| Ethnic Stacking Years$^3$ | -0.004*** | -0.004*** | -0.003*** | -0.003*** |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Constant | -4.686 | -8.188 | -23.232 | -23.246 |
|  | (63.516) | (67.881) | (79.409) | (79.407) |
| N | 1197 | 1197 | 1197 | 1197 |
| LL | -80.197 | -79.956 | -75.213 | -75.213 |
| AIC | 186.395 | 191.912 | 186.426 | 186.426 |
| BIC | 252.533 | 273.313 | 278.002 | 278.002 |
| Random Effects | No | No | No | Yes |

Logistic regressions with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Main Models 1-4 are estimated with specifications including *GDP per Capita (ln)*.
Table C.4 presents the results from Models C5-C8 control for *GDP (ln)* as an alternative. *Peacekeepers (ln)* remains consistently positive and statistically significant at conventional levels. *GDP (ln)* is also unchangingly positive but fails to achieve statistical significance.

Table C.5 Robustness Checks III

|  | (C9) | (C10) | (C11) | (C12) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Peacekeepers (ln)$_{t\text{-}1}$ | 0.293** | 0.293** | 0.271** | 0.271** |
|  | (0.125) | (0.122) | (0.138) | (0.138) |
| Autocracy | 7.703*** | 7.749*** | 7.177*** | 7.177*** |
|  | (1.447) | (1.569) | (1.346) | (1.346) |
| Anocracy | 1.521* | 1.503 | 1.271 | 1.271 |
|  | (0.871) | (0.918) | (0.917) | (0.917) |
| GDP per Capita (ln) | 0.436 | 0.459 | 0.248 | 0.248 |
|  | (0.387) | (0.407) | (0.381) | (0.381) |
| Population (ln) | -0.418 | -0.412 | -0.837* | -0.837* |
|  | (0.460) | (0.476) | (0.428) | (0.428) |
| Military Expenditure (ln) | 0.006 | 0.009 | 0.046 | 0.046 |
|  | (0.084) | (0.086) | (0.078) | (0.078) |
| Military Size (ln) | 0.024 | 0.019 | 0.147 | 0.147 |
|  | (0.323) | (0.338) | (0.363) | (0.363) |
| Ethnic Exclusion | 2.088** | 2.098** | 2.789** | 2.789** |
|  | (1.012) | (1.025) | (1.090) | (1.090) |
| Recent Coup Attempts |  | 0.201 | -0.030 | -0.030 |
|  |  | (0.602) | (0.621) | (0.621) |
| Interstate Conflict |  | 5.800*** | 5.350*** | 5.350*** |
|  |  | (1.498) | (1.606) | (1.605) |
| Intrastate Conflict |  | -0.006 | 0.332 | 0.332 |
|  |  | (0.590) | (0.651) | (0.651) |
| British Colony |  |  | 1.685** | 1.685** |
|  |  |  | (0.840) | (0.840) |
| French Colony |  |  | 1.960*** | 1.960*** |
|  |  |  | (0.700) | (0.700) |
| Year | 0.008 | 0.009 | 0.020 | 0.020 |
|  | (0.033) | (0.035) | (0.041) | (0.041) |
| Ethnic Stacking Years | -4.473*** | -4.474*** | -4.114*** | -4.114*** |
|  | (0.930) | (0.942) | (0.900) | (0.899) |
| Ethnic Stacking Years$^2$ | 0.250*** | 0.250*** | 0.226*** | 0.226*** |
|  | (0.056) | (0.057) | (0.056) | (0.056) |
| Ethnic Stacking Years$^3$ | -0.004*** | -0.004*** | -0.003*** | -0.003*** |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Constant | -11.474 | -14.685 | -30.029 | -30.023 |
|  | (63.420) | (67.625) | (79.214) | (79.215) |
| N | 1197 | 1197 | 1197 | 1197 |
| LL | -80.290 | -80.055 | -75.336 | -75.336 |
| AIC | 186.581 | 192.109 | 186.672 | 186.672 |
| BIC | 252.719 | 273.511 | 278.248 | 278.248 |
| Random Effects | No | No | No | Yes |

Logistic regressions with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table C.5 presents coefficients from Models C9-C12, which control for *Military Expenditure (ln)* instead of *Military Expenditure per Soldier (ln)*. The coefficients of the main independent variable, *Peacekeepers (ln)*, display statistically significant positive effect on the predicted probability *Ethnic Stacking*. *Military Expenditure (ln)*, on the other hand, remains consistently positive but statistically insignificant.

