Baç, Mehmet (2008) Generalized trust and wealth. (Accepted/In Press)
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Abstract
The relation between economic inequality and trust is studied in a
model where the ability to elicit trustworthiness from unrelated
people depends on own wealth as well as the distribution and mean
of population wealth. In equilibrium, the rich trust but betray
while the poor do not trust but are trustworthy. Homogenizing
wealth around its mean leads to a zero-trust outcome if mean
wealth is sufficiently low, to full trust if mean wealth is large. More effective enforcement
technologies increase, more effective counter-enforcement
technologies decrease trust. Economic inequality reinforces itself
through the trust and betray incentives it induces, suggesting a
beneficial role for redistributive policies.
Item Type: | Article |
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Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory K Law > K Law in general. Comparative and uniform law. Jurisprudence |
Divisions: | Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences |
Depositing User: | Mehmet Baç |
Date Deposited: | 19 Sep 2008 15:04 |
Last Modified: | 08 Dec 2009 16:30 |
URI: | https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/9169 |
Available Versions of this Item
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