The accession games: a comparison of three limited-information negotiation designs

Kıbrıs, Arzu and Müftüler-Baç, Meltem (2010) The accession games: a comparison of three limited-information negotiation designs. (Accepted/In Press)

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We analyze the European Union enlargement process from a rational institutionalist perspective and argue that the accession negotiations are designed to resolve the uncertainty that the existing EU members have in terms of the candidate’s preferences. We model the negotiations as a Bayesian game and demonstrate how exactly the design in place helps the Union in gathering information about the candidate country. Our model also enables us to compare alternative negotiation designs in terms of their ability to alleviate informational problems. We compare the resulting equilibrium payo¤s under di¤erent negotiation designs to see whether there is any ground for a player to prefer a particular design over others. Our analysis supports the earlier arguments in the literature about the informative role of accession negotiations, and demonstates how exactly the negotiations carry out this role.

Item Type:Article
Subjects:J Political Science > JA Political science (General)
J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe)
ID Code:16170
Deposited By:Arzu Kıbrıs
Deposited On:17 Dec 2010 10:38
Last Modified:29 Jul 2019 12:49

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