Optimal supervision intensity, collusion and the organization of work

Warning The system is temporarily closed to updates for reporting purpose.

Baç, Mehmet (2006) Optimal supervision intensity, collusion and the organization of work. (Accepted/In Press)

WarningThere is a more recent version of this item available.

[img]PDF - Registered users only - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader

Official URL: http://digital.sabanciuniv.edu/elitfulltext/offcampus/3011800000264a.pdf


The intensity of supervision. Defined as the proportion of supervisors to bottom-rank productive workers, differs widely across organizations and nations. Analyzing three monitoring systems that differ in their supervision intensity, I show that the possibility of collective shirking arrangements can impose a system- dependent limit on the range of implementable performances. This brings about a tradeoff in the choice of the monitoring systems: the system that economizes on incentive costs may implement an inferior range of performances. Application of the model generate work-disutility-, ethics and job-characteristics-based explanations for variations in the intensity of supervision.

Item Type:Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:Monitoring hierarchy; collusion; implementation; incentives
Subjects:K Law > K Law in general. Comparative and uniform law. Jurisprudence
ID Code:31
Deposited By:Mehmet Baç
Deposited On:30 Jan 2007 02:00
Last Modified:23 Sep 2009 12:22

Available Versions of this Item

Repository Staff Only: item control page