Strategy-proof size improvement: is it possible?

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Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz and Dur, Umut (2022) Strategy-proof size improvement: is it possible? Scandinavian Journal of Economics . ISSN 0347-0520 (Print) 1467-9442 (Online) Published Online First https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/sjoe.12515

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Abstract

The number of assigned agents—“size”—is an important parameter in object allocations. While size maximality clashes with individual rationality and strategy-proofness, it can still be possible to increase the size over a mechanism while keeping these properties. To pursue this research, we devise a size comparison criterion to investigate the possibility of size increase. A mechanism ψ size-wise dominates another mechanism φ if the latter never assigns more agents than the former, and at some problem, ψ assigns more agents than φ. We obtain arguably mild conditions for a mechanism to be size-wise undominated by an individually rational and strategy-proof mechanism. Moreover, whenever there are at least as many objects as the total number of agents, we find conditions, different from those previously mentioned, for a mechanism to be size-wise undominated by an individually rational and group strategy-proof mechanism. These results have implications for deferred-acceptance, top trading cycles, efficiency-adjusted deferred-acceptance, serial dictatorship, and Boston mechanisms.
Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Equilibrium; Matching; Mechanism; Size; Strategy-proofness
Divisions: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Depositing User: Mustafa Oğuz Afacan
Date Deposited: 17 Apr 2023 11:48
Last Modified: 17 Apr 2023 11:48
URI: https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/id/eprint/45380

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