Investor's increased shareholding due to entrepreneur-manager collusion

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Atasoy, Özgün and Barlo, Mehmet (2007) Investor's increased shareholding due to entrepreneur-manager collusion. [Working Paper / Technical Report] Sabanci University ID:SU_FASS_2007/0014

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This study presents an investor/entrepreneur model in which the entrepreneur has opportunities to manipulate the workings of the project via hidden arrangements. We provide the optimal contracts in the presence and absence of such hidden arrangements. The contracts specify the shareholding arrangement between investor and entrepreneur. Moreover, we render an exact condition necessary for the credit market to form.

Item Type:Working Paper / Technical Report
Uncontrolled Keywords:Shareholding, Collusion, Hidden--Action Problems
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
ID Code:5794
Deposited By:Mehmet Barlo
Deposited On:21 Oct 2007 21:40
Last Modified:21 Oct 2007 21:40

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