Transnational crimes: how nations should cooperate and why they don't

Baç, Mehmet (2023) Transnational crimes: how nations should cooperate and why they don't. Scandinavian Journal of Economics . ISSN 0347-0520 (Print) 1467-9442 (Online) Published Online First

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Chain-form crime partnerships and intelligence sharing by national authorities to detect cross-border partners create multiple externalities in the combat against transnational crimes and illicit trafficking. Cooperative enforcements that minimize global harms prioritize the country with lower intelligence production and/or superior detection capability. In equilibrium, as in practice, national enforcements are underbudgeted and might prioritize the wrong side – predominantly the high-budget, high-harm country. Governments might not share intelligence out of fear of importing enforcement burden, and harmonizing criminal sanctions alone might not be effective. Shocks on crime deterrence in a target country are first absorbed by source countries, implying weaker horizontal crime transfer effects than projected.
Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: budget allocation; enforcement externalities; Harm minimization; illicit trafficking; intelligence sharing; terrorism
Divisions: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Depositing User: Mehmet Baç
Date Deposited: 02 Sep 2023 17:23
Last Modified: 02 Sep 2023 17:23

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