On the choice of a public good for agents with double-peaked preferences

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Küçükbaş, Oğuz (2017) On the choice of a public good for agents with double-peaked preferences. [Thesis]

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Official URL: http://risc01.sabanciuniv.edu/record=b1669290 (Table of Contents)


We study the problem of choosing the location of a public good on a finite interval when agents have double-peaked preferences. A preference relation is double-peaked when an agent has two most preferred spots and her location is his least preferred in between these two spots. We assume that the locations of the agents are observable and agents report only their most preferred spots. We characterize strategy-proof mechanisms, and show that there is no strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism for this problem. We also show that our results still hold when we replace the assumption of a finite interval with the continuity of the mechanism. Additionally, we discuss the consequences of dropping the assumption that the locations are observable, and the possibility of strategy-proof mechanisms that use the whole preference relations of the agents.

Item Type:Thesis
Additional Information:Yükseköğretim Kurulu Tez Merkezi Tez No: 483284.
Uncontrolled Keywords:Social choice theory. -- Voting mechanisms. -- Strategy-proofness. -- Double-peaked preferences. -- Sosyal seçim kuramı. -- Oylama mekanizmaları. -- Manipüle edilemezlik. -- Çift tepeli tercihler.
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
ID Code:34780
Deposited By:IC-Cataloging
Deposited On:10 May 2018 15:59
Last Modified:28 Apr 2020 13:56

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