Uncertainty and ratification failure

Kıbrıs, Arzu (2012) Uncertainty and ratification failure. Public Choice, 150 (3-4). pp. 439-467. ISSN 0048-5829 (Print) 1573-7101 (Online)

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I study a game where two agents bargain on an agreement to replace the status quo. For their agreement to come into e¤ect, they need the approval of a third agent. The preferences of this third agent is private information, but there is communication among agents. I study this game in the context of international agreements to provide an explanation for involuntary rati�cation failures. I show that under certain assumptions, the informational de�ciency is incurable due to incentives to misrepresent preferences, and that a parliament whose majority is more hawkish than their executive prefers the executive to be risk averse.
Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Game theory - Bargaining - Signaling games - Linkage politics - International cooperation - Incomplete information
Subjects: J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
Divisions: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > Academic programs > Political Science
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Depositing User: Arzu Kıbrıs
Date Deposited: 24 Jan 2012 11:40
Last Modified: 31 Jul 2019 09:56
URI: https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/18823

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