Strategies of self-determination groups and economic sanctions

Official URL: https://risc01.sabanciuniv.edu/record=b2711500_(Table of contents)

While a significant body of literature has accumulated on the intentional and unintended consequences of economic sanctions, little is known about how sanctions affect various audiences in the target states. This research aims to bridge this gap by investigating how the application of this foreign policy tool influences the tactical choices of self-determination groups over the variety of nonviolent and violent tactics to achieve their intended goals. It is argued that apart from economic costs levied by the sanctions, the enforcement of sanctions sends strong signals to domestic audiences of the target. The imposition of economic sanctions is an indicator of credible international pressure on governments, which conditions expectations and behaviours of self-determination groups. For the groups in pursuit of greater self-rule, international legitimacy and recognition, foreign economic coercion increases in-group incentives to use nonviolent means of resistance. International sanctions signal that, along with the economic costs, target governments suffer reputational damage. Moreover, since peaceful tactics are considered more legitimate in the eyes of the international community, groups adjust their behavior and use nonviolent strategies after deployment of economic sanctions. The Crimean Tatar self-determination case informs our theoretical expectations. The findings drawn from large-N analysis (1960-2004) suggest that imposition of economic sanctions is associated with an increased likelihood of employing nonviolent tactics by selfdetermination groups. On the other hand, the imposed economic sanctions reduce the likelihood of using peaceful tactics by groups demanding complete independence.