Behavioral implementation under incomplete information

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Barlo, Mehmet and Dalkıran, Nuh Aygün (2020) Behavioral implementation under incomplete information. [Working Paper / Technical Report] Sabanci University ID:UNSPECIFIED

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We investigate mechanism design under incomplete information allowing for individuals to display different behavioral biases in different states of the world. Our primitives are individual choices, which do not have to satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preferences. In this setting, we provide necessary as well as sufficient conditions for behavioral (ex-post) implementation under incomplete information.

Item Type:Working Paper / Technical Report
Uncontrolled Keywords:Behavioral Mechanism Design, Behavioral Implementation, Incomplete Information, Bounded Rationality, Ex-Post Implementation
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory > HB135-147 Mathematical economics. Quantitative methods
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
ID Code:41313
Deposited By:Mehmet Barlo
Deposited On:20 Feb 2021 18:57
Last Modified:20 Feb 2021 18:57

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