Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz and Bó, Inácio and Turhan, Bertan (2022) Assignment maximization. Journal of Public Economic Theory . ISSN 1097-3923 (Print) 1467-9779 (Online) Published Online First https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12602
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Official URL: https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12602
Abstract
We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individuals matched to acceptable outcomes. We present two mechanisms that maximize assignments. The first is Pareto efficient and undominated—in terms of the number of assignments—in equilibrium. The second is fair for unassigned agents and assigns weakly more agents than any stable mechanism in equilibrium.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Divisions: | Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences |
| Depositing User: | Mustafa Oğuz Afacan |
| Date Deposited: | 21 Aug 2022 15:20 |
| Last Modified: | 21 Aug 2022 15:20 |
| URI: | https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/44234 |
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