Opinion expressions under social sanctions

Baç, Mehmet (2014) Opinion expressions under social sanctions. International Review of Law and Economics, 38 . pp. 58-71. ISSN 0144-8188 (Print) 1873-6394 (Online)

This is the latest version of this item.

[thumbnail of scientific article] PDF (scientific article)
Restricted to Registered users only

Download (197kB) | Request a copy


I study a social debate where individuals are subject to informal sanctions if their expressions or silence signal the opinions of a minority group. Individual preferences are peaked at the expression of true opinions and there is a loss of utility from keeping silent. The model generates predictions about how equilibrium expressions change as a function of model primitives such as sanction intensity, disutility of silence and size of the minority group. A dynamic extension sheds light on the limit distribution of opinions if unvoiced opinions gradually disappear while publicly expressed opinions gain new adherents over time.
Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Bayesian equilibrium; Norms; Opinion expression; Social sanctions
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HM Sociology
Divisions: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > Academic programs > Economics
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Depositing User: Mehmet Baç
Date Deposited: 12 Feb 2024 11:17
Last Modified: 12 Feb 2024 11:17
URI: https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/48973

Available Versions of this Item

Actions (login required)

View Item
View Item