Investor's increased shareholding due to entrepreneur-manager collusion

Atasoy, Özgün and Barlo, Mehmet (2007) Investor's increased shareholding due to entrepreneur-manager collusion. [Working Paper / Technical Report] Sabanci University ID:SU_FASS_2007/0014

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This study presents an investor/entrepreneur model in which the entrepreneur has opportunities to manipulate the workings of the project via hidden arrangements. We provide the optimal contracts in the presence and absence of such hidden arrangements. The contracts specify the shareholding arrangement between investor and entrepreneur. Moreover, we render an exact condition necessary for the credit market to form.
Item Type: Working Paper / Technical Report
Uncontrolled Keywords: Shareholding, Collusion, Hidden--Action Problems
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Depositing User: Mehmet Barlo
Date Deposited: 21 Oct 2007 21:40
Last Modified: 26 Apr 2022 10:45

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