Salman, Umutcan (2016) Affirmative actions under the Boston mechanism. [Thesis]
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Abstract
We consider three popular a rmative action policies in school choice: quota-based, priority-based, and reserve-based a rmative actions. The Boston mechanism (BM) is responsive to the latter two policies in that a stronger priority-based or reserve-based a rmative action makes some minority student better o . However, a stronger quotabased a rmative action may yield a Pareto inferior outcome for the minority under the BM. These positive results disappear once we look for a stronger welfare consequence on the minority or focus on BM equilibrium outcomes.
Item Type: | Thesis |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | Matching theory. -- School choice. -- Boston mechanism. -- Affirmative action. -- Minority. -- Welfare. -- Eşleştirme teorisi. -- Okul seçimi. -- Boston mekanizması. -- Pozitif ayrımcılık. -- Azınlık. -- Refah. |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Divisions: | Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > Academic programs > Economics Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences |
Depositing User: | IC-Cataloging |
Date Deposited: | 20 Sep 2017 15:03 |
Last Modified: | 26 Apr 2022 10:10 |
URI: | https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/34007 |