Third-party interest, resource value, and the likelihood of conflict

Battiston, Giacomo and Bizzarri, Matteo and Franceschin, Riccardo (2022) Third-party interest, resource value, and the likelihood of conflict. [Working Paper / Technical Report] Sabanci University ID:Working Paper No.631

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Resource wealth induces predation incentives but also conflict-deterring third-party involvement. As a result, the relation between resource value and conflict probability is a priori unclear. This paper studies such relation with a flexible theoretical framework involving a resource holder, a predator, and a powerful third party. First, we show that, if third-party incentives to intervene are sufficiently strong, conflict probability is hump-shaped in the resource value. Second, we theoretically establish that resource value increases the third party's incentive to side with the resource-rich defendant in case of intervention, providing another mechanism for stabilization when the resource value is high. Third, exploiting widely-used measures of resource value and geologic predictors of oil presence, we provide evidence for our theoretical results. Using data on military bases and arms' trade, we show suggestive evidence that US military inuence drives a non-monotonicity of conflict probability in oil value.
Item Type: Working Paper / Technical Report
Uncontrolled Keywords: conflict, resource curse, third party, oil, intervention
Divisions: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Depositing User: Riccardo Franceschin
Date Deposited: 09 Oct 2022 16:56
Last Modified: 09 Oct 2022 16:56

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