Matching with contracts under status quo

Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz (2022) Matching with contracts under status quo. [Working Paper / Technical Report] Sabanci University ID:UNSPECIFIED

[thumbnail of Matching_Contracts_SQ.pdf] PDF
Restricted to Registered users only

Download (415kB) | Request a copy


We consider a matching with contracts problem where there is an initial matching a priori. Both sides of the market can veto the new matching whenever they would rather keep their initial contract. We propose a stability notion, called ``conditional stability." Our first mechanism---``Non-Vetoed Deferred Acceptance" ($NDA$)---is non-vetoed, conditionally stable, and strategy-proof. These three properties are incompatible with (two-sided) constrained efficiency; hence $NDA$ is not constrained efficient. However, no mechanism that is non-vetoed, conditionally stable, and strategy-proof improves on $NDA$. Lastly, we propose a non-vetoed, conditionally stable, and constrained efficient mechanism that dominates $NDA$.
Item Type: Working Paper / Technical Report
Uncontrolled Keywords: Non-vetoed, conditional stability, efficiency, matching, mechanism, strategyproofness
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > Academic programs > Economics
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Depositing User: Mustafa Oğuz Afacan
Date Deposited: 05 Oct 2022 11:19
Last Modified: 05 Oct 2022 11:19

Actions (login required)

View Item
View Item