Kıbrıs, Özgür and Sertel, Murat R. (2007) Bargaining over a finite set of alternatives. Social Choice and Welfare, 28 (3). pp. 421-437. ISSN 0176-1714 (Print) 1432-217X (Online)
![[thumbnail of This is a RoMEO green publisher -- author can archive pre-print (ie pre-refereeing) and post-print (ie final draft post-refereeing)]](https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png)
PDF (This is a RoMEO green publisher -- author can archive pre-print (ie pre-refereeing) and post-print (ie final draft post-refereeing))
Bargaining.pdf
Download (344kB)
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0178-z
Abstract
We analyze bilateral bargaining over a finite set of alternatives. We look for “good” ordinal solutions to such problems and show that Unanimity Compromise and Rational Compromise are the only bargaining rules that satisfy a basic set of properties. We then extend our analysis to admit problems with countably infinite alternatives. We show that, on this class, no bargaining rule choosing finite subsets of alternatives can be neutral. When rephrased in the utility framework of Nash (1950), this implies that there is no ordinal bargaining rule that is finite-valued.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor |
| Divisions: | Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences |
| Depositing User: | Özgür Kıbrıs |
| Date Deposited: | 19 Sep 2006 03:00 |
| Last Modified: | 28 Apr 2020 13:51 |
| URI: | https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/15 |
Actions (login required)
- View Item