Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz and Durahim, Umut Mert (2017) When preference misreporting is harm[less]ful? Journal of Mathematical Economics, 72 . pp. 16-24. ISSN 0304-4068 Published Online First http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.04.005
![Warning](/style/images/warning.png)
There is a more recent version of this item available.
![[thumbnail of Afacan_Dur(2017)_Harmless.pdf]](https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png)
Afacan_Dur(2017)_Harmless.pdf
Restricted to Registered users only
Download (598kB) | Request a copy
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.04.005
Abstract
In a school choice problem, we say that a mechanism is harmless if no student can ever misreport his preferences so that he is not hurt but someone else is. We consider two large classes of mechanisms, which include the Boston, the agent-proposing deferred acceptance, and the school-proposing deferred
acceptance (sDA) mechanisms. Among all the rules in these two classes, the sDA is the unique harmless mechanism. We next provide two axiomatic characterizations of the sDA. First, the sDA is the unique stable, non-bossy, and ‘‘independent of an irrelevant student mechanism’’. The last axiom requires that the outcome does not depend on the presence of a student who prefers being unassigned to any school. As harmlessness implies non-bossiness, the sDA is also the unique stable, harmless, and independent of an irrelevant student mechanism. To our knowledge, these axiomatizations as well as the well-known Gale and Shapley’s (1962), which reveals that the sDA is the student-pessimal stable mechanism, are the only characterizations of the sDA.
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Uncontrolled Keywords: | Harmless; Harmful; Matching; Mechanism; Non-bossiness; Characterization |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory > HB135-147 Mathematical economics. Quantitative methods |
Divisions: | Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > Academic programs > Economics Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences |
Depositing User: | Mustafa Oğuz Afacan |
Date Deposited: | 07 Aug 2017 11:09 |
Last Modified: | 26 Apr 2022 09:46 |
URI: | https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/32675 |
Available Versions of this Item
- When preference misreporting is harm[less]ful? (deposited 07 Aug 2017 11:09) [Currently Displayed]