Assignment maximization

Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz and Bó, Inácio and Turhan, Bertan (2023) Assignment maximization. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 25 (1). pp. 123-138. ISSN 1097-3923 (Print) 1467-9779 (Online)

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We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individuals matched to acceptable outcomes. We present two mechanisms that maximize assignments. The first is Pareto efficient and undominated—in terms of the number of assignments—in equilibrium. The second is fair for unassigned agents and assigns weakly more agents than any stable mechanism in equilibrium.
Item Type: Article
Divisions: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Depositing User: Mustafa Oğuz Afacan
Date Deposited: 06 Sep 2023 16:12
Last Modified: 06 Sep 2023 16:12

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