Alkan, Ahmet and Anbarcı, Nejat and Sarpca, Sinan (2012) An exploration in school formation: income vs. ability. Economics Letters, 117 (2). pp. 500-504. ISSN 0165-1765
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.048
Abstract
We study stable school formation among four students that differ in ability and income. In the presence of ability complementarities and school costs to be shared, we identify the conditions under which a stable allocation is efficient, inefficient, nonexistent, and tell who become peers.
Item Type: | Article |
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Uncontrolled Keywords: | School formation; Stable matching; Peer effects; Multilateral bargaining; Assortative matching |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
Divisions: | Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > Academic programs > Economics Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences |
Depositing User: | Ahmet Alkan |
Date Deposited: | 27 Nov 2012 11:17 |
Last Modified: | 26 Apr 2022 09:02 |
URI: | https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/21032 |
Available Versions of this Item
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An exploration in school formation: income vs ability. (deposited 14 Oct 2012 22:57)
- An exploration in school formation: income vs. ability. (deposited 27 Nov 2012 11:17) [Currently Displayed]