Implementation with a sympathizer

Altun, Ozan Altuğ and Barlo, Mehmet and Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün (2020) Implementation with a sympathizer. [Working Paper / Technical Report] Sabanci University ID:UNSPECIFIED

There is a more recent version of this item available.
[thumbnail of Implementation_with_a_Sympathizer_Altun_Barlo_Dalkiran_200608.pdf] PDF

Download (560kB)


This paper considers the Nash implementation problem in which the planner does not know individuals' state-contingent choices that may involve violations of rationality. In economic environments with at least three individuals, we show that the planner may Nash implement a social choice correspondence while extracting information about individuals' state-contingent choices from the society whenever one of the individuals, whose identity is not necessarily known to the planner and the other individuals, is a weak sympathizer. Such an agent is weakly inclined toward the truthful revelation of individuals' state-contingent choices but not the \true" state. Then, in every Nash equilibrium of the mechanism we design, all individuals except one truthfully reveal the same information about individuals' choices.
Item Type: Working Paper / Technical Report
Uncontrolled Keywords: Nash Implementation; Behavioral Implementation; Consistency; Partial Honesty; Information Extraction.
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory > HB135-147 Mathematical economics. Quantitative methods
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > Academic programs > Economics
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Depositing User: Mehmet Barlo
Date Deposited: 23 Sep 2020 17:22
Last Modified: 26 Apr 2022 10:55

Available Versions of this Item

Actions (login required)

View Item
View Item