Behavioral implementation under incomplete information

Barlo, Mehmet and Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün (2023) Behavioral implementation under incomplete information. Journal of Economic Theory, 213 . ISSN 0022-0531 (Print) 1095-7235 (Online)

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We investigate implementation under incomplete information allowing for individuals' choices featuring violations of rationality. Our primitives are individuals' interim choices that do not have to satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preferences. In this setting, we provide necessary as well as sufficient conditions for behavioral implementation under incomplete information. We also introduce behavioral interim incentive Pareto efficiency and investigate its implementability under incomplete information.
Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Behavioral implementation; Behavioral interim incentive efficiency; Incomplete information; Interim implementation
Divisions: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Depositing User: Mehmet Barlo
Date Deposited: 02 Feb 2024 15:35
Last Modified: 02 Feb 2024 15:35

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