School choice with vouchers

Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz (2019) School choice with vouchers. Journal of Economic Theory, 179 . pp. 57-72. ISSN 0022-0531 (Print) 1095-7235 (Online)

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We introduce a novel school-choice with vouchers model. A feasibility notion is defined to incorporate the constraint that students from low-income families need a voucher to go to a private school. We then introduce a stability notion, while emphasizing that the traditional school-choice model and usual stability notion are realized as a special case of our formulation. A class of feasible, stable, and constrained efficient mechanisms is proposed. However, feasibility and stability are incompatible with strategy-proofness in the sense that no mechanism is feasible, stable, and strategy-proof at the same time, implying that any mechanism in our class is manipulable. Given the efficiency and strategic disadvantages of stability, as an alternative solution, we introduce a feasible, efficient, and strategy-proof mechanism. Lastly, we provide a comparative statics analysis.
Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Voucher; School choice; Matching; Stability; Efficiency; Strategy-proofness
Divisions: Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences > Academic programs > Economics
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences
Depositing User: Mustafa Oğuz Afacan
Date Deposited: 15 Feb 2019 15:33
Last Modified: 06 Jun 2023 14:42

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