Optimal supervision intensity, collusion and the organization of work

Baç, Mehmet (2007) Optimal supervision intensity, collusion and the organization of work. Canadian Journal of Economics, 40 (1). pp. 317-339. ISSN 0008-4085

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The intensity of supervision, defined as the proportion of supervisors to bottom-rank productive workers, differs widely across organizations and nations. Analysing three monitoring systems that differ in their supervision intensity, I show that the possibility of collective shirking arrangements can impose a system-dependent limit on the range of implementable performances. This brings about a tradeoff in the choice of the monitoring system: the system that economizes on incentive costs may implement an inferior range of performances. Applications of the model generate work-disutility-, ethics- and job-characteristics-based explanations for variations in the intensity of supervision.
Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Monitoring hierarchy; collusion; implementation; incentives
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
K Law > K Law in general. Comparative and uniform law. Jurisprudence
Divisions: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Depositing User: Mehmet Baç
Date Deposited: 23 Oct 2007 20:37
Last Modified: 26 Apr 2022 08:14
URI: https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/5401

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