Arbiter assignment

Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz and Anbarci, Nejat and Kıbrıs, Özgür (2022) Arbiter assignment. [Working Paper / Technical Report] Sabanci University ID:UNSPECIFIED

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In dispute resolution, arbitrator assignments are decentralized and they incorporate parties’ preferences, in total contrast to referee assignments in sports. We suggest that there can be gains (i) in dispute resolution from centralizing the allocation by bundling the newly arriving cases, and (ii) in sports from incorporating teams’ preferences. To that end, we introduce a class of Arbiter Assignment Problems where a set of matches (e.g., disputes or games), each made up of two agents, are to be assigned arbiters (e.g., arbitrators or referees). In this new set of problems, the question of how agents in a match should compromise becomes critical. To evaluate the value of an arbiter for a match, we introduce the (Rawlsian) notion of depth, defined as the arbiter’s worst position in the two agents’ rankings. Depth optimal assignments minimize depth over matches, and they are Pareto optimal. We first introduce and analyze depth optimal (and fair) mechanisms. We then propose and study strategy-proof mechanisms.
Item Type: Working Paper / Technical Report
Uncontrolled Keywords: Arbiter, arbitration, assignment, depth optimality, dispute resolution, fairness, football, mechanism, referee, sports, strategy-proofness, unanimity compromise
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > Academic programs > Economics
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Depositing User: Özgür Kıbrıs
Date Deposited: 04 Oct 2022 16:32
Last Modified: 04 Oct 2022 16:32

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