Epsilon-Nash implementation

Barlo, Mehmet and Dalkıran, Aygün Nuh (2009) Epsilon-Nash implementation. Economics Letters, 102 (1). pp. 36-38. ISSN 0165-1765

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2008.11.002

Abstract

This paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions for a social choice correspondence to be implementable via epsilon-Nash equilibrium when agents' preferences can be represented by cardinal utilities. Our results also display robustness of Maskin's seminal result on Nash implementation.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Maskin-monotonicity; Implementation; Epsilon-Nash equilibrium; Limited veto power
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory > HB135-147 Mathematical economics. Quantitative methods
Divisions:	Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > Academic programs > Economics
Depositing User:	Mehmet Barlo
Date Deposited:	23 Jan 2009 15:23
Last Modified:	26 Apr 2022 08:27
URI:	https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/11279

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Epsilon-Nash Implementation. (deposited 04 Nov 2008 08:52)
- Epsilon-Nash Implementation. (deposited 17 Dec 2008 08:28)
  - Epsilon-Nash implementation. (deposited 23 Jan 2009 15:23) [Currently Displayed]

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