Quid pro quo harassment, contracts and liability

Baç, Mehmet (2023) Quid pro quo harassment, contracts and liability. Canadian Journal of Economics, 56 (1). pp. 24-45. ISSN 0008-4085 (Print) 1540-5982 (Online)

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This paper identifies two channels through which contracts induce performance and contain quid pro quo harassment: a disincentive effect raises the cost for harassers and a selection effect that attracts whistleblower types raises potential victims' resistance. An effective employer liability generates a negative relationship between wages and harassment risk. If liability is ineffective, however, employers can opt for low-wage contracts that induce high harassment and minimum internal complaints. In such environments, wages compensate exogenous harassment risks. Thus the wage-harassment risk equation can signal effectiveness of employer liability.
Item Type: Article
Divisions: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > Academic programs > Economics
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Depositing User: Mehmet Baç
Date Deposited: 21 Mar 2023 10:56
Last Modified: 21 Mar 2023 10:56
URI: https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/45396

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