Congruence in proportional representation systems: non-economic issue salience and coalition formation

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Official URL: https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12519

This article contributes to our understanding of democratic representation by analyzing government congruence – the gap between the positions of the government and the median voter – within proportional representation systems. Analyzing elections in non-post-communist, democratic OECD countries in the post-war period until 2014, we argue and show that the salience of non-economic issues such as national way of life and migration led to ideological incongruence indirectly through its effect on government formation by right-wing political parties. We suggest that in this period right-wing political parties that own and emphasize these issues found it easier to differentiate themselves from their ideological counterparts and join a coalition with them without being threatened by credit claiming conflicts. Since, everything else kept constant, right-wing coalitions were then more likely to emerge when such non-economic issues were salient in the party system, their probability to form when the median is located at the center was also higher, leading to higher levels of ideological incongruence overall.