Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems

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Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz (2014) Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems. Economic Theory, 56 (3). pp. 493-514. ISSN 0938-2259 (Print) 1432-0479 (Online)

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Abstract

We identify a new channel through which schools can potentially manipulate the well known student and school optimal stable mechanisms. We introduce two different fictitious students creation manipulation notions where one of them is stronger. While the student and school optimal stable mechanisms turn out to be weakly fictitious student-proof under acyclic (Ergin (2002)) and essentially homogeneous (Kojima (2013)) priority structures, respectively, they still lack strong fictitious student-proofness. We then compare the mechanisms in terms of their vulnerability to manipulations in the sense of Pathak and S�onmez (2013) and find out that the student-optimal stable mechanism is more manipulable than the school-optimal one. Lastly, in the large market setting of Kojima and Pathak (2009), the student-optimal stable mechanism becomes weakly fictitious student-proof as the market is getting large.
Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: the student-optimal stable mechanism, the school-optimal stable mechanism, ctitious students, acyclicity, essential homogeneity, large market
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > Academic programs > Economics
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Depositing User: Mustafa Oğuz Afacan
Date Deposited: 22 Feb 2014 21:19
Last Modified: 02 Aug 2019 09:56
URI: https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/23992

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