Table C.6 Robustness Checks IV

| | (C13) | (C14) | (C15) | (C16) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Peacekeepers (ln)$_{t-1}$ | 0.265** | 0.266** | 0.279** | 0.279** |
| | (0.118) | (0.114) | (0.133) | (0.133) |
| Autocracy | 7.484*** | 7.541*** | 7.345*** | 7.345*** |
| | (1.454) | (1.611) | (1.430) | (1.430) |
| Anocracy | 1.063 | 1.015 | 1.049 | 1.049 |
| | (1.070) | (1.111) | (0.949) | (0.949) |
| GDP per Capita (ln) | 0.163 | 0.212 | -0.209 | -0.209 |
| | (0.471) | (0.479) | (0.467) | (0.467) |
| Population (ln) | -0.635 | -0.641 | -0.962** | -0.962** |
| | (0.597) | (0.620) | (0.435) | (0.435) |
| Military Exp. per Soldier (ln) | 0.065 | 0.066 | 0.117 | 0.117 |
| | (0.163) | (0.171) | (0.149) | (0.149) |
| Military Size (ln) | 0.224 | 0.221 | 0.499 | 0.499 |
| | (0.461) | (0.484) | (0.426) | (0.426) |
| Ethnic Exclusion | 2.126** | 2.122** | 2.671*** | 2.671*** |
| | (0.969) | (0.967) | (1.024) | (1.024) |
| Ethnic Fractionalization | 1.656 | 1.719 | 0.891 | 0.891 |
| | (1.359) | (1.419) | (0.870) | (0.870) |
| Religious Fractionalization | -0.479 | -0.435 | -0.758 | -0.758 |
| | (1.063) | (1.040) | (1.096) | (1.096) |
| Recent Coup Attempts | | 0.287 | 0.048 | 0.048 |
| | | (0.603) | (0.641) | (0.641) |
| Interstate Conflict | | 5.360*** | 5.038*** | 5.038*** |
| | | (1.476) | (1.609) | (1.610) |
| Intrastate Conflict | | 0.114 | 0.298 | 0.298 |
| | | (0.599) | (0.666) | (0.666) |
| British Colony | | | 1.803** | 1.803** |
| | | | (0.872) | (0.872) |
| French Colony | | | 2.239*** | 2.239*** |
| | | | (0.741) | (0.741) |
| Year | 0.015 | 0.017 | 0.024 | 0.024 |
| | (0.037) | (0.040) | (0.047) | (0.047) |
| Ethnic Stacking Years | -4.425*** | -4.431*** | -4.064*** | -4.065*** |
| | (0.924) | (0.939) | (0.909) | (0.909) |
| Ethnic Stacking Years$^2$ | 0.248*** | 0.248*** | 0.227*** | 0.227*** |
| | (0.055) | (0.056) | (0.057) | (0.057) |
| Ethnic Stacking Years$^3$ | -0.004*** | -0.004*** | -0.003*** | -0.003*** |
| | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Constant | -22.201 | -27.133 | -37.466 | -37.490 |
| | (71.322) | (77.137) | (93.402) | (93.396) |
| N | 1135 | 1135 | 1135 | 1135 |
| LL | -78.465 | -78.191 | -73.401 | -73.401 |
| AIC | 186.929 | 192.382 | 186.801 | 186.801 |
| BIC | 262.445 | 283.001 | 287.489 | 287.489 |
| Random Effects | No | No | No | Yes |

Logistic regressions with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

159

Table C.6 displays estimates from models C13-C16, which incorporate Fearon and Laitin's (2003) time-invariant data on ethnic and religious fractionalization, reflecting the population heterogeneity of countries. Since South Sudan gained independence from Sudan on July 9, 2011, the information on Sudan is excluded from the sample after 2011. As suggested by previous literature (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010, 89), communal diversities within countries do not inherently lead to politicization of the intergroup differences or discrimination. The coefficients for *Ethnic Fractionalization* and *Religious Fractionalization* are opposite in direction, and both variables fail to achieve statistical significance. The main explanatory variable, *Peacekeepers (ln)*, on the other hand, continue to exhibit a significant positive effect.

