title   
  

Behavioral implementation under incomplete information

Barlo, Mehmet and Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün (2023) Behavioral implementation under incomplete information. Journal of Economic Theory . ISSN 0022-0531 (Print) 1095-7235 (Online) Published Online First http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105738

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Abstract

We investigate implementation under incomplete information allowing for individuals' choices featuring violations of rationality. Our primitives are individuals' interim choices that do not have to satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preferences. In this setting, we provide necessary as well as sufficient conditions for behavioral implementation under incomplete information. We also introduce behavioral interim incentive Pareto efficiency and investigate its implementability under incomplete information.
Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Behavioral Implementation, Incomplete Information, Interim Implementation, Behavioral Interim Incentive Efficiency
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory > HB135-147 Mathematical economics. Quantitative methods
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > Academic programs > Economics
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Depositing User: Mehmet Barlo
Date Deposited: 03 Oct 2023 16:04
Last Modified: 03 Oct 2023 16:04
URI: https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/48348

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