Graduated penalty scheme

Warning The system is temporarily closed to updates for reporting purpose.

Baç, Mehmet and Bag, Parimal Kanti (2009) Graduated penalty scheme. International Review of Law and Economics, 29 (4). pp. 281-289. ISSN 0144-8188

This is the latest version of this item.

PDF (accepted for publication (pdf file)) - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader

Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2009.07.001


Evaders of any dues such as local council tax, motor vehicle tax, tv license fees etc., if detected, can pay promptly the dues plus any fine or postpone, which usually means a larger fine, and potentially imprisonment if payments are not made in full. We provide a rationale for this graduated penalty scheme, based on criminal tracking costs. Although in conflict with the state's basic objective of deterring evasion, a graduated penalty scheme may emerge as an optimum balance between the dual objectives of deterrence and settlement delay minimization. The analysis also offers insights as to the types of citizens especially responsive to a graduated penalty scheme.

Item Type:Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:Evasion/crime; Fine default; Graduated penalty
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
K Law > K Law in general. Comparative and uniform law. Jurisprudence
ID Code:13464
Deposited By:Mehmet Baç
Deposited On:09 Dec 2009 10:12
Last Modified:25 May 2011 14:19

Available Versions of this Item

Repository Staff Only: item control page