Debating the amendment-making rule: the rigidity vs. flexibility debate in the Turkish constitution-making process

Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781108596459.008

This chapter analyzes the drafting process of the constitutional amendment rule ‘Art. 146’ in the Constitutional Conciliation Commission ‘Anayasa Uzlaşma Komisyonu, AUK’ from 2011 to 2013. Examining the party proposals for the amendment-making rule and the minutes of the debates, the chapter illustrates that party proposals for Article 146 varied greatly with regard to the degree of flexibility and rigidity. In the end, the draft article produced was more flexible than the most rigid proposal and more rigid than the most flexible proposal. It largely reiterated the amendment-making rule of the 1982 Constitution after amendment in 1987. Despite the availability and active involvement of constitutional law experts who provided theoretical grounding to the arguments advanced by the AUK members, the debate surrounding the formulation of the amendment-making rule was dominated by future concerns and past disappointments. The fact that amendment making has been used in the past to impose changes to the political system and constitutional structure and the fear that amendment making could be used for power centralization and contribute to autocratization prevented full consensus.