Epsilon-Nash implementation

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Barlo, Mehmet and Dalkıran, Aygün Nuh (2009) Epsilon-Nash implementation. Economics Letters, 102 (1). pp. 36-38. ISSN 0165-1765

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2008.11.002


This paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions for a social choice correspondence to be implementable via epsilon-Nash equilibrium when agents' preferences can be represented by cardinal utilities. Our results also display robustness of Maskin's seminal result on Nash implementation.

Item Type:Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:Maskin-monotonicity; Implementation; Epsilon-Nash equilibrium; Limited veto power
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory > HB135-147 Mathematical economics. Quantitative methods
ID Code:11279
Deposited By:Mehmet Barlo
Deposited On:23 Jan 2009 15:23
Last Modified:22 Jul 2019 14:50

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