Third-party interest, resource value, and the likelihood of conflict

Official URL: https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102635

Resource wealth induces predation incentives but also conflict-deterring third-party involvement. As a result, the relation between resource value and conflict probability is a priori unclear. This paper studies such relation with a theoretical framework involving a potential aggressor and a powerful third party. First, we show that, if the third party's incentives to intervene are sufficiently strong, conflict probability is hump-shaped in the resource value. Second, we theoretically establish that resource value increases the third party's incentive to side with the resource-rich defendant in case of intervention, providing another mechanism for stabilization when the resource value is high. Third, we explain how our theory relates to policy-relevant case studies involving conflict-ridden areas (including inter-state or civil conflicts) and powerful third parties.