Institutional Regulation Of Interparty Pre-Electoral Coordination In Europe: 1945-2018

Official URL: https://risc01.sabanciuniv.edu/record=b3200008

This dissertation examines changes in the formal institutional background of preelectoral alliance formation. Building on an original dataset covering 27 European countries from 1945 to 2018, it investigates Why countries modify their electoral rules that govern pre-electoral alliance formation. It also conducts a single case study on Turkey to investigate Why parties exhibit preferences over a specific type of pre-electoral alliance over others. The dissertation focuses on the motivations of political parties for modifying electoral rules, specifically those governing pre-electoral alliances. Drawing from rational choice and historical institutionalism paradigms, the research explores factors such as party system fragmentation, electoral volatility, and democratic age. The empirical analyses demonstrate that while fragmentation within a party system doesn’t directly predict changes, fragmentation within ideological clusters has a more significant impact, especially in the second largest party’s cluster. The study also highlights the role of electoral volatility, indicating that it increases the likelihood of change in alliance rules, particularly towards restrictive changes. But when volatility occurs within the ideological cluster of the second largest party, permissive changes are more likely. The dissertation’s contributions are twofold. Firstly, it presents a comprehensive comparative study of changes in rules governing pre-electoral alliance formation, shedding light on the motivations behind these changes. Secondly, it bridges the gap between the electoral reform and pre-electoral alliance literatures, offering insights into the intricate interplay between institutional design and political strategies.