Fichte and the relationship between self-positing and rights

Nomer, Nedim (2010) Fichte and the relationship between self-positing and rights. Journal of History of Philosophy, 48 (4). pp. 469-490. ISSN 0022-5053 (Print) 1538-4586 (Online)

This is the latest version of this item.

[thumbnail of nomer.pdf] PDF

Download (230kB)


A common criticism of Fichte’s political thought is that it is not systematically connected to his idea of self-positing, which would amount to a rift in his practical philosophy. This criticism can be countered through an extensive analysis of Fichte’s view of rational society. This view involves not just a portrayal of the institutions essential to a just society but also an account of citizen participation. The idea here is that social and political progress derives from the people, either collectively or individually, rather than from institutions directly. This idea is crucial to recognizing the link between self-positing and membership in a political community in Fichte’s practical philosophy, because self-positing entails, I argue, participation in the determination of the social order.
Item Type: Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > Academic programs > Political Science
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Depositing User: Nedim Nomer
Date Deposited: 25 Oct 2010 14:41
Last Modified: 29 Jul 2019 09:29

Available Versions of this Item

Actions (login required)

View Item
View Item