Epsilon-Nash implementation

Barlo, Mehmet and Dalkıran, Aygün Nuh (2009) Epsilon-Nash implementation. Economics Letters, 102 (1). pp. 36-38. ISSN 0165-1765

This is the latest version of this item.

[thumbnail of Barlo Dalkiran (2009) - Author's Copy] PDF (Barlo Dalkiran (2009) - Author's Copy)
Restricted to Registered users only

Download (315kB) | Request a copy


This paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions for a social choice correspondence to be implementable via epsilon-Nash equilibrium when agents' preferences can be represented by cardinal utilities. Our results also display robustness of Maskin's seminal result on Nash implementation.
Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Maskin-monotonicity; Implementation; Epsilon-Nash equilibrium; Limited veto power
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory > HB135-147 Mathematical economics. Quantitative methods
Divisions: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > Academic programs > Economics
Depositing User: Mehmet Barlo
Date Deposited: 23 Jan 2009 15:23
Last Modified: 26 Apr 2022 08:27
URI: https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/11279

Available Versions of this Item

Actions (login required)

View Item
View Item