Affirmative actions under the Boston mechanism

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Salman, Umutcan (2016) Affirmative actions under the Boston mechanism. [Thesis]

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Abstract

We consider three popular a rmative action policies in school choice: quota-based, priority-based, and reserve-based a rmative actions. The Boston mechanism (BM) is responsive to the latter two policies in that a stronger priority-based or reserve-based a rmative action makes some minority student better o . However, a stronger quotabased a rmative action may yield a Pareto inferior outcome for the minority under the BM. These positive results disappear once we look for a stronger welfare consequence on the minority or focus on BM equilibrium outcomes.
Item Type: Thesis
Uncontrolled Keywords: Matching theory. -- School choice. -- Boston mechanism. -- Affirmative action. -- Minority. -- Welfare. -- Eşleştirme teorisi. -- Okul seçimi. -- Boston mekanizması. -- Pozitif ayrımcılık. -- Azınlık. -- Refah.
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > Academic programs > Economics
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Depositing User: IC-Cataloging
Date Deposited: 20 Sep 2017 15:03
Last Modified: 26 Apr 2022 10:10
URI: https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/34007

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