An exploration in school formation: income vs. ability

Alkan, Ahmet and Anbarcı, Nejat and Sarpca, Sinan (2012) An exploration in school formation: income vs. ability. Economics Letters, 117 (2). pp. 500-504. ISSN 0165-1765

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.048


We study stable school formation among four students that differ in ability and income. In the presence of ability complementarities and school costs to be shared, we identify the conditions under which a stable allocation is efficient, inefficient, nonexistent, and tell who become peers.

Item Type:Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:School formation; Stable matching; Peer effects; Multilateral bargaining; Assortative matching
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
ID Code:21032
Deposited By:Ahmet Alkan
Deposited On:27 Nov 2012 11:17
Last Modified:01 Aug 2019 09:52

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