Judicial transformation in a competitive authoritarian regime: evidence from the Turkish case

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Official URL: https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/lapo.12250

What accounts for the variation in the judiciary's ability to serve as a democratic guardrail under populist rule? This article contends that populist governments use judicial activism against their political agenda to portray courts as institutions that curtail popular sovereignty and subsequently adopt a democratizing discourse to conceal their assault on the judiciary. Based on the Turkish case under the rule of the AKP (Justice and Development Party), it explores how the judiciary's democratic deficits provided a legitimation strategy for the ruling party's gradual capture of the courts. During its initial term, the right-wing populist AKP government faced staunch opposition from high courts aligned with the secular establishment. In response, it strategically used the Turkish Constitutional Court's counter-majoritarian decisions to legitimize its actions, paving the way for court-packing and other forms of judicial manipulation through a series of constitutional amendments. These changes set a dangerous precedent for future clashes with the judiciary, hastening the erosion of Turkish democracy and the subsequent shift toward a competitive authoritarian regime.