Table C.7 Logistic Regression Estimates with Non-Log-Transformed Values

|  | (C17) | (C18) | (C19) | (C20) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Peacekeepers (in 100s)$_{t-1}$ | 0.142** | 0.138*** | 0.152*** | 0.152*** |
|  | (0.056) | (0.050) | (0.052) | (0.052) |
| Autocracy | 7.547*** | 7.566*** | 7.086*** | 7.086*** |
|  | (1.464) | (1.515) | (1.338) | (1.338) |
| Anocracy | 1.370 | 1.350 | 1.217 | 1.217 |
|  | (0.920) | (0.946) | (0.918) | (0.918) |
| GDP per Capita (ln) | 0.366 | 0.373 | 0.103 | 0.103 |
|  | (0.401) | (0.424) | (0.421) | (0.421) |
| Population (ln) | -0.433 | -0.430 | -0.947** | -0.947** |
|  | (0.449) | (0.473) | (0.418) | (0.418) |
| Military Exp. per Soldier (ln) | 0.082 | 0.086 | 0.144 | 0.144 |
|  | (0.160) | (0.163) | (0.162) | (0.162) |
| Military Size (ln) | 0.004 | 0.012 | 0.233 | 0.233 |
|  | (0.327) | (0.360) | (0.382) | (0.382) |
| Ethnic Exclusion | 2.118** | 2.146** | 2.865*** | 2.865*** |
|  | (1.037) | (1.049) | (1.110) | (1.110) |
| Recent Coup Attempts |  | 0.161 | -0.116 | -0.116 |
|  |  | (0.601) | (0.618) | (0.618) |
| Interstate Conflict |  | 5.891*** | 5.506*** | 5.506*** |
|  |  | (1.559) | (1.666) | (1.666) |
| Intrastate Conflict |  | -0.080 | 0.337 | 0.337 |
|  |  | (0.596) | (0.630) | (0.630) |
| British Colony |  |  | 1.901** | 1.901** |
|  |  |  | (0.840) | (0.840) |
| French Colony |  |  | 2.171*** | 2.171*** |
|  |  |  | (0.745) | (0.745) |
| Year | 0.014 | 0.017 | 0.022 | 0.022 |
|  | (0.036) | (0.038) | (0.042) | (0.042) |
| Ethnic Stacking Years | -4.557*** | -4.556*** | -4.187*** | -4.187*** |
|  | (0.961) | (0.974) | (0.926) | (0.926) |
| Ethnic Stacking Years$^2$ | 0.254*** | 0.254*** | 0.230*** | 0.230*** |
|  | (0.058) | (0.059) | (0.058) | (0.058) |
| Ethnic Stacking Years$^3$ | -0.004*** | -0.004*** | -0.003*** | -0.003*** |
|  | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) | (0.001) |
| Constant | -23.382 | -29.367 | -32.680 | -32.680 |
|  | (69.088) | (73.228) | (82.284) | (82.284) |
| N | 1197 | 1197 | 1197 | 1197 |
| LL | -81.020 | -80.792 | -75.191 | -75.191 |
| AIC | 188.040 | 193.584 | 186.381 | 186.381 |
| BIC | 254.178 | 274.986 | 277.957 | 277.957 |
| Random Effects | No | No | No | Yes |

Logistic regressions with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses.

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Large-scale troop commitments typically hail from a small group of interested contributors. For this reason, the distribution of the actual number of peacekeeping troops is heavily right-skewed. As a result, all models so far have accounted for the effect of peacekeepers using the variable's natural-log transformation. As reported in Table C.7, Models C17-C20 employ *Peacekeepers (in 100s)*, representing the maximum monthly deployment of peacekeeping troops by countries in a given year, measured in hundreds. The variable consistently exhibits a positive and statistically significant effect on the predicted probability of *Ethnic Stacking*, which is supported at conventional levels in Model C17, and at the 99 percent confidence level across Models C18-C20.