Barlo, Mehmet and Dalkiran, Nuh Aygün (2008) Epsilon-Nash Implementation. (Accepted/In Press)
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Abstract
This paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions for a social choice correspondence to be implementable via epsilon-Nash equilibrium when agents' preferences can be represented by cardinal utilities. Our results also display robustness of Maskin's seminal result on Nash implementation.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory > HB135-147 Mathematical economics. Quantitative methods |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > Academic programs > Economics |
| Depositing User: | Mehmet Barlo |
| Date Deposited: | 17 Dec 2008 08:28 |
| Last Modified: | 26 Apr 2022 08:26 |
| URI: | https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/11138 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Epsilon-Nash Implementation. (deposited 04 Nov 2008 08:52)
- Epsilon-Nash Implementation. (deposited 17 Dec 2008 08:28) [Currently Displayed]
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