Bounded memory folk theorem

Barlo, Mehmet and Carmona, Guilherme and Sabourian, Hamid (2016) Bounded memory folk theorem. Journal of Economic Theory, 163 . pp. 728-774. ISSN 0022-0531 (Print) 1095-7235 (Online)

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.001

Abstract

We show that the Folk Theorem holds for n-player discounted repeated games with bounded-memory strategies. Our result requires each player's payoff to be strictly above the minmax payoff but requires neither time-dependent strategies, nor public randomization, nor communication. The type of strategies we employ to establish our result turn out to have new features that may be important in understanding repeated interactions.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Repeated Games; Memory; Bounded Rationality; Folk Theorem
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory > HB135-147 Mathematical economics. Quantitative methods H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions:	Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > Academic programs > Economics Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Depositing User:	Mehmet Barlo
Date Deposited:	16 May 2016 10:05
Last Modified:	23 Aug 2019 16:39
URI:	https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/29335

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The bounded memory folk theorem. (deposited 12 Oct 2011 14:06)
- The bounded memory folk theorem. (deposited 10 Dec 2012 09:18)
  - Bounded memory folk theorem. (deposited 15 Dec 2014 10:30)
    - Bounded memory folk theorem. (deposited 25 Dec 2015 17:32)
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