Predatory pricing in competition law

Official URL: http://192.168.1.20/record=b1295928 (Table of Contents)

Predatory pricing can be described as an anticompetitive strategy, with which the predator aims to deter entry to the market or to expel other players from it, in order to gain market share and extra profits, related to the dominant position it will have. The feasibility of this strategy has been questioned by the economists and several theories about the reasons and feasibility of predation have emerged in time. In addition to that, different criteria and tests, related to these theories, have been introduced to the economics literature, to serve for predation analysis. From the beginning of 1900s on, several firms have been accused with predatory pricing charges. Competition authorities in different countries have dealt with these accusations and analyzed cases in light of the proposed criteria and tests. Most important examples came from United States and European Union exercises. It can be argued that United States competition authority followed classical economic theory arguments in their decisions, whereas European Union Commission followed modern theory arguments. This thesis examines predatory pricing in detail with its theory and real life examples from United States, European Union and Turkey. It aims to compare the approach of the competition authorities in these countries to predatory pricing, by analyzing different cases.