Economic interdependence and civil conflict onset: an analysis on Tanzania and The Democratic Republic of Congo

Official URL: http://risc01.sabanciuniv.edu/record=b1628596 (Table of Contents)

This study aims to explicate a set of specific conditions under which colonization may lead to civil war. The specific set of conditions focus on how colonization affects the economic relations of groups within colonized states in both directions. First of all, the study examines the decision theoretic model for explaining how economic interdependency will decrease the probability of conflict. In doing so, static and dynamic formed games are introduced and the models conclude that the utility of engaging in war when groups which have symmetric endowments are higher. Therefore, when colonization monoculturizes the production of groups, the onset of war has more risk to the groups. In order to illustrate the model, the study focuses on two cases: the Arusha and Meru in Tanganyika and the Hema and Lendu in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The case of Arusha-Meru people indicates that colonization actually lead the production scheme to diversify and hence, decreases the tension between them. On the other hand, the Hema and Lendu tribes illustrate the impact of monoculturization on the onset of civil conflict.