Bounded memory folk theorem

Barlo, Mehmet and Carmona, Guilherme and Sabourian, Hamid (2016) Bounded memory folk theorem. Journal of Economic Theory, 163 . pp. 728-774. ISSN 0022-0531 (Print) 1095-7235 (Online)

This is the latest version of this item.

[thumbnail of Barlo-Carmona-Sabourian-JET-2016.pdf] PDF
Restricted to Registered users only

Download (698kB) | Request a copy


We show that the Folk Theorem holds for n-player discounted repeated games with bounded-memory strategies. Our result requires each player's payoff to be strictly above the minmax payoff but requires neither time-dependent strategies, nor public randomization, nor communication. The type of strategies we employ to establish our result turn out to have new features that may be important in understanding repeated interactions.
Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Repeated Games; Memory; Bounded Rationality; Folk Theorem
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory > HB135-147 Mathematical economics. Quantitative methods
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > Academic programs > Economics
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Depositing User: Mehmet Barlo
Date Deposited: 16 May 2016 10:05
Last Modified: 23 Aug 2019 16:39

Available Versions of this Item

Actions (login required)

View Item
View Item