Epsilon-Nash Implementation

Barlo, Mehmet and Dalkiran, Nuh Aygün (2008) Epsilon-Nash Implementation. (Accepted/In Press)

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This paper provides necessary and sufficient conditions for a social choice correspondence to be implementable via epsilon-Nash equilibrium when agents' preferences can be represented by cardinal utilities. Our results also display robustness of Maskin's seminal result on Nash implementation.

Item Type:Article
Subjects:H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory > HB135-147 Mathematical economics. Quantitative methods
ID Code:11138
Deposited By:Mehmet Barlo
Deposited On:17 Dec 2008 08:28
Last Modified:22 Jul 2019 12:55

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