Alkan, Ahmet (2001) On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings. Review of Economic Design, 6 (1). pp. 99-111. ISSN 1434-4742
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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/PL00013699
Abstract
This paper studies the structure of stable multipartner matchings in
two-sided markets where choice functions are quotafilling in the sense that they
satisfy the substitutability axiom and, in addition, fill a quota whenever possible.
It is shown that (i) the set of stable matchings is a lattice under the common
revealed preference orderings of all agents on the same side, (ii) the supremum
(infimum) operation of the lattice for each side consists componentwise of the
join (meet) operation in the revealed preference ordering of the agents on that
side, and (iii) the lattice has the polarity, distributivity, complementariness and full-quota properties.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Stable matchings, revealed preference, choice function, lattice |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > Academic programs > Economics Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences |
| Depositing User: | Ahmet Alkan |
| Date Deposited: | 04 Feb 2011 09:48 |
| Last Modified: | 29 Jul 2019 14:47 |
| URI: | https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/16338 |
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