A revealed preference analysis of solutions to simple allocation problems

Kıbrıs, Özgür (2012) A revealed preference analysis of solutions to simple allocation problems. Theory and Decision, 72 (4). pp. 509-523. ISSN 0040-5833 (Print) ; 1573-7187 (Online)

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Abstract

We interpret solution rules on a class of simple allocation problems as data on the choices of a policy maker. We analyze conditions under which the policy maker’s choices are (i) rational (ii) transitive-rational, and (iii) representable; that is, they coincide with maximization of a (i) binary relation, (ii) transitive binary relation, and (iii) numerical function on the allocation space. Our main results are as follows: (i) a well-known property, contraction independence (a.k.a. IIA) is equivalent to rationality; (ii) every contraction independent and other-c monotonic rule is transitive-rational; and (iii) every contraction independent and other-c monotonic rule, if additionally continuous, can be represented by a numerical function.
Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Rational; Contraction independence; Weak axiom of revealed preference; Strong axiom of revealed preference; Continuity; Monotonicity
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > Academic programs > Economics
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Depositing User: Özgür Kıbrıs
Date Deposited: 12 Oct 2011 15:55
Last Modified: 26 Apr 2022 08:48
URI: https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/17129

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